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ABSTRACT 
The thesis deals with the party journalism of the years 
1710-1712 as it concerned Marlborough, relating it to its political 
context and discussing the techniques of controversy employed. 
The introduction outlines Marlborough's popular status 
during the earlier years of Anne's reign, the uneasiness aroused by 
his family's monopoly of royal favour, the growing discontent with 
the war, despite his repeated victories, and Marlborough's personal 
reactions to such criticism. 
The first three chapters concern the issues arising from 
the ministerial changes and General Election of 1710, measures which 
many pamphleteers justified by censuring Marlborough's abuse of royal 
favour and conduct as general and plenipotentiary. The important 
contribution of Marlborough's principal apologist, Francis Hare, to 
this latter controversy is discussed in detail. Chapter III demonstrates 
that journalistic. pressure was also a determining factor in Marlborough's 
retention of his command under the new ministry. 
Chapters IV to'VI trace the efforts of Marlborough's 
Journalistic supporters during his last campaign to make his continuing 
military success the spearhead of their opposition to the ministry's secret 
peace negotiations, a procedure more favoured by the Duchess of 
Marlborough than by the Duke, and culminating at the end of 1711 in 
major ministerial press attacks on the latter and finally in his 
3. 
dismissal on charges of financial malpractice. 
The last two chapters describe the controversies of the year 
following Marlborough's dismissal, including the journalists' 
unscrupulous exploitation of the peculation charges, and the numerous 
publications purporting to expose plots of Marlborough's devising 
against the Queen and ministry. The difficulties facing his defenders 
and the effect of this massive and damaging press campaign on the 
Duke himself are also examined. 
An epilogue deals briefly with journalistic reactions to 
Marlborough's period of self-exile on the Continent from December 
1712 until August 1714. 
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NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Dating 
The English calendar at the period covered by this thesis was 
eleven days behind the Continental. For letters written, and events 
happening in England, Old Style dates only have been given, while 
for letters written from the Continent, the alternative date has been 
added (e. g., 11/22 June 1710). 
Some letters, pamphlets, and newspapers written or published 
between 1 January and 25 March of a given year bear the date of the 
previous year, according to the Old Style practice of beginning the 
new year on 25 March. In such cases, the actual date according to 
modern usage has been added (e. g., 10 January 1712/3). Such additions 
have not been enclosed in square brackets. 
In cases where the exact publication date of a pamphlet can be 
ascertained with reasonable accuracy (e. g., from advertisements in 
newspapers), this has been given, usually after the first citing of 
the work in the notes, and followed by the source of information. All 
newspaper advertisements cited in this connection refer to pamphlets 
published "this day" except where otherwise stated. 
Citing of Printed Works 
In both the notes and the bibliography, titles have been cited 
with their original spelling, but capitalization and punctuation have 
been regularized. The place of publication is specified only where it 
is not London, and all references are to the first edition of the work, 
except where otherwise indicated. As a rule, short titles only have 
been given in the notes, fuller titles being reserved for the bibliography. 
In addition, the following abbreviations and short forms have 
been used in the notes for frequently cited references: 
Add. MSS Additional MSS 
B. I. H. R. Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research. 
B. M. British Library, Reference Division, 
Departments of Printed Books and Manuscripts 
( at the British Museum). 
Bolingbroke Corr, Letters and Correspondence, Public and 
Private, of the Right Honourable Henry St 
John, Lord Visc. Bolingbroke, -during the 
Time He Was Secreatary of State to Queen 
Anne, ed. Gilbert Parke. 1796.4 vols. 
Churchill Winston S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life 
and Times. 1947.2 vols. 
Coxe William Coxe, Memoirs of the Duke of Marlbo: 
with His Original Correspondence, revised b; 
, John Wade. 1 47-1 4.3 vols. 
Dispatches The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill 
First Duke of Marlborough from 1702 to 1712, 
ed. Sir George Murray. 1645.5 vols. 
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Heinsius Corr. The Correspondence, 1701-1711, of John Churchill 
First Duke of Marlborough and Anthonie Heinsius, 
Grand Pensionary of Holland, ed. B. van't Hoff. 
The Hague, 1951. 
H. J. Historical Journal 
H. L. . Huntington Library Quarterly. 
H. M. C. Historical Manuscripts Commission. Reports in the 
notes are cited with this abbreviation, followed 
by the name of the owner of the manuscripts 
fi (e, g., H. M. C. Hare MSS); fuller details are given 
in the bibliography. 
J. S. A. H. R. Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. l1 
Moore, Checklist John Robert Moore, A Checklist of the Writings of 
Daniel Defoe. 2nd edn., Hamden, Conn., 1971. 
Morgan, Bibliography William Thomas and. Chloe Siner Morgan, A 
Bibliography of British History 1700-1715" 
Bloomington, 1934-1942.5 vols. 
Oldmixon, Maynwaring 
. 
John 0ldmixonJ, The Life and Posthumous Works 
of Arthur Maynwaring, Esq. 1715. 
Political State The Political State of Great Britain, ed. Abel 
Boyer. Vols. I-VIII (1711-1714)o 
Private Corr. Private Correspondence of Sarah, Duchess of 
Aßarlborough. 2nd edn., 1838.2 vols. 
P. R. O. S. P. Public Record Office, State Papers. 
R. O. Record Office. 
s. sh. Single sheet publication, printed on one side or 
both sides. 
Swift, Prose Works The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. Herbert 
Davis, . et al . Oxford] 1939-1968.14 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of 1713, John Vanbrugh complained, in a 
letter which got him into a good deal of trouble, of 'the continual 
plague, and bitter persecution'' which the Duke of Marlborough had 
"most barbarously been followed with, for two years past"; later 
explaining that he referred to the "pamphlets, newspapers, and stories, 
which daily galled him. "1 Marlborough's most systematic apologist, 
i s. 
Francis Hare, noted a little more accurately at the end of 1710, that 
this material had begun to appear in quantity about six months before. 
2 
While no biography of Marlborough is without some reference 
to this press campaign, the subject has never been studied in detail. 
Michael Foot's account, The Pen and the Sword (1957), concentrates 
largely on Swift's contribution which, though important, was in volume 
only a fraction of the whole; and since Swift wrote little against the 
Duke after his dismissal at the end of 1711, Mr. Foot also concludes at 
this point, though the controversy itself continued fiercely throughout 
the following year. In general, much less has been heard of 
Marlborough's journalistic defenders than of his attackers; yet the 
productions of the former were not only of importance in their own 
right, but frequently determined the timing and content of hostile 
publications. 
The present study is concerned with the mass of propaganda, 
both hostile and favourable to IMarlborough, published between 1710 and 
the end of 1712 -- some two hundred and fifty pamphlets, broadsides, 
X04 
and periodicals in all. The controversy was not of course rigidly 
confined within these time-limits. Marlborough was no stranger to 
press attack before the fall of the Whig ministry in 1710, and his 
departure into self-imposed exile on the Continent two and a half years 
later did not put an abrupt end to it. Nevertheless, as the comments 
of Vanbrugh and Hare suggest, it was during this period that the pamphlet 
war was at its height and, on the Tory side, most closely co-ordinated 
with the policy of Oxford's ministry towards Marlborough. This 
propaganda is important historically because of the influence it can 
be shown to have had on the career of one of the greatest figures of 
Queen Anne's reign, and consequently on the political and international 
events in which he was involved; and since this was also one of the 
major press campaigns of a period remarkable for the volume and ferocity 
of its "paper wars, " the tracing of its successive stages provides a 
framework in which the journalists and their techniques can be studied 
closely in action. 
Vanbrugh's term, "persecution, " is a challenging one and, if 
applied indiscriminately to all hostile publications, misleading. It 
has been pointed out that Whig expressions of indignation at Marlborough's 
treatment are as suspect as Tory abuse; that Marlborough's military 
successes had made him "a political power in the Whig opposition, " and 
the use of the press to discredit him, after "the accustomed manner of 
the day, " was therefore "an essential step in achieving the Tory peace. 
0 
It is certainly true that the Tory attacks on Marlborough were politically 
I/. 
motivated; many of his defenders were to acknowledge this quite freely. 
It is also true that professional and personal disparagement in the press 
was an occupational hazard from which few of the public figures of Queen 
Anne's reign were completely exempt. Yet Marlborough's treatment was 
exceptional-even by the standards of the day, and there were times, 
especially after his dismissal, when the outrage of his supporters was 
not without foundation. Those who favoured the ministry's policies, 
but remained sufficiently unbiassed to question the strict truth of 
many of the press attacks on its greatest opponent, might have salved 
their consciences with something resembling Arbuthnot's definition of 
the political lie "Detractory or Defamatory": that "which takes from 
a Great Man the Reputation that justly belongs to him, for fear he 
should use it to the Detriment of the Publick. "4 But to Marlborough's 
sympathizers, who believed that the measures he opposed were pernicious, 
this would naturally have seemed no justification at all. 
Nevertheless, it must be said in fairness to Swift and his 
associates, that the initiative did not always lie with Marlborough's 
detractors. At times, most notably during the campaign of 1711, he 
suffered as much from the activities of his own supporters, who made 
his name and reputation the spearhead of their opposition to the ministry, 
as from the unprovoked hostility of Tory persecutors. In fact, the 
motives of the pamphleteers of both sides, and the reasons for the 
success or failure of their propaganda, can only be fully understood if 
the controversy is followed step by step, in relation to the political 
I'Z. 
conflicts which gave rise to it. However, in view of the quantity 
of material involved, and the many existing studies of Marlborough's 
career and of the reign as a whole, I have chosen in this thesis to 
discuss' these contemporary issues as they arise from an examination 
of the propaganda itself, and as they bear directly on an understanding 
of it, rather than to examine each individual publication. in the context 
of a detailed and strictly chronological narrative of events. 
Although Marlborough's worst ordeal began with the downfall 
of the Whig ministry in 1710, many of the weaknesses which the Tory 
journalists then proceeded to exploit had been inherent in his position 
for some years. It has been suggested that one reason for Marlborough's 
sensitivity to press attack after the advent of Swift was his inability 
to adjust to the role of satiric victim after the "cascades of eulogy" 
to which he had so long been accustomed. 
5 But although the volume of 
panegyric was very large, it had never entirely precluded detraction. 
In fact, one historian has gone to the opposite extreme and concluded, 
from the determined Tory belittlement of Marlborough's greatest achieve- 
meats, that he had been "one of the most unpopular men in England" even 
6 
at the height of his success. G. M. Trevelyan accepts, in a modified 
form, this inability to command widespread popularity, explaining Tory 
hostility and Whig indifference in terms of a failure to give undivided 
allegiance to either party. He suggests also that a baffling reticence 
_ý 
and a certain want of personal magnetism in Marlborough made it easy for 
'3, 
his political opponents to destroy his hold on the affections of the 
common people. 
Political allegiances were certainly at the root of the 
problem. In 1711, a more impartial writer commented disgustedly, 
It has sometimes turn'd my very Bowels within me, and made 
me even sick to see the nauseous Effects of weighing Men in 
Party-Scale; to see Bearded Men with grave Faces, putting 
in the Trifles of their Side against Actions of unparallel'd 
Importance, and Golden Solidity on the other; and declaring 
the over Ballance in Favour of the former ...: to bear their fulsome Encomiums of worthless Wretches, their shameless 
Invectives againg [sic] glaring Merit, their vain and 
inconsistent Determinations concerning the very same Persons 
and Actions. With what different and contrary Measure have 
they on each Side taken the Height of the D- of M-., according 
as fresher Discoveries ... have brought either Side accounts 
of his being more or less theirs ..: 
8 
The fact was that Marlborough, finding himself fundamentally at odds 
with the Tories on questions of strategy, had been compelled to rely 
increasingly on the Whigs for political support, thereby alienating 
their opponents still further; yet his reluctance to commit himself- 
whole-heartedly to the Whig cause and-the Junto's pretensions to power 
at times engendered, not merely indifference, but a hostility as bitter 
as the Tories'. 
After the disappointing campaign of 1705, for example, a 
controversial pamphlet accused Marlborough of deliberately neglecting 
the opportunity for a decisive victory and casting the blame on the 
Allies, in the hope that he would be given a more absolute command and 
so be enabled to sell his country into a dishonourable peace with France. 
Failing this, it was suggested, he would prolong the war to reimburse 
14 
himself for the lost opportunities for gain. Tory malice could not 
have contrived a more ingenious indictment, yet the pamphlet was the 
work of a well-known Whig propagandist, possibly influenced by prominent 
Whig patrons, who feared that Marlborough was leaning towards the high 
Tories. 9 It is also notable-that between the years 1704 and 1708, the 
party organ whose criticism most persistently galled Marlborough and his 
staff was the arch-Whig Observator. 
10 During the winter of 1707/8, 
when the Junto was bringing pressure to bear on the ministers for 
admission to the Cabinet, successive issues of the journal accused 
Marlborough of engrossing royal favour, prolonging the war to enrich 
himself, misapplying the public money, and in all respects laying the 
foundations of a Cromwellian dictatorship; it was even hinted that he 
would be called to account officially for these crimes. 
11 
This selection of criticism suggests weaknesses in Marlborough's 
circumstances and character more serious than a simple lack of personal 
magnetism. In particular, the privileged position to which he had 
succeeded when Queen Anne came to the throne was an open invitation to 
detraction. In 1704, Defoe had noted that "the Nation is Particularly 
Jealous of Favourites, " and had cited several examples of the breed, who 
all Incur'd the Displeasure of the people by One Crime, 
Persueing Their Private Intrest, Enriching and Aggrandizeing 
themselves and Familyes, and Raiseing Vast Estates Out of the 
Spoils of the Publick, and by Their Princes favour heaping up 
Honors and Titles to Themselves from Mean Originalls. 12 
The traditional stigma was fixed on Marlborough and his wife in every 
detail before the Queen had been twelve months on the throne. Rewards 
1S 
bestowed on him after his campaign drew an almost incoherent tirade 
from the aged=John Evelyn: 
After: th [ej excesse of honors conferred by the Queene on the 
E. of Marborow, to make him a knight of the Garter, & Duke for 
the successe of but one Campagne, [that] he should desire 
5000 pounds a yeare out of the Post-office to be settled on 
him was by the parliament thought a bold & unadvised request, 
who had besides his owne considerable Estate, above 30000 
pounds per Ann in places & Employments, with 50000 at Interest: 
His Wife also (whose originall & his every body knew, & by 
what merit become such favorite, for his sister was a Miss 
to K. James the 2d when Duke of York, his Father but a cleark 
of the Green-Cloth,. ingrossing all that stirred & was 
profitable at Court ... ) Thus suddainly rising was taken 
notice of & displeased those who had him til now in great 
esteeme ... 
And others, as well as Evelyn, remarked on Marlborough's desertion 
of James II at the Revolution, as a particularly flagrant example 
13 
of his abuse of the royal favour to which he owed his advancement. 
The prejudice against the Marlboroughs (Ming John" and "Queen 
Zarah") as all-engrossing royal favourites was common to both Whig 
and Tory, and recognized as the one thing capable of drawing down on 
the Duke the Envy of the People of En glandI despite his spectacular 
success as Captain-General. 
14 Misgiving increased when an estate, with 
the promise of a palace at royal expense, was bestowed on him after the 
Blenheim campaign. "Great is the man, and great have been his actions, " 
an observer commented, "but all these favours create enemies. The 
Duchess, however, and the Lord Treasurer being linked together, and 
favourites of the Queen, nothing stands in their way, though it be 
never so much regretted. '"15 
A related source of uneasiness was Marlborough's prevailing 
moral frailty. What his admirers might interpret as frugality or 
16. 
acquisitiveness, was to his enemies the sin of avarice or covetousness, 
condemned by Christian moralist and philosopher alike, guaranteed to 
engage the "Mortall Aversion" of the populace, and supposedly quite 
incompatible with a truly heroic nature. 
16 This foible undoubtedly 
made serious inroads on Marlborough's prestige. A foreign visitor to 
the capital in the summer of 1710 was shocked to witness a frenzied 
exhibition of popular antagonisms to the Duke, occasioned only by a 
ballad concerning his miserly habits. 
17 Such recognition of the 
failing was the more dangerous because of the inferences which could 
plausibly be drawn from it concerning his conduct in public life. 
"His sordid avarice is the root of all evil, " Harley wrote in 1708, 
of what he conceived to be Marlborough's neglect of a favourable 
opportunity to conclude the var. 1$ 
Whether or not Marlborough's enemies could raise sufficient 
resentment against him on these counts to destroy the prestige of his 
years of success, depended to a great degree upon the progress of the 
war. - In retrospect, Francis Hare considered that "all the Complaints 
we have heard of the Management of the War" dated from the winter of 
1707/8.19 There had of course been discontent at the disappointing 
campaigns of 1703 and 1705, expressed in "barbarous lampoons" which 
caused Marlborough some concern, but the victories of Blenheim and 
Ramillies were sufficient to vindicate his policy and place him, 
temporarily, "above all detracting tongues. 1120 When he advised the 
rejection of French peace overtures in 1706, it was with the conviction 
17 
that one more successful campaign would secure all the terms the 
Allies could desire; when, therefore, the next campaign proved to be 
the most unsuccessful of the whole war, recrimination was inevitable. 
The Tory doctrine of the futility of concentrating the Allied forces 
under Marlborough's command in Flanders, as a means of securing the 
entire Spanish monarchy for the Austrian candidate, began to make new 
converts, and at least two pamphlets threatened a parliamentary enquiry 
into the lost opportunity for peace. 
21 
By this time, the suspicion that Marlborough was prolonging 
the war in his own interests "had raised such an odium against him ... 
among the people, that many foresaw it would end in his ruin. ""22 It 
was an ominous sign that his third victory at Oudenarde in 1708 failed 
to silence criticism as effectively as its predecessors. As economic 
hardship began to bite, it was becoming apparent that only victory which 
secured peace, but not victory alone, however glorious in itself, could 
do so completely. The country gentlemen, who bore the burden of the 
land-tax and had thoughtBlenheim "more for their 4e. in a pound than 
ever yet they saw, " now declared that "they had rather be quiet have 
, I- there Depts [sic] paid and enjoy there Trade then be at the expence of 
Victorys which they have no prospect of getting any thing by! '; and 
r" y 
Marlborough was personally blamed for not making the most of his success. 
23 
A sermon preached by Francis Hare before the House of Commons the following 
-- winter is an eloquent testimony to the prevalence of this criticism. ' 
.- 
Had the peace negotiations of 1709 ended as well as they 
18 
seemed at first to promise, Marlborough's reputation would have been 
safe; but when Louis XIV refused to comply with the measures that would 
have guaranteed the cession of the entire Spanish monarchy to the 
Austrian candidate, there were insinuations in England that Marlborough 
was glad of the resulting rupture of the negotiations, and even that he 
had pressed impossible terms upon France as a pretext for continuing 
the war. 
25 Insinuation became a clamour when the promised invasion of 
France gave place to the long-drawn siege of Tournai, and after the 
inconsequential and costly battle of Malplaquet in September there was 
"a perfect chorus" of "Grumblers. " Reactions ranged from suspicion that 
the casuality figures were being deliberately suppressed, to criticism of 
Halborough's tactics and the sour comment of the Jacobite, Thomas Hearne, 
that the usual thanksgiving ceremonies were a governmental ruse to conceal 
the prolongation of the war for Marlborough's benefit. 
26 The first six 
months of the following year being occupied with further deadlocked 
peace negotiations' and siege warfare, Henry Watkins, a member of 
Marlborough's staff, wrote in July that peace was essential, if only 
because "'tis now the blackest Character Envy gives Our best deserving 
Patriots that they continue the War for their own advantage. "27 
Yet although the Tory disposition to find fault with Marlborough 
was mounting, it could manifest iself publicly, only in what the 
Observator called "a treacherous and clandestine Manner"28 while the Whig 
ministry was in power. Verses embodying recent criticism of the war 
had to be circulated in manuscript, 
29 
and a clash between Defoe and the 
news-writer, John Dyer, well illustrates the reluctance of Tory journalists 
'9 
to reproduce verbal detraction in its most outspoken form. According 
to Defoe, Dyer's account of Malplaquet had included "this happy 
Parenthesis, VICTORY, as Marlborough ca11. " Dyer's words actually 
were, "this great Success (as ye D. of Marlb. 0 calls it). "30 Defoe's 
misquotation had made the sneer unmistakable- and given the impression 
that, by omitting Marlborough's full title, Dyer had added an insolent 
familiarity to his disparagement of the victory. Dyer had of course 
intended disparagement, or at least to encourage it in his readers. 
Hearne, for example, unhesitatingly translated the passage into unequivocal 
criticism. 
31 Nevertheless, it had been so framed that, if challenged, 
Dyer could claim it was entitled to be taken at its innocent face-value. 
Accordingly, he referred his readers back to the newsletter iniquestion, 
as proof that he had not used the "unmannerly phrase" attributed to him, 
and then adroitly turned the tables on Defoe with a fine show of 
indignation, by accusing him of "a designe to wound the reputation of 
that great Man thro: my Sides. "32 
The winter of 1707/8 witnessed an event of great political 
importance in the enforced resignation of Robert Harley as Secretary of 
State, after what Marlborough and Godolphin believed to be an attempt 
to overthrow their administration. The Queen bitterly resented being 
forced, by Marlborough's threat of resignation, to part with her new 
favourite; and although there may be some doubt about Harley. 's guilt 
initiaily, 33 there can be none about his feelings toward Marlborough 
and Godolphin afterwards. In a series of draft pamphlets written in 
zo 'ý 
retirement between 1708 and early 1710, while his plans for ridding the 
Queen of her now Whig-dominated ministry matured, Harley accused 
Marlborough of every. crime later to be laid to his charge by the Tory 
pamphleteers; of engrossing the Queen's favour and usurping royal 
authority, of embezzling the public money, of passing over promising 
opportunities for peace, and neglecting the navy and the war in Spain 
in favour of protracted and futile offensives in Flanders. 
3k These 
tirades, however, never saw the light in printed form. 
Henry St John, having resigned with Harley, was also living 
in retirement on his country estate; and though still professing his 
former admiration for Marlborough's military talents, he was beginning 
to take up the cause of the war-weary gentry, with complaints that the 
landed interest was being ruined by the war, that success was no compensa- 
tion for financial hardship, and that too much care was being taken of 
Allied interests at England's expense. 
35 But, as in Harley's case, 
these criticisms did not find their fullest expression in print until 
a Tory ministry had come to power and was faced with the task of 
making peace. 
In 1709, there were only occasional hints of what was to come. 
When, in January, a great stir was caused within Parliament and without by 
the publication of an allegorical attack on the Marlboroughs and the 
Godolphin administration, entitled An Account of a Dream at Harwich, 
most readers considered that the honours for authorship lay between 
Harley and St John. St John, at least, may have had some knowledge 
I 
of the most daring attack on the Whig administration at this period, 
Mrs. Manley's Secret Memoirs and Manners of Several Persons of Quality 
of Both Sexes from the New Atalantis, published in two volumes in May 
and October 1709.37 It is also possible that Mrs. Manley had some 
contact with Harley's associate at Court, the queen's new female favourite, 
Abigail Hasham. Sarah's suspicion that the latter had assisted the 
authoress financially is substantiated by internal evidence, and Mrs. ilanley 
was certainly well-informed about Abigail Masham's part in Harley's 
intrigues. One phrase of description, "she speaks more correct than 
others Write" (II, p. 148), also implies some personal contact between 
the two women? 
In two recent studies of Hrs. Manley's satiric technique, a 
symbolic relationship has been suggested between her lurid accounts of 
the sexual intrigues of the Whig personalities, with their pitiless 
preying upon female innocence, and the evils of a Whig administration -- 
in Tory eyes, "an amoral masculine world of ruthless economic individualism 
and irreligious Realpolitick. " The character of Marlborough ("Count 
Fortunatus"), one study argues, was her most concentrated embodiment of 
these destructive forces. 39 Yet perhaps not all her contemporary 
4 
k 
readers would have been conscious of this parallel between the private 
microcosm and the public macrocosm. One Oxford reader, in fact, was 
bemused and rather disappointed by her preoccupation with the former in 
a work which he had assumed to have great political, significances 
I have read but little of the New Atalantia, & am able to 
interpret nothing after the History of t. Fortunatue. The 
22 
design seem's to be rather to lay open men's private, 
than public, Characters, & to discover their Secret 
Love-Intrigues, than their more dark designs in Policy 
& State. I wish You would favour me with the key to 
it ... 40 
Readers in possession of the key would of course have been 
able to extract more enjoyment from the book, but one need not assume a 
symbolic significance to account for the effectiveness of the scandalous 
revelations as a means of embarrassing those in power. Although Mrs. 
Manley later claimed in self-defence that "she did but take up old 
Stories that all the World had long since reported,! '' she was known to 
be "a retainer of the Court and especially of the lewd part of it, " and 
consequently "admitted into the secret intrigues of it. "k1 Her versions 
even of well-known scandals therefore had a special news value in their 
own right for the less well-informed. A case in point was her account 
of John Churchill's youthful affair with the Duchess of Cleveland. Its 
existence had never been a secret, but Mrs. Manley, having later become 
a confidante of the Duchess, was in a position to record its most intimate 
and discreditable details. 
42 
If readers had seen -Fortunatus., ' as the embodiment of any 
destructive force in the state, it was more likely to have been that of 
the corrupt court-favourite, with whom Mrs. Manley repeatedly and 
explicitly identified him, than that of the amoral Whig statesman as 
such. If even the bemused Oxford reader, whose comments have just 
been quoted, was able-to comprehend those portions of the work which 
concerned Marlborough, it was because they drew upon well-established 
Y 
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prejudices against him. It has already been noticed how resentfully 
private critics dwelt upon his conformity to the type of the corrupt 
favourite in his rise to power from humble origins, his profiting by 
his sister's position as the Duke of York's mistress, his desertion of 
the King at the Revolution after so many favours bestowed, and the 
monopoly of royal favour which he, his wife, and Godolphin held after the 
Queen's accession. Mrs. Manley later declared that these were the 
grounds on which she too thought him "a just and flaming Subject for 
Satire, "43 and they were certainly the basis of her attack on him in the 
New Ataalantis. Aware that "the People, who with no indulgent Eyes, 
examine into the actions of Favourites, had always rather Rail then 
Applaud; and hate that Grandeur they cannot share in" (II, p. 146), 
she must have realised that this was the safest and surest means of ! 
discrediting him, at a time when peace threatened to disarm critics of 
his management of the war. 
It is as the titled royal favourite that he is introduced, in 
terms similar to those used by Evelyn: "rais'd by the concurrent Favour 
of two Monarchs, his own, and his Sisters Charms, from a meer Gentleman 
to that Dignity"; it is also noted that his wife is the "She-favourite" 
of the Queen, and "all will be manag'd in the new Reign by their 
Advice" (I, P. 21). It was proverbially said of the breed of corrupt 
favourites, that they rose to their high stations by "base and shameful" 
means; they might, for example, owe their first advancement "to the 
Beauty of their Face, or the interest of a Std. "44 Mrs. Manley's 
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account of Marlborough's rise illustrated his exact conformity to this 
pattern; for she describes how the attraction which his youthful good- 
looks had held for the King's most promiscuous mistress led to his first 
promotions at Court and in the army, and how he took advantage of her 
infatuation to further his ambitions, afterwards ridding himself of her 
by a mean trick and disowning all obligations. The narrative then 
centres on his relations with the Duke of York, with emphasis on the 
part which the "prostitution" of his sister had played in his preferment, 
and on his desertion at the Revolution of the King who had saved his life 
in a ship-wreck and to whose favour he owed all his fortune. Yet however 
shameful this behaviour, "he has rose by it, and will in a moment ... 
touch the tallest Dignities of the Empire" (I, pp. 21-43). This last 
episode is reworked in the second volume, where it is said to have been 
the prime cause of the King's decision to abandon his cause; for 
"the Ingratitude of Favourites and Friends, whom we have particularly 
oblig'd, is, to most, the sensiblest of all Disappointments or E ils" 
(119 PP. 134-142). 
The affair described in the second volume between Godolphin 
and the Duchess of Marlborough, with the Duke complaisant for political 
reasons, is the most distasteful construction that could be put upon 
the clique of favourites surrounding the throne, which had already 
caused some misgiving; and when Harley and Abigail Masham are introduced, 
it is specifically as characters worthy of royal favour, in contrast to 
their corrupt predecessors. (II, pp. 144-149). 
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The New Atalantis was hailed by Lady Mary Wortley Montagu as a 
relief from "heavy panegyric" and "false characters, so daubed with 
flattery, that they are the severest kind of lampoons ... like that 
vile paper the Tatler. "45 It is certainly true that Mrs. Manley had 
questioned some eulogistic commonplaces about Marlborough's rise to power. 
Some months before in the Tatler, Steele had commented, 
it, is, methinks, a pleasing Reflection, to consider the Disputations 
of Providence in the Fortune of this Illustrious Man, who, in the 
Space of Forty Years, has pass'd through all the Gradations of 
Human Life, 'till he has ascended to the Character of a Prince ... But such Elevations are the Natural Consequences of an exact Prudence, 
a calm Courage, a well-govern'd Temper, a patient Ambition, and an 
affable Behaviour. These Arts, as they are the Steps to his Greatness, 
so they are the Pillars of it now it is rais'd. 
In the same year, Ned Ward also recalled the time when the great general 
was "no more than Mr Churchill, an Ensign in the Guards, " and while 
" 
condemning the hierarchy of the army as a whole, he acknowledged that 
Marlborough owed "his Grandeur to little but the Greatness of his Sense 
and Courage. "46 
Mrs. Manley had suggested'some far less creditable factors in 
Marlborough's advancement, but she could not ignore the reputation he 
had acquired for patience, courage, and even temper. In fact, her 
initial character-sketch differs from Steele's, only in the subacid 
flavour she imparts to "that coolness of Temper, that allay of Fire, 
that passive Moderation, ever uppermost, and to which he has ow'd his 
greatest Success. " She explains, however, that these good qualities 
were not innate; even his courage was not "inborn to him, but acguir'd, "" 
simply another manifestation of the self-control to which all his 
26 
"appearances of Virtue" were attributable, and which had so long concealed 
his deep-rooted avarice and ambition (I, pp. 26-27). 
Mrs. Manley's statement that the New Atalantis had pointed the 
way for future critics of Marlborough and the Whig leaders was proved 
accurate; and considering that the tract was the most sustained attack 
on these ministers in print while they were still in full power and well 
able to punish those who deviated too sharply from eulogy, it was with 
some justice that she later claimed credit "for having, with hazzard 
to my self, first circulated their vices and opend the ey's of the Crowd, 
who were dazzled by the shine of power into awe and Reverence of their 
persons. 147 
Marlborough's personal reaction to press attack and to replies 
in kind was to be of some importance in determining his relations with the 
new ministry after 1710, and his responses to earlier material of the 
same sort throw some light on his later. attitude. 
With his strong sense of personal dignity and of the importance 
of his European mission, and his habitual distaste for party warfare, 
Marlborough could not be expected to take kindly to partisan fault-finding, 
printed or verbal. "I have had the good luck to deserve better from all 
Englishmen, than to be suspected of not being in the true interest of my 
country, " he wrote at the height of his success. 
48 
The denial of this 
merit, which was implicit or explicit in almost every criticism of his 
conduct, galled him inexpressibly. On one occasion, his reaction was 
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so violent that Godolphin ventured to remonstrate with him. "I think 
what you say is reasonable, " Marlborough wrote back, unappeased, "but 
as I act to the best of my understanding, with zeal for the queen and 
my country, I cannot hinder being vexed at such usage. "49 At another 
time, having threatened the author and printer of the persistently 
critical Observator with physical violence, he expressed the hope that 
this would "be approved on by all honest Englishmen, since I serve my 
Queen and country with all my heart. 
" 
There was, however, more to these reactions than wounded self- 
. esteem. 
A later pamphleteer was correct in remarking that Marlborough 
had always valued "the good Opinion of his Native Country, "51 the more 
so because it was a means of protection against the hostility to which he 
was subject from both parties. "N shall certainly not care what any 
party thinks of me, " he wrote in 1704, "being resolved to recommend 
myself to the people of England, by being to the best of my understanding, 
in the true interest of my country"; and again the following year, "I 
have no other ambition but that of serving well her majesty, and being 
thought what I am, a good Englishman. "52 His fear of those who threatened 
to strip him of this modest, but all-important title was not groundless. 
It was later to be demonstrated that propaganda which could do so 
convincingly, would go far to leave him at the mercy of his political 
enemies. 
Marlborough also feared the effect of plausible detraction 
for the practical reason that the maintenance of his prestige at home, 
28 
abroad, and in the army was necessary for theefficient discharge of 
his official responsibilities. "I could suffer every thing for Her 
[the Queen's] sake, but cant think it for Her Service, that I should 
unjustly be blam'd, " he wrote in 1705, of a deliberate omission from 
the official account of a controversial incident in the London Gazette, 
which amounted to a reflection on his professional judgment and threatened 
his effective command of the Allied army. 
53 
His freedom of action in the field could likewise be seriously 
hampered by the knowledge of his enemies' readiness to'find fault with 
his conduct. Fear of these fault-finders haunted him throughout his 
campaigns, increasing as his political position grew weaker and the 
criticism which greeted his last two victories taught him what to expect 
in the event of failure or defeat. Soon after the ministerial changes 
of 1710, he wrote to the Secretary of State, requesting the Queen's 
authority to undertake a particular operation, because "it is grown too 
much in fashion to canvas and reflect on what I do without any considera- 
tion of the service. " To Godolphin, he had already confessed that, 
"as every thing is now, I dare attempt nothing, but what I am almost 
sure must succeed, " for "should I not have success, I should find but 
too many ready to blame me. "54 
The methods Marlborough had used before this time to combat 
party propaganda varied according to the nature of the offence. In cases 
of particular provocation or controversy, he had recourse to the law, 
recommending the official suppression of James Drake's notorious 
29-- 
Memorial of the of England, and demanding "justice" under the 
continual goading of the Observator; and though he favoured a remittance 
of punishment for William Stephens, the author of a highly critical pamphlet, 
he admitted that he would have been "very uneasy if the law had not found 
him guilty. 
05 But as a general means of discouraging less important 
offenders, he preferred to rely on his own matchless powers of self-control. 
Resignedly noting the publication of "another scurrilous pamphlet" in 
1705, he advised Sarah that "the best way of putting an end to that 
villany is not to'appear concerned. "56 This conviction was the basis of 
his habitual "official's reaction to criticism. Though he had complained 
bitterly in private of partisan fault-finders during the campaign of 
1708, his formal response was one of the loftiest unconcern. 
57 
His reluctance to encourage replies in kind was another 
manifestation of this studied indifference to critics, reinforced in the 
hour of success by the confidence that, "as long as God blesses us with 
success their writing can have little weight. "58 It is understandable 
that in 1706, Marlborough should have believed his victories themselves 
to be the most effective answer to his critics. Defoe's support of his 
cause in the Review drew from him the categorical statement, "I do not 
love to see my name in print, for I am persuaded that an honest man must 
be justified by his own actions, and not by the pen of a writer, though 
he be a zealous friend. "59 
In practice, however, Marlborough was far from blind to the 
value of suitable printed publicity for his actions. If they were to 
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be his justification, it was necessary that they be properly represented 
to the public. He was observed to be "no ways inclinable to give 
Encouragement to Panegyricks upon himself, " and specimens such as 
William Pittis's Two Campaigns in One Panegyrical Essay, written to 
ingratiate himself with the ministry, warranted this indifference. 
60 
Nevertheless, it was not unknown for more reputable eulogists to receive 
substantial cash benefits from the general, and he not only sanctioned, 
but supervised an account of the Blenheim campaign, in which accuracy 
went hand in hand with praise. 
61 He also kept a strict watch over the 
official bulletins of the army's movements, which were prepared by his 
staff for publication in the London Gazette, and was "no ways pleas'd" 
when they were tampered with by the gazetteer without his permission. 
62 
The unprecedented explosion of temper which followed the damaging 
omission from one of these bulletins in 1705 revealed how essential he 
considered this official publicity for the maintenance,. of his reputation. 
It was probably to prevent a repetition of this outburst, that Godolphin 
warned Harley, a great believer in retaining journalists in the government 
service, that a pamphlet which he commissioned for Marlborough's benefit 
a few months later should be submitted for the general's approval before 
it went to press a63 
The political propaganda of this period must be read with 
the reservation that "it is almost impossible to assess how far it 
reflected and how far it formed opinion. "64 The press attacks on 
31 
Marlborough from both sides before 1710 were manifestations of 
political pressure and party hostility, but it would be a mistake to 
take them, in their own right, as indications of his fundamental 
unpopularity. Before the end of his first campaign, he was observed 
to be "the great darling of ye People, and (as he goes on) is like to 
be every day more soe. "65 Although, year by year, he became increasingly 
vulnerable to party criticism, especially on the grounds of his supposed 
abuse of royal favour and mismanagement of the war, this prestige remained 
astonishingly durable. In the Tory stronghold of Oxford, amid reports 
of the carnage of Malplaquet, he was still found to have "Reputation 
enough" and to be considered "a very Extraordinary man. "66 Even Mrs. 
Manley admitted him to be "shining in a thousand Virtues that obscur'd 
his Vices. " 
67 
The more systematic campaign of detraction which was set 
on foot once his political opponents were restored to power was basically 
a tribute to this prestige. Had Marlborough really been as unpopular 
as is sometimes claimed, his reputation and achievements would have 
been neither an asset to the Whig opposition, nor a serious obstacle 
to the ministry's policies, and there would have been no need to set 
the pamphleteers to work to discredit him. 
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Chapter I 
THE FAVOURITE-MINISTER 
Several historians have drawn attention to the relative 
scarcity of comment on the past conduct of the war from pamphleteers 
who wrote in justification of the ministerial changes and the General 
Election of 1710.1 Given the outspoken Tory complaints on this subject 
for some years past, and the radical revision of Whig war and peace 
policies which the new ministers instituted once firmly in office, the 
initial, almost Whiggish assurances from their journalistic supporters, 
of a vigorous war effort and a safe and honourable peace, are at first 
sight somewhat surprising. 
2 The explanation, however, lies in the very 
precarious position in which the ministry found itself on coming to 
power. The Whig financiers of the City and the Allies abroad were 
already alarmed at the domestic upheaval, and to have fostered the 
impression that peace at any price was the aim of the new administration 
would have made its chances of survival very remote. 
3 
Nevertheless, what the Tory propagandists prudently forbore 
to say, their opponents said for them, this being the most promising 
means of staving off defeat. 'The Main Objection against the Present 
Chan es, " Abel'Boyer noted, 
is, That as all Seasons are not proper for Physick, so 
all Times are not fit for Purging the Body Politick; 
and that the War having been Successfully carry'd on by 
the late Ministry, it had been Prudence not to shift 
Hands before a. Peace was concluded. 4 
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Some prominent supporters of the new ministry were also 
prepared to admit that "it falls out indeed at an unhappy Conjuncture 
with respect to our Affairs both at home and abroad, that there should 
be any Occasion for an alteration of the Ministry. 115 There was, 
therefore, in spite of the Queen's undoubted right to change her 
ministers whenever she chose, a real need to justify the decision to 
do so, at so apparently unseasonable a juncture. 
Harley's pamphleteers were unanimous in their solution to*this 
problem. Retaining the medical analogy of "Physick" and "the Body 
Politick, " Boyer observed that "in Cases of Necessity" drastic remedies 
might be administered at any time. 
arguing that the changes arose 
A colleague expanded the point by 
from an inevitable necessity of giving some speedy cheque 
to the formidable Power of a few Men, who have given 
Indications too evident to be slighted, that they have 
entered into Confederacies, and taken Resolutions to govern 
both queen and Nation according to their own pleasure. 
And when Sir Thomas Double, Charles Davenant's caricature of incarnate 
Whiggism, complained of the untimeliness of the ministerial revolution, 
his companion reported that it might perhaps have been delayed, "if your 
Behaviour had been such as was in any degree compatible with the very 
Existence of Regal Government. "6 
These seeds fell on fertile ground. James Brydges considered 
that Harley's overthrow of the prestigious administration of Marlborough 
and Godolphin had only been possible because "Several concurring 
-w11 
circumstances tended by degrees to imprint an-opinion in the body of 
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the Gentlemen & People, that there was an intention of altering in 
time the constitution in Church & State. "7 Marlborough had. been 
abroad at the time of the Sacheverell trial, certainly one of the 
"circumstances" which had raised this alarm against the Whig ministry. 
However, the Tory pamphleteers had little difficulty in involving him 
in the general condemnation of his colleagues on other grounds. In 
fact, he and his family were repeatedly singled out for special attention. 
The ordeal was long-lasting. Propaganda on this subject began to 
appear in quantity after the dismissal of Marlborough's son-in-law, 
Sunderland, in June 1710, and as late as February the following year, 
Swift was devoting space in the Examiner to answering "that baffled 
Question, Why was the late_Ministr changed? '8 riýrw ... n 
For many pamphleteers an appeal to the traditional prejudice 
against royal favourites, which Mrs. Manley had already directed towards 
the Marlboroughs, was the most obvious means of substantiating the claim 
that an immediate ministerial change had been essential for the preserva- 
tion of the Queen's authority and the national liberties. In fact, 
since Marlborough was related to two members of the old ministry by 
marriage, and his wife, daughters, and sons-in-law held Court offices, 
the entire political upheaval could be justified as the necessary 
extirpation of a dangerous family monopoly of government and royal favour. 
In answer to those who demanded the reasons for the ministerial revolution, 
Defoe put two rhetorical questions: "Whether the exorbitant Ambition 
4-1 
of a Family ... is not a sufficient Reason? " and 
Whether the People of England are not strangely alter'd, 
who are particularly remark'd in the World, for their 
being Jealous of the too Great Growth of Favorites; That 
they should now desire to promote what they have always 
apprehended was dangerous to their Liberties? 9 
In the past, as Defoe had informed Harley, this jealousy 
had been aroused by the aggrandizement of the low-born favourite and 
his family with titles, honours, and estates at public expense. The 
abuse now-lavished on the Marlborough family by Defoe's colleagues 
was calculated to arouse every aspect of this traditional prejudice. 
"The Pride, Insolence and Profuseness of Upstarts intolerable, " one 
such tirade ran, "One Family rais'd above all the Rest with as many 
Places (not long ago) as would honourably maintain Twenty others of 
as much Modesty and more Gratitude. " Boyer also argued that 
the People cannot behold, without a just Resentment, Two, 
Three, or more Persons exalted high above all the rest, 
who abuse the Prince's Favours; whose Ambition is not 
satisfied with any Honours, and whose Avarice is not 
satiated with Multiplicity of Profitable Places, nor with 
Repeated Gifts and Grants .. o who, in return to his Kindness and Munificence, put continual Slights and 
Affronts upon him, and keep him in an Inglorious Dependance 
on their Wills, in the Disposal of All. 'Tis such a sort 
of Favourites and Ministers that the People Hate, and 
Exclaim against; and whom Men of Birth and Superior 
o- 
Merits endeavour to get Remov'd. 10 
The half-finished palace at Woodstock and the newly 
completed Marlborough House at St. James's became for these 
pamphleteers symbols of the enrichment of a single family at public 
expense, and of the prince's subordination to his own creatures. 
Boyer's account combined the suggestion that these "Insulting Palaces" 
/I- a 
were a personal affront to the Queen, with a backward glance at the 
sinister medieval figure of the over-mighty subject and the stronghold 
from which he could defy regal authority. Another pamphleteer wanted 
to know "Whether ever such Princely Edifices were built, and Fortunes 
rais'd by the Servants of a Crown in so short a Time, and in the Midst 
of War. " According to one estimate, the cost of Blenheim amounted to 
"upwards of Three Hundred Thousand Pounds. "11 
As might be expected, Mrs. Manley made a substantial contribution 
to this propaganda, developing at length ,a point of similarity between 
the Marlboroughs and the pernicious favourites of history which had not 
hitherto been touched on. With a thin veil of allegory, she reviewed their 
relations with the Queen during previous reigns, claiming, amongst 
other things, that they had encouraged her to gamble heavily with cards 
and dice, in the expectation that all debts would be paid when she 
succeeded to the throne, and to indulge in lavish banquets, so that 
she would have neither the time nor the inclination for affairs of 
state, which would then be left in their hands-12 These details were 
clearly intended to recall the excesses of extravagance and sensual 
indulgence into which designing favourites were traditionally supposed 
to lead weak monarchs for their own ends; and since Anne's gambling 
debts in her minority were heavy, and her addiction to the pleasures 
of the table throughout her life a subject for ridicule, there was 
a grain of truth in the account just sufficient to sustain this 
identification of the Marlboroughs with such "Advocates of 
"13 Voluptuousness, the Pest of a Realm, and the Evil Genii of Kings. 
4.3 
It was Swift who put the finishing touches to this topic. 
Discussing the ministerial changes in the Exaer, he used a particular 
historical parallel to show, not only that the family was worthy of 
dismissal by traditional standards, but that they did not even have that 
excuse for their existence which their worst predecessors, Edward II's 
notorious minions, could claim, namely "that the Prince is pleased and 
happy, although his Subjects be aggrieved. " For Swift could by this 
time rely on the fact that the queen's disillusionment with her former 
favourites was public knowledge. He then argued that Marlborough's 
"monstrous Alliance" with the "Republican" Whigs, which had made the 
changes imperative, had been a direct result of the Tory Commons' refusal 
to grant in perpetuity the annual sum which the queen bad requested in 
1702, for the support of his Dukedom. Marlborough thus appeared as the 
kind of unscrupulous minister whose political allegiances were determined, 
not by the interests of his country, but by his insatiable appetite for 
the rewards of royal favour. 
14 
The advantage of whipping up this prejudice against the 
Marlborough family as corrupt and dangerous royal favourites, was that, 
once aroused, it constituted in itself a powerful reason for the decision 
not to delay the ministeril changes. For it was the proverbial fate of 
such favourites to fall victim to the rage of their fellow-subjects, and 
Harley may actually have used this alarming prospect of sedition to 
strengthen the Queen's resolution. Among his manuscript jottings is the 
reminder that 
when favourites grow mischievous or dangerous or unsupportable 
to the Prince or the people: if the Prince does not take the 
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true way of laying them aside: the People do it themselves wch 
is attended with much disorder and confusion ... 15 
Boyer, at this time supporting Barley's schemes, may have received hints 
from him on this subject, for he too justified the Queen's action by 
pointing out that, 
to see Ambitious Upstarts engross all Favours, and invade all 
Offices and Employments, has been the occasion of many popular 
Seditious; which wise Monarchs have either pre&tented, or 
appeas'd by a just and seasonable Sacrifice. 16 
This appeal to. a prejudice to support the claim that the 
Queen's authority had been under serious threat from Marlborough and his 
colleagues, was greatly strengthened by an appeal to recent events. In 
answer to indignant protests from the Whigs that there had been no design 
against the established constitution, Swift crushingly retorted, "I beg 
their Pardon if I have discovered a Secret; but who could imagine they 
ever intended it should be One, after those Overt-Acts with which they 
thought fit to conclude their Farcrce? "17 
The ability to appeal to fact was of great value to Marlborough's 
critics at this delicate stage of his relations with the new ministry, 
since it gave their criticism, not only plausibility, but an air of 
impartiality and restraint. One pamphleteer, referring specifically to 
Marlborough, apologized for having discussed matters 
which may touch some great Men whom I yet honour in my 
heart, but all the respect I was able to show on such an 
occasion, was to forbear their Names; the Facts I have 
mentioned are known to be true, 'tis therefore their own 
Actions that reflect the Censure, not the Relation ... 18 
ßl. 5' 
There was of course no genuine desire to spare Marlborough's reputation, 
once this claim to forbearance had been established; as Swift remarked, 
"barely to relate the Facts, at least, while they are fresh in Memory, 
will as much reflect upon the Persons concerned, as if we told their Names 
at length. "19 
In this relation of the facts there was a similar specious 
appearance of impartiality. To allow them to speak for themselves, "make 
their own uncommented Impressions, " as one pamphleteer put it, 
° 
seemed 
the essence of fairness. Yet the episodes in question happened to be 
such, that a bare presentation of the facts without comment or interpreta- 
tion was precisely the technique likely to do most damage to Marlborough. 
He had long suspected that Harley's associate, Abigail Masham, 
had been instrumental in undermining his position at Court, and matters 
had come to a head in January 1710, when the Queen waived the claims of 
Marlborough's candidate for a regiment fallen vacant at the death of the 
Earl of Essex, in favour of those of Abigail Masham's brother, John Hill. 
Marlborough, unable to persuade her to change her resolution, retired 
from Court in anger, determined that she should have to choose between 
retaining his services or those of her bedchamber-woman. Meanwhile, 
Sunderland, with his approval, attempted to arrange a parliamentary 
address recommending Abigail Masham's dismissal from Court. Alarmed and 
affronted, the Queen cast about her for political support, at the same 
time making such concessions to Marlborough that, as his more cautious 
colleagues urged, he could not decently maintain the stand he had taken. 
21 
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But the damage had already been done. The dispute between 
Marlborough and the Queen was public knowledge, and when the pamphleteers 
came to justify the ministerial changes a few months later, it was a 
trump card. Few pamphlets were without some reference to the 'insufferable 
Insolence" to which the Queen had been subjected by Marlborough and his 
colleagues on this occasion; they had attempted "to take that Privilege 
from Her, which the Meanest of Her Subjects enjoy, and Slavery was to 
pursue Her even into Her Bed-Chamber"; under their administration, she 
could "not Dispose of any Commission. Civil or Military, nor have a Woman 
to Pin up her Gown, but with their good Leave"; they "thought it hard to 
let the Queen bestow a Regiment in the Army, where Merit, and her Majesty's 
Judgment, directed"; under a Tory ministry there would be no dispute 
22 
about her "giving a Regiment to whom she pleased"; and so on. 
Although no one could deny that these incidents had taken place, 
or even that Marlborough's behaviour had been imprudent in its lack of 
deference to the Queen, it is what is left unsaid in these accounts that 
produces the desired effect. While the political insignificance of 
Abigail Masham, as the queen's bedchamber-woman, is stressed, her involve- 
ment in Harley's intrigues is not mentioned at all, though this was the 
real reason for Marlborough's determination to have her removed. 
Similarly, his clash with the Queen was not over her "giving a Regiment 
to whom she pleased-91' but over her giving it to a known political enemy 
(none of the accounts mention Hill's identity), on the advice- of his 
political enemies and against all he could say to dissuade her. The 
4-7 
issue at stake, as Marlborough saw it, was therefore nothing less than 
the maintenance of his effective authority in the faction-ridden army, 
which depended upon his being recognized as the sole source of 
preferment. 
23 
This propaganda took advantage of the dilemma in which the 
original incident had placed Marlborough. If he had submitted to Hill's 
appointment, his command of the army would have been weakened; on the 
other hand, as Sarah noted, if he "should not comply or should show any 
reluctance in complying, this would furnish an excellent pretence for 
grievous complaints and outcries that the Queen was but a cipher and 
could do nothing. "24 This is exactly what happened. In these over- 
simplified accounts of the crisis there seemed no other explanation for 
Marlborough's conduct than a desire, in the first instance, to impose 
his will on the Queen in the most trivial aspects of her private life, 
and in the second, to set his command of the army above her authority; 
both apparently indications enough that "some speedy cheque" had to be given 
to his overweening presumption. 
A particularly popular method of justifying the. ministerial 
changes was.. to recount these and other incidents in more. detail and with 
cumulative effect, as the "secret history" of the political upheaval. 
This. term was used to describe accounts,. genuine. or more often invented, 
of the seamier, behind-the-scenes aspects of Court and,, government affairs. 
Hare, for instance, could refer quite accurately to, Sarah's knowledge of 
"the inside and secret history" of post-Revolution politics, but Swift 
was later to disparage comprehensively those "who pretend to write 
ý8 
Anecdotes or secret History, " and "repeat the Discourse between a Prince 
and chief-Minister, where no Witness-was by. "25 Yet however unreliable 
the medium might be as history, in 1710 it undoubtedly proved a very 
effective form of political propaganda. Since the narrator was presenting 
details and scenes outside public knowledge, there could be little 
check on his veracity; and, as Hare observed in exasperation, the very 
name "secret history" "immediately forbids all asking of Questions; for 
were the proofs to be produc'd,. where would be the Secret? 1126 In fact, 
the willing suspension of disbelief which such propaganda induced was 
the despair of those who had the task of counteracting its influence. 
Another pamphleteer lamented that 
the Secret Histories, the Atalantis's, the Faults on Both Sides, 
&c. have been able to Villify the most Worthy Persons; and yet not 
one of these Authors path ever produced the least Proof of what he 
says ... for every scandalous Story is taken upon Trust, and as 
readily believed as if the Quality of Lying were not in Nature. 27 
Of the tracts referred to in this passage, three were particularly damaging 
to Marlborough: the pre-Election tract, Faults on Both Sides, The 
Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus, and, the second volume of Mrs. Manley's 
Memoirs of Europe towards the Close of the Eighth Century,, later to be 
reissued with the first volume as a sequel to the, New, Atalantis. 
Faults on Both Sides was a very influential work, which enjoyed 
"a prodigious Run" and impressed 'many well-meaning People. " 
28 It was 
a more reputable example of secret history than the others, because the 
author, believed to be one Simon Clement, had encouraged the rumour that 
he was writing to Harley's instructions; "I have seen the Man who has 
seen the Queen, " he asserted, when challenged about his confident 
'i 'I 
_a 
statementsof royal policy. 
29 The pamphlet was soon dubbed "Mr H.. ly's 
Book, " and historians have confirmed that the sentiments do correspond 
closely with his, and have even suggested that it was written to his 
dictation. 30 
The attribution to Clement was certainly accurate, and it seems 
also that he was the author in hie own right; "perhaps you may not think 
e it for my disadvantage to let ye Secretry[St. John] know who writ y 
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faults on both sides, " he wrote to a friend the following year. However, 
his letters to Harley reveal a close association between them of some 
years standing, 
31 
so that there is every reason to suspect the minister's 
influence in the composition of the tract, even if he did not actually 
dictate it. 
Ostensibly a critical survey of the history of both parties, 
the pamphlet was a contribution to Harley's ideal of an administration 
free from the extremists of either side. The real objects of the attack, 
however, were the party leaders who, in manipulating the rank and file 
for their own ends, were said to threaten both the rights of the monarch 
and the liberties of the people. Moderate men of both parties were 
urged to unite to put an end"to this evil. It was in this context that 
Marlborough's recent conduct came under criticism, and more was revealed 
about the crisis of the previous winter. Discussing the political 
alliance between the ministers and the Junto, Clement observed, 
surely Men will think themselves Great, Strong, and Powerful, 
when the Parliament, Army, Navy, and Treasury of a Kingdom 
are at their Devotion; and we had reason to think so, when a 
3o 
certain very great Man, whose general Behaviour hac[always 
been remarkably soft, easy, courteous and cool to all, could 
now presume to dispute the disposal of a single Regiment in 
the Army with his Sovereign, and to such a degree of 
animosity, as to depart from her presence in disgust, without 
returning till the good Queen (may I say) submitted and 
yielded the Point to him. (p. 35) 
Again, there is no reference to the real issue at stake in 
this dispute between Marlborough and the Queen, and although Clement 
eschews the exclamatory and outraged tones of the majority of his 
colleagues, his choice of words constantly guides the reader to a highly 
unfavourable view of Marlborough's conduct. The references to the Queen, 
the regal and formal "Sovereign" and the affectionate and respectful 
"good Queen, "draw attention to the Duke's disregard for all these qualities, 
though together they comprehend the proper relationship between monarch 
and subject in all its possible forms; the jarring incongruity of the 
terms "animosity" and "disgust" in such a context is sufficient reflection 
on the impropriety of Marlborough's behaviour without explicit comment, 
and the diffident parenthesis, "may I say, ". is at once an apology for, 
and a careful pointer to, the reversal of proper roles implied in the 
use of the words "submit" and "yield" to describe the attitude of a 
sovereign to a subject. Above all, the incident, as it is here described, 
demonstrates the truth of Mrs. Manley's view, that Marlborough's celebrated 
amenity of temper,, to which he had hitherto owed his "Appearances of 
Virtue, " was in reality only a mask for ambitious designs as yet 
unfathomable. 
The significance of this crisis, as the moment when these 
designs had at.. last, been brought into the open, was confirmed when the 
S/ 
account continued, "I must yet tell you of another Step larger than 
this, and even so high that it wanted, but one of the'top; in a word, 
they had projected to get the great Man created General for Life " (p. 35). 
This, though one would hardly guess it from the unemphatic tone, 
was the first mention in print of what was to become a standard item of 
Tory propaganda. Clement's restraint was genuine. The occasion referred 
to*was no less than Marlborough's third attempt to induce the Queen to 
grant his commission as Captain-General for life; and this after 
discouragements from his own supporters, of which Harley was well-informed, 
and persistent opposition from the Queen herself. Most historians are 
content to absolve Marlborough from the worst implications of. the request, 
and interpret it simply as an ill-considered expedient for relieving 
himself of the pressures of party politics, which threatened his effective 
action abroad. 
32 Yet his contemporaries, some of whom had personal 
recollections of Cromwell's regime, could not be expected to take so 
lenient a view. Was not Grandinsula made the most miserable of Islands 
by such a Concession? the Memory of those Bloody and Tyrannical Days 
are too fresh in our Minds to be deluded into a like Error so soon, " 
one otherwise friendly pamphleteer wrote when he learnt of the scheme. 
33 
Inevitably the effect was to confirm the insinuations of hostile 
journalists such as the Observator, who, even without this clue, had 
already suggested a parallel between the Captain-General and the Lord 
Protector. Clement's failure to do more than hint in passing at these 
alarming implications of Marlborough's action is therefore somewhat 
surprising. 
51 
He could, ' however, count upon most of his readers' drawing the 
appropriate conclusions for themselves, and it is likely that he was 
simply using the authority which his connection with Harley gave him 
to make the basic facts of Marlborough's request available to less 
well-informed colleagues for elaboration as the occasion should offer. 
This in itself would have been a sufficient embarrassment to the Duke, 
for once the request had proved unsuccessful, he certainly would not 
have wished it to become public knowledge. News that the episode had 
begun to be exploited by the party'pamphleteers reached"him while he 
was still abroad, and the comments of two of his supporters on this 
subject suggest that both they and'their'patron regarded Clement's 
revelation, for all its restraint, "as one of the most damaging products 
of the press campaign of this period. 
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Other pamphleteers certainly had no hesitation in enlarging 
on the topic once they had been given their cue. Abel Boyer's Essay 
towards the History of the Last Ministr7 and Parliament, for-example, was 
modelled on Clement's doctrine of Harleyite "moderation, " and once the 
circulation of the original pamphlet began to diminish, it became "the 
Piece on wch the Party would value themselves"; there was apparently no 
inkling in Whig circles that it was the work of one of their own number, 
drawn to Harley's cause, partly at least, by the lure of the post=of 
gazetteer. 
35 In fact, the pamphlet seemed intended to demonstrate Boyer's 
complete severance of sympathy with the old ministry; the, implications 
of the request for the Captain-Generalcy, barely hinted atýby Clement, 
S3 
were not only stated in the most explicit and alarmist terms in the 
Essa , but by typographical means, made almost to leap from the page: 
the Junto had formed the Towering Project, of Getting a 
GENERAL for LIFE: who might, in Time, have gain'd W3. 
absolute an Authority, as that of a Roman perpetual 
DICTATOR; or of a British PROTECTOR: And so have Govern'd 
Arbitrarily both Q and NATION. (p. 47) 
That the ambitions of Marlborough and the Junto had reached 
this pitch was of course the final clinching argument for an immediate 
change of the ministry. 
These same topics were included in The Secret History of 
Arius and Odolphus (i. e. Harley and Godolphin), a pamphlet dedicated 
on the title-page "to those Good People of GRANDINSULA, who have not 
yet done wond'ring, why that PRINCESS would Change so Notable a Ministry. " 
The central feature of its attack on Marlborough ("Fortunatus") was, 
however, an account of his audience with the Queen in the winter of 
1707/8, which had led to Harley's resignation as Secretary of State. 
Historically, the pamphleteer's version of this episode agrees with 
those of well-informed contemporaries in many respects; most notably 
in such details as the queen's readiness to accept Godolphin's resignation 
rather than part with Harley, the few days' grace she allowed him to 
reconsider his decision, her personal distress at being forced to 
dispense with Harley's services when she had been made aware of the 
chaos that would follow Marlborough's resignation, and the hint that 
if she had not been subject to such pressures, she would have retained 
Harley in preference even to Marlborough. These details must have 
54 
been supplied by someone intimately acquainted with the affair, and 
the probability is that it was Harley himself. Hare, in fact, believed 
Harley to be the author. 
36 
The name, 'Fortunatus, was obviously a borrowing from the 
New Atalantis, and the fictional techniques of secret history which 
Swift had condemned are used in the scene between the queen and Marlborough 
to develop the interpretation of the latter's character which Mrs. Nanley 
and Clement had put forward; his outwardly suave and affable demeanour 
is shown to be the mask of a nature basically devious and incalculable. 
Although personal mannerisms are exaggerated to the point of ridicule, 
the general impression of subtle duplicity, concealed by professions 
of cordiality and sincerity, is remarkably similar to that which hostile 
contemporaries, including the Queen herself at a later date, have left 
on record of their personal contacts with Marlborough. 
37 
Clement, however, concentrated on the one incident in which 
political pressures really had caused Marlborough to abandon his 
habitually deferential attitude to the queen. This one lapse might 
perhaps be excused by his apologists, and a plausible objection to all 
Tory complaints about the insolent and overbearing behaviour of 
Marlborough and Godolphin to the queen was that 
they were both as gentle in their Manners and Behaviour, 
had as much Command of Temper as any Men; were bred up 
in Courts, and could not want so much Politeness as not 
to preserve the ordinary Forms of approaching and speaking 
to their Sovereign: The Insolence complained of could 
not certainly be of that Sort ... 38 
The account of Marlborough's audience with the Queen in the 
Secret 
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History, however, purported to demonstrate how he had maintained his 
"tyranny" over her in past years, without abandoning his celebrated 
courtier manner. 
Fortunatus first informs the Empress that he is under such 
pressure from his colleagues to procure Arlus's dismissal, that failure 
would mean his own resignation; "then he farther begg'd leave, (not 
alas! as an Argument for her Compliance) but as he thought himself bound 
in Duty, to lay before her the Consequences of his so unavoidable, tho' 
unwilling Resignation" (p. 24). This, however, is the preamble to a 
barely veiled threat of the chaos he is able to bring upon her affairs 
at home and abroad if she does not comply with him, a presumption which 
is made the more discreditable by the obsequious and patently insincere 
terms in which it is introduced. 
The Empress acknowledges, as she must, that Fortunatus' 
prediction of the disastrous consequences of his resignation is accurate, 
but continues, 
My Lord, I think I am safe, because, I find, I am in your 
Power; But I had rather now, methinks, relie upon the Friend, 
than the Minister; Be then sincerely all the First, and help 
me in this Hardship'. Suppose your self in my Dilemma, and 
tell me truly how you'd answer what you have now so warmly 
press'd me to Consider. (p. 25) 
The Queen was prone to treat her chief ministers as personal friends and 
her regard for Marlborough lingered even after his wife had forfeited her 
affection, so that it is on the basis of histörical fact that the 
pamphleteer contrives the damaging contrast between the simplicity, 
sincerity, and pathos of the Empress's appeal to the friendship of her 
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minister, the unconscious irony of her implicit confidence in him, and 
his obvious insincerity, elaborately-couched threats, and calculating 
use of this trust. In such a context the Empress's artless admission 
that she is in his power has an ominous significance. 
To make it quite plain that Fortunatus is untouched by this 
appeal, the omniscient narrator can slip in a direct pointer to his 
dissimulation -- "seeming touch'd with her Concern"; and it is interesting 
to note also, that the accompanying insight into his thoughts ("Happy in 
the Art of Pleasing, even with a Refusal ... 
[he] resolv'd at least to 
mingle Pity with his Sentence") gives a wholly repellent twist to what 
was otherwise a proverbial tribute to Marlborough's personal magnetism, 
his ability to "refuse more gracefully than other people could grant. "39 
The implication is that when such charm of manner becomes the tool of 
an unscrupulous nature, it is more dangerous and discreditable than 
overt insolence and browbeating. This is made quite apparent when 
Fortunatus draws upon all the florid and hypocritical involutions of 
Court rhetoric at his command to disguise his inexorable insistence on 
his own will: ", 
... since your Peace requires 
it -- Preserve the Injur'd 
Arius in your Favour, and let me run the pleasing Risque of 
my Obedience -- Thus, Madam, when Honour'd with the Name of 
Friend, I must comply, and might at worst deserve your 
Pardon for betrgying you: But then there is a waking Conscience 
in severer Honour, that will be heard, that is not to be 
-soft'ned by the tend'rest Sighs of Nature, that chides me 
for this weak Submission, and bids my Virtue arm in your 
Defence -- Madam, 'tie with the utmost 
Pain I mention it 
but -- forgive the 
Harshness of the Word -- You must 
abandon Arius, or those that only can 
Support you -- (pp. 25-26) 
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The clash between Marlborough and the Queen had, in fact, 
been more plain-spoken on both sides than it is here represented. The 
Queen at first obstinately refused to part with Harley, in spite of all 
Marlborough could say, and it was only in the face of cabinet and 
parliamentary pressures that she finally gave way. 
40 It is clear, 
however, why the pamphleteer chose to emphasise her submissiveness, 
rather than her strength of will on this occasion, for her reduction to 
the position of humble petitioner to her all-powerful minister presents 
the same disturbing spectacle of a reversal of the proper roles of 
sovereign and subject, as Clement had already hinted at, and this was 
the most powerful argument in favour of the ministerial changes. 
A hostile critic of the Secret History referred contemptuously 
to the author's efforts to "scree himself into Arlus's Favourt'! 
41 
and a 
similar purpose is discernible in the second volume of Mrs. Manley's 
Memoirs of Europe. When, in May, she had sent a copy of the first volume 
for Harley's perusal, as an earnest of future services as propagandist, 
he was sufficiently interested to make himself a key for the identification 
of the more obscure characters. 
42 
But although the condemnation of the 
Marlboroughs as corrupt favourites would certainly have pleased him, the 
portrait of the Duke ("Stauracius") was not in all respects adapted to 
his present purposes; for Mrs. Hanley had been so preoccupied with the 
general's twin moral failings of covetousness and ingratitude, that she 
was content to minimize the dangers of his ambition, which, she explained, 
"would have had no Bounds, had not his Avarice confin'd it" (Is p. 253)" 
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Perhaps she was informed, or realized for herself, that for 
the justification of Harley's schemes it had become necessary to 
represent Marlborough's ambition as a serious danger to the Crown, for 
in her second volume she abandoned her condemnation of his vices on 
purely moral grounds, and concentrated instead on the ambitious excesses 
to which they had led him. There was no further mention of the "moderating" 
effect of avarice, and his ingratitude was now not merely "abominable" 
morally, but positively treasonable: ignoring his obligations to a 
prince whose favour had raised him from nothing, Stauracius made "Caesar's 
Goodness of Temper his Engine wherewith to batter down, not only the 
Constitution, but even Augustus himself" (II, p. 25). 
To illustrate this process, Hrs. Manley concentrated, as other 
Harleyite pamphleteers had done, on Marlborough's disputes with the Queen 
during the previous winter. The conventions of secret history allowed 
her to pretend access to the most secret councils and motives of statesmen 
and monarchs, and with this licence she made two additions of her own to 
these episodes which increased the enormity of Marlborough's offence and 
made it of a piece with her accounts of his earlier career. The first 
was the revelation that his display of temper over Hill's appointment to 
the Essex regiment had been entirely counterfeit, and was in fact a pre- 
arranged device to display his devotion to the Junto's 
interests and so 
win their support of his request for the 
Captain. Generalcy for life: 
At another time perhaps Stauracius would not have so 
highly 
resented it; he had no mighty Crash of 
Passion in his 
Composition, he did not care to be warm'd, it must be a very 
great Occasion that rais'd his Phlegm, 
tho' he could 
personate sometimes eee 
39 
However, to serve the present purpose, he "fell into all the Indecency 
both of Manners and Expression that was requir'd" (II, pp. 280-282). 
If this explanation of the incident were accepted, his apologists would 
not be able to excuse it as a momentary loss of self-control, arising 
from a genuine concern at attempts to undermine his authority in the army. 
Mrs. Manley also reconciled Marlborough's confrontation with the 
Queen on this occasion with her earlier accounts of his relations with 
royal benefactors, particularly those in the New Atalantis; for she 
made it clear that the significance of the episode lay not only in the 
threat which the favourite's ambition had posed to the Crown, but in the 
ingratitude of the brutal display of counterfeit anger which had set 
his scheme in motion: "to repay him so ungratefully for all his Bounties! 
his Love, his Tenderness! this was an Arrow in the Heart of the afflicted 
Monarch! " (II, p. 283). Evidently she wished the incident to be considered, 
not in isolation, or even as the product of Marlborough's recent political 
alliance with the Whigs, but as the last in the long series of betrayals 
of affection and trust which had marked his rise in royal favour from the 
earliest stages. 
There can be no doubt of the effectiveness of this propaganda. 
Of Marlborough's stand over the disposal of the Essex regiment, Francis 
Hare wrote later in the year, "no one thing, I fear, has been made a 
greater handle to mischief"; and some time later another defender also 
recalled that it had "been magnified as a great Crime in him, perhaps to 
Her M[ajest]y but especially among the People; and I fear it has had 
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its Effect. " At the end of 1712, Thomas Burnet, surveying all the Tory 
attacks on Marlborough, agreed that this episode, and Harley's enforced 
resignation in 1708 had been plausibly represented as "the two most 
exceptionable Parts of the Dukes Life. "43 Yet at the time no Whig 
pamphleteer presented an adequate defence of Marlborough's conduct on 
these occasions, and few broached the subject at all. Even Hare, who 
was to single out the criticism of Marlborough's military achievements 
in the Secret History for special attention, completely ignored the rest 
of its contents. 
The fact was that no pamphleteer would dare to defend a minister 
who had carried any dispute with the Qüeen, however legitimate in itself, 
to a point where she became personally distressed or resentful; and the 
Tory propagandists had taken great care to stress this aspect of 
Marlborough's confrontations with her. Clement pointed out that at the 
time of greatest pressure from Marlborough and his colleagues, the Queen 
had been recently widowed, "and having lost the Support of her dear Consort, 
the anxiety of her mind was become so great that she was even overwhelm'd 
with grief. 1144 The really discreditable feature of Marlborough's 
conduct, as it was represented in the Secret History, was his insistence 
on his own will in spite of the personal distress it caused the queen; 
and Mrs. Manley's variation on this theme was to dwell on the tears of 
anguish which Stauracius' pretended brutality of, manner had wrung from 
his prince. The Queen's rank, sex, and popularity as a monarch made 
an absolutely chivalrous and deferential behaviour incumbent on all her 
ministers, and the slightest deviation from this standard on Marlborough's 
-= -_ -ý 
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part would have remained indefensible, even if he were cleared of 
the worst suspicions of treasonable intent. 
His apologists could not even argue that the Tory accusations 
of insolence, presumption, and disrespect were exaggerated, for the Queen 
was known to have been deeply affronted by Marlborough's past conduct, 
and particularly by the threatened parliamentary action against Abigail 
Hasham. In fact, this resentment was offered as one of the principal 
reasons for the ministerial changes, and accepted as such by the most 
well-informed. 
45 
Therefore, as a later commentator on this kind of 
propaganda observed, 
her Majesty permitting it to be once openly and directly 
asserted, no Answer could possibly be made to it, no 
Justification could be offered; for to what End could any 
one dare to plead that her Majesty was not used with 
Insolence, if she, the only Judge and Witness in that Case, 
would affirm she was ?_ 46 
These were not the only deterrents to Marlborough's potential 
apologists. Some who were prepared to defend his conduct in other 
spheres, actually shared the censorious view which the Tory pamphleteers 
had taken of his recent behaviour to the Queen. Hare, for example, 
thought the dispute over the Essex regiment ill-advised, if not in itself, 
at least in the advantage it had given to his opponents; for "it will 
always seem hard a prince should not now and then dispose of a regiment, 
when her general has the disposal of so many. "47 Another pamphleteer, 
although slightly more sympathetic, unflatteringly attributed any 
impropriety in Marlborough's conduct to "the infirmities of his Age, " 
and was not prepared to defend the attempt to oust Abigail Masham at all, 
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maintaining that her influence had never been proved pernicious and 
that the Queen should have perfect freedom in the choice of her personal 
servants. 
48 
Moreover, the attempts of Marlborough and his Duchess to 
disclaim all responsibility for this scheme, once they discovered how 
greatly it had estranged the Queen, had alienated many of their Whig 
supporters, and by the time of the ministerial changes the subject was 
such a sore one on all counts that the silence of the majority of the 
pamphleteers is scarcely surprising. 
49 
Silence was also the only possible reaction to the revelation 
of Marlborough's attempts to secure the Captain-Generalcy for life. 
His own colleagues had opposed him at the time, and the only friendly 
pamphleteer who mentioned the subject at all, denied outright that 
Marlborough had made any such request, on the unconsciously ironical 
grounds that he was far too prudent to do anything so "repugnant to 
the Genius of the Nation. "50 
In fact, the emphasis which Harleyite pamphleteers placed on 
the exorbitant ambition of the Marlboroughs, as the true cause of the 
ministerial change, had been designed to unite both Whigs and Tories 
in condemnation of the family. Defoe was able to remind Whig protestors 
that in the past they had been "as warm against, and as dissatisfy'd 
with" this abuse of royal favour as their opponents, and an astute 
supporter of Harley's had recommended that the Whigs as a party be 
encouraged to attribute their disgrace solely to those "whose vanity 
and avarice of usurping so much rendered them insupportable and their 
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discharge necessary: ', By this means, he believed, the family would 
be deprived of supporters to "blazon their actions" and condemn those 
who had advised the change. 
51 
In any case, the mere fact that Marlborough and his colleagues 
were now known to have forfeited royal favour, was itself a sufficient 
deterrent to all but their most zealous defenders. "With the generality 
of Writers, " Mrs. Manley wrote, "'tis confess'd, the Emperor's Smiles 
creates [sic] (as his Frowns destroy) Desert"; and in a moment of ironic 
self-examination Swift confirmed the truth of this maxim for himself and 
many others. 
52 The defection of Defoe and Boyer to Harley's cause once 
he was in power illustrates the lure of Court favour for journalists with 
no commitment to extreme Whiggism and no overriding loyalty to the old 
ministers. Moreover, since Harley and his colleagues were the Queen's 
personal choice, any pamphleteer who attempted to defend the Whig leaders 
at their expense could expect to find himself accused, like his patrons, 
of insulting the Queen's intelligence and questioning her prerogative; 
53 
and if the offence were particularly blatant, there was always the danger 
of official prosecution. 
This thought was in Sarah's mind as she reviewed one of the 
few really solid attacks on the new administration, for the benefit of 
the Queen's doctor, Sir David Hamilton. The pamphlet, The Impartial 
Secret History of Arlus, Fortunatus, and Odolphus, argued that Tory 
attacks on Marlborough's exorbitant ambition were libels inspired by 
the resentment of Harley and his associates at his repeated victories 
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over the French, since these threatened the success of their schemes 
for bringing in the Pretender. It was, Sarah claimed, 
a plain true story told of the present and past time, 
under hard & disagreeable names, to read, but one understands 
it as well as if they were call'd by their own names, &I 
suppose it was done in that manner to make it more easy to be 
printed. 
In fact the theme was so provocative that, having copied out large portions 
of the pamphlet with annotations, she was anxious lest the document go 
astray; "being writ in my hand it might do me a prejudice. " Her 
protestations that she did not know the author were belied by her under- 
standing of the finest points of his allegory and by her concern to shield 
him from the "people in power. "54 His identity, however, remains a secret, 
though some suspicion must fall on Arthur Maynwaring, who was at this time 
engaged in editing the Medley under her auspices, and who had collaborated 
with her in the past in the writing of a pamphlet in which the subject of 
Tory crypto-Jacobitism was very prominent. 
55 Even if the Impartial Secret 
History was not his work, it certainly embodied his sentiments; earlier 
in the year he had argued that when the Tories came to power, they could 
be expected to "make their first Attack upon that Family, which had 
destroy'd the Hopes of the Pretender. "56 
It was natural that the arch-Whig Duchess, long convinced of 
the Jacobite commitment of the Tory leaders and outraged at the press 
attacks on her husband, should have regarded this pamphlet as a definitive 
answer to his critics; but it is doubtful if this opinion would have been 
shared in less prejudiced circles. Marlborough himself was not absolutely 
6S 
convinced at this time of the reality of Barley's designs on the 
Protestant Succession. 57 Nor did this explanation of Tory hostility 
account for the fact that many of the pamphlet attacks, however malicious 
and exaggerated, were based upon recent episodes in Marlborough's relations 
with the Queen, some of which, as even his own supporters admitted, were 
open to serious misinterpretation. 
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Chapter II 
GENERAL AND PLENIPOTE DIARY 
Yet, preoccupied as the Tory pamphleteers were with the domestic 
crisis, they could not shelve the question of the war completely. Whig 
pamphlets, the most influential of which were The French King's Thanks 
to the Tories of Great Britain and A Letter from Monsieur Pett[ecul m 
to Monsieur BEulys, still insisted that an opportunity for peace had 
been lost, and the French heartened by the ministerial changes. 
According to Dyer, the Tories laughed at such suggestions, but the 
attention that was devoted to these two pamphlets in the first issues 
ýýzY 1 
of the Examiner suggests that/were regarded as dangerous. 
Hare anticipated that, finding themselves blamed for the lost 
chanee of peace, the new ministers would "lay the fault of its not'being 
made somewhere else, to skreen themselves from being thought the true 
cause of it. "2 This is exactly what they and their journalists did. 
Charles Davenant's incorrigibly self-damning Whig' spokesman cited four 
Whig pamphlets, among them the two just mentioned, and expressed the 
hope that they had 
prepar'd the People, by way of anticipation, to lay upon 
the new Ministry, the interuption of the Peace, and the 
decay of Credit; which, to speak plain Truth, have been 
the, result of former Errors, and no more than was to be 
expected from our Conduct ... 
St John's Letter to the Examiner put forward the same doctrine. 
3 Once 
the General Election had produced its massive Tory victory, and the 
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ministry settled in earnest to the task of making peace, there was 
more need than ever to substantiate this claim. After some initial 
optimism, reflected in the Tory journalists' almost Whiggish assurances 
about the future. of the war, it became evident that the Whig ideal of 
"no peace without Spain" would. have to be relinquished. "We have nothing 
to save us but a peace " Swift wrote in January 1711, "and I am sure we 
cannot have such a one as we hoped, and then the Whigs will bawl what 
they would have done had they continued in power. " In the Examiner he 
accordingly prepared to argue that the difficulties which the Whigs would 
hasten to blame on the new ministry were "the necessary Consequence of 
former Counsels. " 
4 
It was clear that if blame were to be diverted, and the 
ministerial revolution justified in these terms, some criticism of 
Marlborough's past conduct of the war and the peace negotiations would 
be involved. The accusation that he had prolonged the war was by this 
time of-several years' standing and increased in plausibility with every 
campaign; '"tis natural for People when they grow weary of a War, to 
give into any Surmizes of this kind, be they-never so ill grounded, " 
Hare admitted. 
5 In the circumstances, the first hints of the Tory 
pamphleteers on this subject were surprisingly tentative, keeping to the 
safe ground of unchallengeable platitudes concerning'the frailty of human 
nature in general and of Marlborough's nature in-particular. -III do not 
say that his G[ra]ce desires to prolong the War, for I should think 
he has got enough, " one journalist commented, "yet I hear that the 
7L- 
Con[tribu]tions are very sweet and inviting ... I have nothing to 
say against this great Man, but I tell you that Grandeur and Riches 
make Men. often forget themselves, that Ambition is Blind, and Avaritia 
est radix Omnium malorum'"; and another pamphleteer, having also declined 
to accuse Marlborough directly, continued:. 
it is possible such as are Gainers by the Continuance of 
the War, may not be so heartily dispos'd to finish it, as 
we could Wish ... It's natural for all Persons to lean towards 
their own Interest, and to prefer the bettering their own 
Private Circumstances before those of the Publick ... [and] 
it is not certain but many Thousands per Annum may have an 
Influence upon the most Heroical Minds ... 
6 
As yet, however, there were only hints, from St John and his two aptest 
pupils, Swift and Mrs. Manley, of the theory of a massive league of 
vested interests between Marlborough, the Whig monied men, and the 
Allies, into which these charges of self-interest were later to be 
elaborated.? 
Since Marlborough was both Captain-General and senior English 
plenipotentiary, the charge of prolonging the war could be substantiated 
by criticism either of his strategy in the field, or of his conduct at 
the conference-table. But although the former was for the time the more 
popular topic, one very obvious objection had first to be answered: 
namely, if Marlborough had been bent on protracting the war, "what could 
engage him to be so sincere in his many signal Victories o'er our 
Enemies? ""8 His critics found their answer in a revival of the long- 
standing Tory grievance that, although the restoration of the entire 
Spanish monarchy to the Austrian candidate was the principal unrealized 
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war-aim, the Whig ministry had consistently subordinated operations 
in Spain to Marlborough's theatre in Flanders, where, it was argued, 
France was so heavily defended by frontier fortresses that even repeated 
victories and successful sieges could not put a decisive end to the war. 
By 1710, as both Maynwaring and Hare acknowledged, this had become the 
most plausible criticism of Marlborough's conduct of the war. 
9 As 
Addison had written in the Tatler when peace was thought sure, "the 
Command of General in Flanders hath been ever look'd upon as a Provision 
for Life"; 1° and1o the civilian it would seem. self-evident that the 
country fought for should be the-principal theatre of operations. 
Moreover, this-theory seemed to offer an explanation-for the 
bewildering fact that Marlborough's successes, spectacular as they were, 
had not yet secured a-peace. -Indeed, the very extent. of this success, 
by a startling-paradox, could be made to support the contention that 
his strategy was basically misguided; for how, Swift demanded, could 
peace have been lost after so many victories, but by "the extreamest 
Degree of Folly and Corruption? "11 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
almost every hostile pamphleteer who broached the subject, adopted this 
explanation of the protraction of the war. 
12 
The question of Marlborough's misconduct as plenipotentiary 
was a more delicate matter. Since the Whigs accounted for the repeated 
failure of the negotiations by insisting that the French had never 
treated sincerely for peace, blame could be transferred to Marlborough 
only if it were argued that the terms demanded had been impossible for +hen% 
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to grant. This suggestion had long been current by word of mouth, 
but the ministerial journalists could not reproduce it without 
contradicting their own assurances that the new administration would be 
as zealous as the old in procuring a safe and honourable peace. For 
the time, therefore, Marlborough's critics could do little more than 
arouse suspicion and resentment in the most general terms, with the 
hint that more would be revealed at a later date. 
Mrs. Manley and Charles Davenant both dwelt upon the economic 
hardships resulting from Marlborough's failure as peacemaker, for which 
the glory of his victories was said to be no compensation. 
13 An 
anonymous pamphleteer, who may have been Harley himself, queried 
rhetorically, 
WHETHER the Country Fellow was not in the right, who said, He 
could not expect a Peace, while the General was the Plenipotentiary, 
any more than he could hope for the end of his Law-Suit, whilst a 
Norfolk Attorney was the Arbitrator of his Difference? 14 
Replying to a Whig pamphleteer who had mentioned a design to blame 
the English plenipotentiaries for the failure of the peace negotiations, 
the Examiner blandly reproved him for arousing a suspicion which, 
"when once awaken'd, may not easily be laid asleep again. "15 Even 
St John dared not at first go beyond these tentative insinuations; 
he passed over the Whig assertion that "our Plenipotentiaries did all that 
possibly could be done to obtain a Safe and Honourable Peace" but "not 
because it is True, for the contrary shall one Time or other be made out 
to the World, when the True State of our present Condition will be set 
in a clearer Light. t, 
16 It was not until November that Mrs. Manley was 
permitted to make the first overt reference in print to the "harsh and 
17 
unreasonable Terms of Peace" demanded by Marlborough during the 
negotiations of 1709, and Swift did not broach the subject in the 
Examiner until January of the following year. 
17 Yet it seems that 
these scattered hints did their work, for by the end of 1710, Hare 
decided that a detailed defence of Marlborough's conduct as 
plenipotentiary had become essential, "there being no Point that 
People are so uneasy at, or so much in the dark about, and consequently 
in which they can be so easily impos'd on. , 
18 
It was with the publication of The Secret History of Arlus and 
Odolphus in November 1710, that this desultory propaganda was given its 
most coherent expression, providing what was probably the immediate 
provocation' for Hare's definitive vindication of his patron. 
19 The 
usual cautiously stated maxims concerning the temptations facing an 
avaricious general were now delivered sharply and directly, and without 
apology ("are we to treat that Vice in every other Man with Suspicion, 
Ill Wishes, and Contempt, and think it not only Pardonable, but Worthy 
of the Highest Trust in-him? "); while the passage° discussing the 
-errors in Marlborough's strategy, which contained a mocking echo of 
, Addison's comment in the Tatler, was low-keyed"and good-humoured in its 
irony, its power coming from the implicit assumption that the case 
was so self-evident as to need no overstatement: 
the War, we find, has made a shift some Years to out-live our 
Hopes of it, which 'this possible we may in some Measure owe to 
his prudent Conduct, /laying the Cause of the War in one Country, 
and the Seat of it in another, where our Conquests have got us 
more Honour, than Profit ... The Command of an Army in the 
Country where our Enemy has been able to lose so many Battles, 
has been always look'd on as Provision for Life even of the most 
Victorious Generals. Let them be never so Successful they are 
18 
sure not to fight themselves out of their Posts, unless they 
are too Rash in exposing their Persons: There's a Barrier of 
stubborn Towns will find Work enough for the Wisest of 'em ... (pp. 10-11) 
In such a context, even the outrageous insinuation about Marlborough's 
personal cowardice, slipped in almost as an afterthought, and simply as a 
matter of logic, could be swallowed without straining. 
The pamphleteer then took the. opportunity to give the carping 
which had followed the battle of Malplaquet its first detailed and 
unequivocal expression in print, his air of casual familiarity with the 
circumstances of the action establishing his right to be heard on a subject 
which might otherwise have been considered outside the sphere of the party 
writer: 
Was the last Years Bloody Battle so well Concerted, as it might 
have been? Was it so absolutely Necessary to stay two Days 
within Sight of the Enemy, for a few Troops that never Engag'd 
when they came, and give 'em so much Time to throw up such 
unequal Fortresses before we Attack'd them? (p. 12) 
Nor did this writer show any hesitation in broaching the 
delicate subject of Marlborough's conduct as peacemaker, though his 
subject was not the controversial and highly publicized conferences of 
1709 and 1710, but the overtures made by the French after the battle of 
Ramillies in 1706. The theory that a satisfactory peace might have been 
obtained on this occasion was a favourite one of Harley himself,, 
20 
and 
if resentment against Marlborough could be expected to increase in 
proportion to the number of years of unnecessary war to which he was 
believed to have committed his country, it was clearly more profitable 
for his enemies to date his obstruction of the peace from 1706, rather 
than 1709 or 1710. 
'79 
According to the secret historian, Harley, as Secretary of State, 
had received "from a Minister of our chief Allies such full Conditions of 
Peace propos'd to them from our Grand Enemy, as would have wholly answer'd 
the End of our War, " but Marlborough and Godolphin, bent on prolonging 
hostilities, had refused to consider them, and had forced their colleague's 
resignation, when he attempted to lay the matter before the Queen (pp. 13-14). 
In fact this wording was ambiguous; it implied that Louis XIV had, -in 1706, 
been prepared to restore the entire Spanish monarchy to the Austrian 
candidate. This was not the case, 
21 
though the intention to deceive those 
who had not been well-informed about the terms offered was obvious. On 
the other hand, those in possession of the facts were at liberty to take the 
passage as an indirect argument that English interests would be perfectly 
well served without insistence on this aim. It thus became a conveniently 
oblique means of introducing a proposition which might soon have to be 
argued openly, and which was bound to meet with vociferous opposition 
from the Whigs. 
Before Hare published his four letters "to a Tory-Member, " soon to 
be known under the general title, The Management of the War, there had 
been no satisfactory reply to these criticisms of Marlborough's conduct 
as general and plenipotentiary. One Whig pamphleteer had declined 
to enter the debate on the inadequate grounds that the critics had not 
produced "one colourable Argument" in support of their case, and others 
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resorted to the standard theory that frustrated Jacobitism accounted 
for Tory belittlement of the victories 
2Z Only Addison in the shortlived 
Whit-Examiner and Lord Cowper in his Letter to Isaac Bickerstaff, dealt 
briefly, but intelligently, with the objections to Marlborough's Flanders 
warfare, 
23 
and Hare was to incorporate their arguments into his own 
complete vindication. In fact it was he, and not Steele in the person 
of Isaac Bickerstaff, who took to heart Cowper's injunction to compose a 
more detailed defence of the conduct of the war and the peace negotiations 
than had hitherto appeared. 
Hare certainly had more points in his favour than any other 
candidate, for a journalistic task which demanded discretion, intelligence, 
and a good deal of specialized knowledge. His formidable powers of 
intellect commanded the respect of friends and enemies throughout his life. 
A professional rival had magnanimously declared him to be "as fit a man for 
the station of Chaplain General [to the army as any One in England: an 
honest, brave man and a good Scholar"; and even his bitterest Tory critic 
conceded, "none will deny him to be a Person of Learning and Intelligence. "21"' 
By the end of 1710, in his capacity as Marlborough's personal chaplain, 
Hare had had nearly seven years' experience of observing and reporting the 
army's engagements and had so satisfied Marlborough's exacting standards 
that he was entrusted with the task of preparing the official account of 
the Blenheim campaign for publication. 
25 In fact, as his private news-letters 
reveal, he had an interest in, and an understanding of, military matters 
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that were unusual in a civilian, and especially in one who was also a 
scholar and a clergyman. 
26 
These occupations meant that Hare was a respectable apologist, 
as well as an intelligent one, a matter of importance to a patron who 
was so sensitive to the productions of the party hacks. Hare undoubtedly 
hoped for preferment in the church as a reward for his journalistic and 
other services. In fact, one of his critics sneered at The Management of 
the War, as having been written solely to "grasp at a Miter, " and claimed 
that "he is more mercenary who writes for a considerable Preferment, than 
the other who does it only for a few Guineas. "27 A bishopric was certainly 
not beyond Hare's expectations, and, but for his Cambridge degree, the 
bishopric of Oxford would have been his four years before. As it was, 
he had had to be content with a chaplaincy at Chelsea Royal Hospital and 
a prebend at St. Paul's, procured for him by Marlborough and Godolphin, 
and he later dated his claims to the bishopric of Worcester from the year 
in which The Management of the War was published. 
28 
Yet personal ambition cannot have been his sole motive for writing 
it. Association with those who were under royal displeasure was not the 
high road to promotion, as Hare discovered in November 1710, when, as- 
Marlborough's chaplain, he was ostentatiously passed over for an appointment 
to Convocation. 29 But at the beginning of the year he had written to 
Henry Watkins, "'tis my principle, you know, not to desert, or leave his 
Grace till he leaves me, " and to this principle he adhered even when the 
"good End" he then anticipated became very remote; he could therefore claim 
8Z ý 
quite truthfully in retrospect, "I endeavoured to serve my Lord 
Marlborough & his friends at a time when I could not be supposed to act, 
either out of Flattery, or for any private views. "30 His indignation at 
the party criticism which dogged his patron was genuine, 
31 
and his impulse 
to defend him must have arisen as much from this, as from any remoter 
consideration. 
Hare's personal loyalty to Marlborough at this period transcended 
his commitment to either party. "I can't understand being for this or 
that party, but I can understand being for this or that man, this or that 
thing, " he wrote revealingly while The Manat ment of the War was in the 
process of composition. 
32 In fact, his attitude to the parties was 
largely determined by their respective attitudes to his patron. It is 
significant that he found many of the doctrines of Faults on Both Sides 
congenial, and his sympathies clearly lay with ministers such as Marlborough 
and Godolphin, who were naturally moderate politically and therefore subject 
to pressure from the extremists of both parties. 
33 
3llthough he was in accord with the Whig war policy of a complete 
reduction of the exorbitant power of France, and although Oldmixon was later 
to write of his "Zeal in those Days for Revolution Princirles, ''31' Hare's 
greatest indignation in the long, sensible, and intelligent letters he 
wrote to the Duchess of Marlborough in 1710, was reserved for the power- 
hungry Junto and the obstructions they had put in Marlborough's way; 
"your Grace is very generous to excuse, as you do, the usage your Whig 
friends, as you are pleased to call them, have shewn to Lord Marlborough, " 
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he observed with daring coolness at one point 
3S Professionally he leant 
towards the Tories; "if the men of the Tory Ministry have their faults, 
they don't so directly strike at religion, nor set themselves to run down 
those who profession it is. 
06 These opinions were sufficiently well- 
known among Hare's Whig friends to be the subject of some teasing. 
37 Yet 
there was no doubt where his sympathies lay when a difference arose between 
Marlborough and the Tories. His letters to his Tory colleague, Watkins, 
contain scathing references to the latter's "old friends" and their 
malicious detraction of the Duke, and when the ministerial reshuffle 
which brought the party to power threatened Marlborough's position, Hare 
was careful to assure Horace Walpole, a former pupil with Whig allegiances, 
that he was "heartily sorry for the changes both on account of the Public, & 
for the part my friends suffer in it. "38 
The four "letters" or sections of The Management of the War were 
originally published separately between 4. January and 24 February 1711.39 
The first two ran_: to a fourth and a third edition respectively, excluding 
the final collected form, no mean feat at a time when "whatever appear'd 
on the Whig Side, was thrown away without any Examination tho' ever so well 
writ. " 
4 Indications of the pamphlets' enduring popularity and influence 
are plentiful. Boyer, who had no reason, in view of Hare's severe censure 
of a work of his own, to give him more praise than his due, states that they 
were "receiv'd. with general Approbation, " and there are casual references 
in both Whig and Tory writings to the "four letters" and the "four famous 
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Letters" long after their publication. 
41 They were also in common use 
by Whig pamphleteers as source material, and were recalled by historians 
of both parties later in the century as the definitive vindication of the 
war and peace policies of Marlborough and the Whig ministry. 
42' 
But 
perhaps the most striking tribute to their importance is the attention 
paid to them by Swift, who made a point of ignoring the majority of 
opposition pamphlets as beneath his notice; he not only devoted space 
to discussing them in two issues of the Examiner, but conceded that they 
were "worth Examinin 1' in detail. 
43 
The attribution to Hare was made almost at once, and since in the 
text of the pamphlets, he had made some attempt to discourage the 
assumption that the author had been an eyewitness of the events he 
described, there may be some truth in the derisive comment of a critic: 
I understand, he is so fond of his Productions, finding them 
inscrib'd the Second and Third Editions, That what at first he 
recommended as a Secret to the Publisher, he takes all Occasions 
to reveal himself, that is, to own and declare himself the 
-Author of those admir'd Letters. 41r 
Certainly there was some discreet leakage of information in friendly 
circles. "If you have not Seen the Mannagemt: of the Warr in 4 parts 
writt by an Acquaintance of yours, " a London correspondent of Horace 
Walpole's wrote, "Let me know and I will Send them by a Safe hand. " 
45' 
However, another pamphlet, probably the work of Oldmixon, who had seen 
The Management of the War through the press, denied that Hare had ever 
claimed authorship, and suggested that the person responsible may have 
been "a La man, and a Member too; and I have heard more than one guess'dant. ' 
8S' 
This was almost certainly a reference to Maynwaring, M. P. for West Looe, 
y publication. 
416 
these who had actually revised Hare's work for 
6 
attempts to confuse the issue were unsuccessful. Oldmixon was ridiculed 
for giving himself "a sort of learned Air, / For Manapemennts of War, 
compos'd by H--re, 14 and "the Confessor to the Army, who knows so much of 
47 
the Mam-irement of the War" continued to be the butt of the Tory pamphleteers. 
The fact was that a semi-official acknowledgement of authorship had 
both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, given Hare's 
connection with Marlborough, it would add to the respect with which the 
pamphlets were read; on the other, it could and did lay Hare open to the 
charge of writing for preferment and of meddling in matters unbecoming his 
cloth; nor was it desirable for Marlborough's name to be too closely 
associated with any criticism of the Queen's new administration. An 
admiring commentator on the pamphlets was very conscious of this dilemma, 
and declined to discuss the various conjectures about their authorship, 
for "it requires something more to discover a Man, who, without doubt, had 
some sufficient Reasons to forbear exposing his Name in Print"; but he 
continued, 
I can nevertheless I assure you, that if we guess right, his 
Person, his Character, and the Opportunity he had of being 
rightly informed, ought to give us a Confidence, that the 
Facts he mentions, and which the Public has not been acquainted 
with, are Authentick, and to prepossess us in Favour of his 
Reasoning. bg 
Others stressed this authority which Hare's position on Marlborough's 
staff gave him, and it was inevitable that he should also be generally 
assumed "to have receiv1d Hints and Instructions from his Patron. "49 
g6 
The extent of Marlborough's involvement is, however, not easy 
to determine. The distaste he had evinced for printed apologies in 1706 
was rooted in the natural assumption that a victorious general needed no 
such justification, but with the criticism that followed Oudenarde and 
Malplaquet, this view became increasingly untenable, and by 1710 there 
could be no doubt that his prestige would suffer considerably, if the 
press attacks of his political opponents went completely unanswered. 
This press campaign was, as Maynwaring later put it, tv%e 11 unforeseen Foe" 
which Marlborough would have to contend with henceforth; 
50 
and the fact 
that his reputation was being systematically assailed by Journalists 
protected and encouraged by his ministerial colleagues, meant that he was 
singularly vulnerable. St John, who as one of the Secretaries of State, 
controlled the official methods of suppressing propaganda offensive to 
51 
those in power, was himself a hostile pamphleteer and a patron of 
pamphleteers; Marlborough could not have recourse to the law for protection, 
as in the past. Replies in kind were therefore the only means of 
combating the evil, and Marlborough was prepared to acknowledge this, though 
he was soon to be made aware that even this procedure had its dangers. 
Nevertheless, when there was a question of: enlisting Steele as a possible 
defender the following year, Sarah, to whom the initial application had 
been made, found her husband quite agreeable to the transaction in principle, 
57Z 
provided that its financial basis was not made public. . 
It is unlikely, 
therefore, that he would have had any objections to Hare's similar efforts. 
It is, in any case, difficult to believe that Hare would have 
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ventured into print on such a subject without Marlborough's sanction. 
One recalls Godolphin's warning to Harley that 'a pamphlet which he had 
commissioned for Marlborough's benefit should have the general's approval 
before printing. There is also the following letter from the Duke 
to his wife of 26 April/7 May 1711: 
I have forgott if I did formerly give you an account of a 
Chaplain that desir'd to Print a relation of. the present Warr, 
he was direct'd to lett you have a Copie, which I desire you 
would beg the favour of 52 to peruse, for if they are not well 
perform'd, the printing of them should be delay'd; but I 
think we can't do better then to leave that to the Judgement 
of 52.53 
The letter is deliberately cryptic, at a time when Marlborough knew that 
his correspondence was liable to be opened by the ministry's agents; 
but "52" was occasionally used as a cipher for the Duchess herself 
(the wording to suggest that they were two different people may be 
a device to conceal this), and the chaplain referred to was almost 
certainly Hare, who was still in London at the time. 
54 The impersonal 
reference probably indicates that Marlborough had no cipher for his name. 
The projected work may have been either The Management of the War 
(assuming that Marlborough did not know of its publication), or Hare's 
longer tract, The Conduct of the Duke of Marlborough during the Present 
War, which appeared the following January. But the point which the letter 
does establish positively is that, while Marlborough expected his 
clients to apply to him for permission to publish accounts of his 
conduct, he preferred to leave the closer supervision to his wife and 
her circle. The transaction involving Steele also suggests that this 
was the usual arrangement. 
88 
From a practical point of view, it is also unlikely that Marlborough 
had any direct influence on the composition of The Management of the War, 
since he had remained abroad for several weeks after Hare had returned to 
London at the end of 1710, and it was during this period that the bulk of 
the pamphlets must have been written; 
55' 
and after his own home-coming, 
Marlborough was in such a "continual hurry and concern3,11 that he can have 
had little time to devote to such matters. 
56 But this is not to minimize 
his indirect influence on the pamphlets which, as will be seen, is apparent 
throughout. After seven years' close association, Hare would have been 
sufficiently well-informed about Marlborough's views on any subject likely 
to have a bearing on his task, not to need specific "Hints and Instructions-" 
for the occasion. 
Sarah's influence on Hare can be more fully documented. Her 
decision to begin a lengthy correspondence with him on the-affairs of the 
day, and to supply him with copies of her own manuscript accounts of recent 
events, at a time when he was of possible use as a pamphleteer, suggests 
that she was consciously sounding and guiding his opinions; 
s? 
and in fact, 
several passages from Hare's letters to her were transferred almost word 
for word into The Management of the War. 
58 There is also the possibility 
that he received payment from her for his services. In a letter written 
just before the first of the pamphlets went to press, Hare gave her 
"a thousand thanks for the goodness you have shown in the kind present you 
have been pleased to send me, " and some years later, complaining of the 
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lack of recognition of his services in Whig circles, he added, "I say 
not this to reproach your Grace, whom I have always found more ready 
to do favours, than I have been to ask them. "59 One need not assume 
that the present referred to was money, though it may have been, but it 
is reasonable to suppose that it had some connection with his current 
journalistic activities. If it seems strange that Hare did not 
mention the pamphlets he was engaged on in his letters to her, it may simply 
have been that, like most opposition journalists, he was reluctant to commit 
any evidence of his involvement in the press campaign to paper. 
Hare methodically devoted two of his four letters to considering 
the criticism of Marlborough's conduct as general, and two to his part in 
the peace negotiations; and in the former he naturally devoted most space 
to the charge that Marlborough had neglected the vital Spanish theatre 
in favour of a series of futile offensives in Flanders. He was aware the 
plausibility of this theory for many people, so that, while privately 
dismissing it as "nonsensical cant, " 
60 he was careful to make his 
printed rebuttal closely argued and equally plausible. His first contention 
was that the climate and geography of Spain, and its distance from gland, 
made it unsuitable as the main theatre of war, and that Marlborough's 
strategy which had given it only a secondary importance was therefore 
quite sound; "if that Kingdom be ever recover'd, it must be by proper 
Applications to France" (pp. 10-19). This was certainly a doctrine learnt 
from Marlborough, who had been confirmed in it by Allied failures in Spain. 
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"If you could order itt so as that wee might have success in Flanders, " 
he had written to Heinsius, "I should hope to gaine: Spain by France. ""61 
Hare's account of the difficulties of mounting full-scale campaigns 
in Spain was undoubtedly accurate. St John himself admitted, "we feel by 
experience, how insupportable an expence it is to carry on a regular war 
with great armies in Spain, " but added, '! still we think, -that the expence 
which we have been at, well applied, would have been effectual. " 
62 
It was 
this charge of "shameful Mismanagements in Spain" which Swift accused Hare 
of ignoring, 
63 
and once it had been confirmed by the House of Lords, in 
order "to give the Duke of Marlborough a side-wind Mortification " Hare's 
opponents could use the official verdict to demolish his case without 
further, argument. 
64 
In tackling the, second part of this major criticism, that having 
failed to give priority*to the Spanish theatre, Marlborough had occupied 
himself solely with siege warfare on France's most heavily defended frontier, 
Hare was on stronger ground. 
, 
Yet his task was seriously complicated by his 
awareness of the need for constant discretion and-forbearance: in discussing 
the shortcomings of the Allies, as he considered these had hampered the 
execution of the Duke's strategy. Marlborough himself had repeatedly 
complained of having to minimize his difficulties on this score in public, 
for fear of fostering bad relations, which would impede the progress of the 
65 
war still further. Hare had noted with approval his patron's refusal to 
"suffer Justice to be done him by, the least Word,. that might be prejudicial 
to the Publick, or indeed. to any body else, "66 and. he now took this discretion 
T 
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as his model. Having noted in general terms that the Duke's hands had "been 
often ty'd, when he was impatient to be doing something brave and 
Enterprizing, " he added dutifully, 
but I had rather leave his Grace without-Defence' th. n pretend to 
do him Justice, by entring_ into things he thinks fit to make a 
Secret of; the End of the War will be time enough for that. (p. 31) 
One is reminded of Marlborough's characteristic observation to a Dutch 
official over some dispute between the armies of the two nations: "let 
us wink at' all this, and when we have a peace, it will be then time to 
come to a-discussion. "67 
Yet this self-imposed forbearance was constantly at odds with Hare's 
personal loyalty to his patron. His reaction to an episode of. severe 
strain for Anglo-Dutch relations during the campaign of 1705 throws some 
light on his later dilemma. On this occasion, Marlborough had been 
bitterly frustrated by the refusal of the Dutch generals to agree to 
what promised to be a decisive battle, but had restrained his public 
protests somewhat, forýfear of the damage.. they would do, to Allied 
relations. 
68 
Hare, though sharing Marlborough's resentment to the 
full, had also drawn a careful distinction between those with a 
legitimate grievance against-the Dutch and those whose complaints amounted 
onlyrto deliberate trouble-making. Among the latter,, he included the 
high Tories, who "want"us to quarrel with our allies in order to an ill 
peace, " and so "are always rather before hand with those whom a just 
concern for our late disappointments makes uneasy at that. over caution of 
theirs which has in great measure been the cause of them"; violent 
recriminations against the Dutch, even from Marlborough's supporters, were 
92 
therefore not to be encouraged. 
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Yet at the same time, Hare was concerned 
at the cost of this reticence to Marlborough's reputation, for unless the 
whole truth were told, "our good people of England it is likely will lay 
?° 
the fault on him who has done his utmost to prevent it. " 
These same problems existed in a heightened form in 1710. To have 
defended Marlborough by reviving old grievances against the Dutch would 
have inflamed Tory prejudices which propagandists such as St John were 
already beginning to foster in. order to promote dissatisfaction with the. 
war. Nevertheless, on occasion some. of Marlborough's bolder strategies 
had. -been hampered, and his army confined to Flanders against his better 
judgment, by Dutch circumspection, -and 
Hare clearly felt that he-could 
not ignore these timmm-points altogether at a time when the suspicion 
that the Duke was personally responsible for the. prolongation of the war 
was gaining such currency. 
Hare's. solution to this difficulty was to deal with the controversial 
episodes as briefly. and unrancorously as possible, pointing out that 
responsibility for many failures and disappointments did not lie with 
Marlborough, but refraining from direct condemnation of the Allies. He. 
made, for instance, only a passing reference to the incident of 1705 
and the success which might have followed "had every body been as forward 
as his Grace on that Occasion" (p. 27). When this is compared with Hare's 
private fulminations against "that beast Slangenberg" (the obstructionist 
Dutch general), and scathing comments on "Dutch understanding" in military 
matters, his self-restraint is very evident. 
71 He exercised a similar 
forbearance on the subject of the Dutch Deputies, Marlborough's civilian 
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field advisors. Exasperated references in his private letters to "fear 
and an ill-placed parsimony ... never failing qualities of those genius's 
that haunt a general in these countries, I mean Dutch Deputies 91172 were 
so far toned down in print as to imply that the function of these officials 
was not necessarily a detrimental one: 
one may be sure, by all one has ever heard of Deputies, that they 
are something like Socrates's Genius, which never put him upon 
doing any thing; its whole Business was to check him, when he 
seem'd too forward. (p. 31) 
But `on the larger strategic issues, Hare'did find it impossible 
at-some points to avoid laying responsibility'for successive campaigns 
spent in Flanders specifically on'tIie'Dutch. , He could readily cite the 
Blenheim campaign as proof that Marlborough had-not confined himself to 
siege warfare in Flanders when there was a chance of acting decisively 
elsewhere; but to account for the failure to repeat the experiment, he 
pointed out that the Duke was not able to take the army to Italy in 1706, 
because "the Dutch thought they should be too much expos'd by his Absence, " 
and that"the following year, Marlborough was not 
for sitting'still; but the States were so'frightned with the 
Battle of Almanza, and the Invasion of Germany, that they would 
not let him stir. Thus the Duke could neither carry the War out 
of Flanders, nor act with Vigour in it ... 
(pp. 27-28) 
These statements are accurate enough as they stand; 
73 
yet as 
simplifications they do something less than justice to the Dutch. In 
private, Hare freely acknowledged that "the smallness of their country 
and the danger they have once been in of being over-run" made this 
obstinate caution in Flanders understandable. 
74 This is the argument 
put forward in defence of Dutch policy in a recent study; 
and 
Hare might 
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have included it without weakening his defence of Marlborough. Evidently 
his first loyalties were to his patron, and although he was prepared to 
exercise forbearance towards the Allies, he did not feel the need to 
go out of his way to defend them. This was a 'task reserved for the future. 
It can be seen that Hare did not represent the Flanders theatre as 
the ideal place in which to wage the war. Marlborough himself considered 
the Moselle valley "the most sensible part in which we might do the most 
hurt to France, " and in 1705 had formed a project to invade France from 
this direction. 76 Hare, in a passage which bears the obvious impress of 
Marlborough's opinion, could therefore remind the Duke's critics that 
he had made an initial attempt "to penetrate France on that which is 
confessedly the weakest Side, " and that it was not for want of his efforts 
that the_plan had come to nothing (p. 22). 
In 1705, in fact, Hare himself had shared the belief that no 
"effectual impression" could be made on France from the Flanders theatre. 
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It was Marlborough's later success there which caused him to modify this 
opinion, and by 1710 this personal experience enabled Hare, not only to 
argue that Marlborough's overall strategy was sound, but to pay tribute 
to the ability which had overcome difficulties at first believed insuperable 
even by his admirers (pp. 29-30). 
Perhaps Hare+'s arguments on this whole question would not have 
convinced those to whom any land warfare on a large scale was anathema, 
but they must have seemed impressive to those, otherwise well-disposed 
towards Marlborough, who wwre beginning to find Tory criticism increasingly 
plausible, and who were not sufficiently well-informed to discover its 
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weak points for themselves. As one discerning admirer put it, Hare's 
pamphlets were 
very Useful for acquainting such as are ignorant of it, with the 
State of the Case, for reclaiming of well-meaning Persons, who 
have been wrongfully prepossess'd, and for confounding of such 
Politicks as have their Dependance on Affection and Partiality. 78 
Having disposed of this standard item of Tory criticism, Hare 
then turned somewhat surprisingly to the separate charge that Marlborough 
had prolonged the war; surprisingly, because in most cases this 
accusation and the criticism of the general's strategic priorities had 
been one and the same thing, and having dealt with the latter, Hare 
could reasonably claim to have refuted the former. His most systematic 
critic therefore complained that under "the specious Pretence of sheaving, 
That the War has not been prolong'd, " Hare was simply composing a eulogy 
of his patron's achievements. 
79 Hare's purpose, however, was somewhat 
more subtle. The ultimate aim of recalling the details of Marlborough's 
successes was to make the most obvious point of all in his defence, a 
point so obvious that it could be taken for granted and overlooked even 
by his own supporters: 
In one Sense, indeed, I am willing to allow he has prolong'd the 
War, that without him must have ended long ago in an ill Peace; 
which he has hinder'd our coming to so soon as some seem to 
wish we had ... (p. 32) 
This was an argument which was to remain unanswerable until the ingenuity 
of Swift and St John devised the theme of The Conduct of the Allies nearly 
twelve months later. 
ý, 
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There still remained the accusation that Marlborough had wilfully 
cast away the chance of a good peace when it was offered at the conference 
table as a result of his successes; and this was a matter which taxed 
Hare's discretion to the uttermost. 
At first reading, the third and fourth letters "to a Tory-Member; " 
dealing with the negotiations of 1709 and 1710 respectively, appear to 
concern Marlborough scarcely at all. His individual role is seldom 
mentioned, and Hare is occupied with vindicating Allied peace policy at 
its most uncompromising, and with establishing French chicanery as the 
reason for the failure of the treaty. This would, of course, be a 
vindication of Marlborough also, were it not that at one point in 1709, 
of which Hare makes no explicit mention, the Duke was privately in 
disagreement with his colleagues as to the best means of securing their 
ambitious aims. 
The point on which the repeated deadlock of the negotiations 
centred publicly was the thirty-seventh article of the preliminaries. 
As a condition of peace, the Allies insisted that the French king induce 
his grandson to surrender the entire Spanish monarchy to the Austrian 
candidate within a stipulated period of time, while Louis XIV declared 
himself unable to do so, and unwilling to compel his grandson to comply by 
force of arms. Historians have pointed out that Marlborough had earlier 
professed himself in favour of leaving some part of the Spanish monarchy 
to Philip of Anjou, and that he later made secret pleas for some 
modification of the expedients designed to secure Spain for the Allies. 
At one point his proposal was that they accept French guarantees of 
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withdrawal of support from Philip and, following a separate peace with 
France, mount a full-scale campaign for the conquest of Spain, which he 
claimed would be successful within six months. Sir Winston Churchill 
considers these opinions proof of Marlborough's sincere desire for peace; 
others, while giving him credit for realism and good intentions, point 
out that he was showing wisdom after the event, and never attempted to 
press his policy publicly. 
It is uncertain how well acquainted Hare was with his patron's 
views on this subject, but it is difficult to believe him wholly ignorant 
of them. They were known, or suspected, by those who did not have his 
close contact with the general. 
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But if Hare was in the secret, there 
were a number of reasons why he should not have anticipated Marlborough's 
modern apologists and revealed it in order to absolve him personally from 
the charge of obstructing the peace; why he should instead have emphasized 
the complete harmony between the Duke and his colleagues, both English and 
foreign. 
In the first place, Hare seems genuinely to have disagreed with 
Marlborough, whether knowingly or not, about the desirability of making 
any peace with France which would leave Spain to be conquered afterwards, 
for he argued that the Allies would never be brought to co-operate and 
that France would have an opportunity to repair her damaged finances while 
England was still at war. 
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And since these opinions seem also to have 
prevailed in England, it was unlikely that even if Hare had revealed his 
patron's private views, they would have been accepted as proof of a genuine 
desire for peace. The Duke himself had refrained from making them public 
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at the time, because he discovered that to make a peace exclusive of 
Spain would be thought "a continuation of the war, and a giving time 
to France to recover. '183 I 
Yet although Hare made no explicit mention of this matter, there 
are certain passages in his pamphlet which suggest an awareness that the 
unanimity he assumed among the English and Allied plenipotentiaries was 
more apparent than real, and which certainly show an understanding of 
the reasons which induced Marlborough to keep to the letter of his official 
instructions in public, ` whatever his private opinions might have been. 
In particular, Hare stressed the penalties that awaited any representative 
of the British government abroad who disregarded orders framed in accordance 
with parliamentary declarations of policy. In these terms, Marlborough 
certainly was bound to uphold the policy of "no peace without Spain. " 
Therefore, Hare argued, 
if to insist on the 37th Article was a Fault, the D. of M. is 
not to be blam'd for it: Because, if he did insist, 'twas what 
he was°oblig'd-to; he had no Authority to do otherwise. All the 
World knows, that., both Houses of Parliament did the Beginning of 
that Year (1709), address the Queen, That no Peace should be made 
with France, without an entire Restitution of-the Spanish Monarchy 
... If therefore the 37th Article was insisted on, the D. is not to 
be blam'd; he did but his Duty, and could not justifie his doing 
otherwise; which if he had, would as certainly have been a High 
Crime and Misdemeanour, as his not doing it is now made a Matter 
of Complaint against him. (p. 56) 
This is the point put forward in extenuation of Marlborough's, 
conduct in one of the most recent studies. of these negotiations, 
84 
and there is no doubt that Hare was also reproducing his patron's 
sentiments. While complaining privately that the orders sent to the 
plenipotentiaries from England were "full of obstructions, " Marlborough 
99 
repeatedly stressed in his letters to Townshend and Heinsius that heý' 
was obliged to act strictly in accordance with these instructions in 
all matters of importance. 
85" 
It is interesting to note, however, that 
Hare's use of, the phrase "if he did insist, " suggests an awareness that 
the Duke had perhaps'been privately unwilling to do so. 
Another passage, cast in the same carefully guarded language, 
hints at the subtler pressures which determined both Marlborough's 
conduct at the peace negotiations, " and Hare's later delicate handling 
,- of the' subject in print: 
If aM [inister] advises Peace, be sure he is well paid for it; 
if he advises against it, 'tis to perpetuate the War; if to 
facilitate a Treaty, he is willing to give up some Part of the 
Spanish Monarchy, he shall be accus'd of betraying us to France. 
If according to his Instructions he insists upon the whole, 'tis 
plain he aims at nothing by such Terms, but to render all Treaties 
impossible. If he acts-neither one or other of these Parts by 
himself, but in Conjunction with the rest of the Allies, and is 
rather willing to-hear their Opinions than forward to give his own; 
and is so far from assuming to himself a Part that may particularly 
, distinguish him, that he does not so much lead the rest, as he is 
led by them; yet a Fault must be found where there is none, and that 
must be all laid on him; which, were it a Fault, he has perhaps the 
least Share in ... Thus the D. of M. is with them a Dutch-Man, an Imperialist, a French Man or anything else but what he ever was, 
and ever will be in spite of all their Provocations, a True 
Englishman ... (pp. 55-56) 
In the last sentence there is the echo of Marlborough's own words which 
one often finds in Hare's writing; the Duke's sensitivity to the 
accusation that he was not "a good Englishman" his already been noticed. 
But the passage is chiefly remarkable because it suggests that Hare was 
trying to absolve his patron individually from the charge of pressing 
unrealistic terms on France, without actually committing himself to a 
definite account of what had happened, since this would sithply 
Ido 
have stimulated the fault-finding mood of the Tory propagandists. Hare was 
probably right in assuming, for instance, 'that if he had dwelt upon 
Marlborough's efforts "to facilitate a Treaty, " the hostile pamphleteers- 
would have dropped the accusation of insisting on-impossible terms, and 
claimed instead that the Duke had been bribed to betray his country to 
France. How ready they were to arouse this suspicion, even without 
prompting, was demonstrated by'Mrs. Manley's insinuation that Louis XIV 
had'not been'able to buy Marlborough only because, with a treasury 
depleted by the long war, "he could not come up to his Price. "86 
Hare's decision to defend Marlborough's conduct as plenipotentiary 
by appealing to his official instructions also took advantage of the 
difficulties which the new ministry and its propagandists faced in arguing 
openly against the old ideal of "no peace without Spain. " It was only 
after the death of the Emperor in April 1711 that Swift ventured to 
challenge the repeated parliamentary' sanction of this policy, 
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and until 
this was convincingly done, Marlborough could not be publicly blamed for 
adhering to it. 
But even with this major problem solved, the peace negotiations 
were not an easy subject for Hare, to deal with. Personal experience enabled 
him to write intelligently and authoritatively about military matters, but 
when"he came to discuss international diplomacy, the fact that his identity 
was known was not an unqualified-advantage; "we have, never heard that he 
was employ'd as Plenipotentiary, to be so thoroughly acquainted with all 
the Steps taken in that Affair, " a Tory critic acidly remarked, "and if 
he has hapned to say Grace to some of those Ministers, it will hardly be 
JOl 
believ'd. they should lay themselves so open to him, over their Meat. "88 
At first sight, this would seem, to be fair comment. Although Hare 
had been at The Hague during the negotiations of 1709, and had taken a 
keen interest in their. progress then and afterwards, they were conducted 
in some secrecy, and Hare explicitly stated at-the time that he had not 
always been "in the secret. " 
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He could not therefore claim to be writing 
consistently from first-hand knowledge. In fact he made no secret of his 
considerable reliance on accounts of the conferences already printed in 
"the News Papers and Monthly Accounts"; it was to these sources that he 
referred his readers for verification-of his statements at one point 
(p. 5), and at another he quoted ,a 
document from the Mercure Historigue et 
Politique (pp. 8-9). 
90 Evidently he was sufficiently aware of his own 
want of authority not to expect his arguments to be taken on trust 
where, there.. wasrsome readily accessible means of corroboration. 
His most extensive use of such material was not, however, 
specifically acknowledged in the text. When the conferences at 
Gertruydenberg were finally broken off in July 1710, the French 
plenipotentiaries issued a manifesto, justifying their conduct and 
complaining of the treatment they had met with from the Allies. Both 
the English and the Dutch governments were indignant at what they 
considered an attempt to rally the war-weary elements of both nations 
against them, and the States-General drew up a long, detailed "Resolution" 
in reply. 
91 Marlborough's reaction to it is worth noticing; "I think [it] 
must convince everybody that is not resolved to be blind, that the King 
of France did never sincerly resolve the evacuation of Spain and the West 
! O2 
Indies" he wrote to Heinsius, and went on to advise that the document 
"be well translated and printed at Londen, for I can't but hope that our 
people are yett so honest as to go on cherfully with the warr til we 
force France to be reasonable and honest . 1192 In fact, even as he wrote, 
translations of the Resolution were appearing in the London newspapers. 
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Marlborough's comments are of interest, both as evidence of his 
growing realization of the value of printed propaganda, and because 
Hare made considerable use of the Resolution as source material for his 
account of the Gertruydenberg negotiations. 
94 At one point he praised 
the "Plainness and Sincerity" and the "solid Reasoning" with which it 
had exposed French deceit (pp. 85-86), 'and it was particularly valuable 
for his purposes because it had Marlborough's approval and was also 
a detailed expression of the official Dutch attitude on ,a very contröversial 
and complex subject. By adhering closely to it, Hare could therefore 
avoid the conflict of views which had bedevilled his discussion of 
military matters. 
Yet for all his reliance on accessible sources, Hare did give 
the impression of being better informed about the peace negotiations, 
than even the most conscientious reader of "the News Papers and Monthly 
Accounts" could be expected to be, and some of his comments do imply 
that he had had access to privileged, if not secret, information. 
"Considering the Secrecy, -with which Things of, this Nature are, and 
ought to be transacted, " he remarked at the close of his third letter, 
"I flatter my self, you will be content to find I know so much of them, 
rather than wonder I can't tell you more" (p. 65); elsewhere he stated 
I03 
that his account was compiled "from what I have observ'd my self in the 
Progress of this Affair, and the most exact Information I could get 
from others" (p. 54). 
In spite of taunts at Hare's status as chaplain, there was good 
reason for his readers to take these hints seriously. A reputation for 
gravity and strictness acquired during his years as tutor at King's 
College, Cambridge, 95 had not prevented his retaining lasting friendships 
with several of his former students, and by 1710, these young men and their 
influential family connections held an impressive array of public offices. 
Robert Walpole had been Secretary-at-War, while his brother, Horace, was 
secretary to the British Embassy at The Hague during the negotiations 
of 1709 and 1710. Hare also had a friendship dating from childhood with 
Lord Townshend, Marlborough's fellow plenipotentiary and later the 
Walpoles' brother-in-law. 96 Townshend and the younger Walpole, with 
whom Hare was on terms of equality, could have supplied him with ample 
information about the peace conferences, even if Marlborough proved 
unforthcoming with his chaplain. 
There is also some evidence that Hare had a similar assistance 
from Godolphin, whose son, Francis, had been another of his students. 
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The two young men, as Hare's letters reveal, had remained close friends, 
and it has already been noticed that the Lord Treasurer had several times 
interested himself in Hare's promotion. The elder Godolphin certainly 
viewed the press attacks of his political opponents with contempt198 
but he nevertheless approved of Maynwaring's efforts to defend his 
financial administration in print, and was even prepared to supply him 
1011. 
with the necessary confidential material for a further pamphlet. 
99 It 
is quite likely, therefore, that he would have been willing to extend the 
same privilege to Hare. 
The evidence for this collaboration lies in the similarity between 
some of the opinions expressed in Godolphin's letters to Marlborough 
concerning the negotiations of 1709 and 1710, and Hare's discussion of 
the same subjects in print. On the difficulty of securing Allied support 
for a conquest of Spain, for example, Hare's opinions are far closer to 
Godolphin's than to Marlborough's, and there are some striking 
correspondences in matters of detail. Godolphin argued that even if the French 
officially withdrew support from Philip of Anjou, they could still assist 
him underhand with men and money, 
100 
a suggestion which Hare also makes (p. 58). 
The surrender of some towns in Spain which the Allies had proposed as 
security for this point had been refused by the French, and Godolphin 
considered that by withdrawing their garrisons from these towns-, they 
" 
had'rillfully put it out of their power" to adopt this expedient. 
He then proposed as an alternative, the surrender of Perpignan, 
Pamplona, and Bayonne, "all three of them inletts to Spain by Severall 
ways, & therfore in my humble opinion, the properest Security the Allys can 
have next to towns w 
th in Spain it, self, " and one which the French could 
not pretend was out of their power to give. 
101 In discussing this 
subject, Hare stresses all these points in very similar terms (pp. 68-70). 
Finally, Godolphin claimed that the French troops withdrawn from the Spanish 
towns had been kept in Spain in order to assist Philip's cause; and again 
102 
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this accusation is to be found in Hare's account (p. 69). These points 
are scarcely conclusive evidence of Godolphin's influence on Hare, but 
together with the family connection, they do suggest a possibility 
of collaboration. 
Yet in spite of Hare's claims to privileged information, it 
is probable that the third and fourth letters, which did not run 
beyond the second edition, made fewer converts than the first two. 
Although his uncompromisingly "official" attitude to the whole 
subject of the peace treating might frustrate Marlborough's Tory 
critics for a short time, it could not hope to dispose of their 
insinuations once and for all. In particular, the` vehement emphasis 
on French insincerity as the sole cause of the breakdown of the 
negotiations was bound to seem unsatisfactory to many readers. 
According to one contemporary historian, this claim had largely lost 
103 its power to persuade by the summer of 1710. 
Hare's acknowledged connection with Marlborough made his defensive 
stance a lesser disadvantage than it might otherwise have been. When 
he pointed out that critics of the Duke's tactics and strategy "were 
neither at the Consultations of our Generals themselves, nor pretend to 
any Correspondence with those that were" (pp. 38-39), and that the majority 
of party writers "seldom know any thing of Affairs abroad themselves; 
much less are they fit Masters to teach others, how to judge about them" 
(p. 24), he evidently intended a silent comparison with his own superior 
claims to such knowledge, in spite of his token attempts elsewhere to 
loh 
suggest that he had not been an eyewitness of the events he described. 
He also set himself apart from the standard breed of "answerers" 
by his attitude to his opponents' publications. He did not, for instance, 
make the tactical error of confining his attention to any single pamphlet. 
"YoiLwon't expect I should consider each of these Papers by themselves, " 
he wrote to the "correspondent" who was supposed to have requested a reply 
to several popular Tory prints, "that would be giving too much trouble 
to one, who, I know, is too good a Judge to think them of so much 
Consequence (p. 1). Instead, his first step was to extract the most 
representative criticism of his patron contained in these pamphlets and 
summarize it under four headings (p. 3); in the process, hints and innuendoes 
were reduced to direct accusation and each accusation given in its bluntest 
form. This businesslike and unflinching approach to his opponents 
proclaimed Hare's confidence in the strength of his case, and also made 
it clear that he was about to present an independent, methodical, and 
definitive reply to the whole body of Tory accusation against Marlborough. 
He then proceeded to subject each of the four points to a rigorous and 
lengthy examination. 
An ostentatious reliance on solid argument and exposition, and 
what Hare called "plain naked Truth and Fact" (p. 8), was at once 
acknowledged as the most notable feature of the four letters. It was, of 
course, one of the most confidence-inspiring techniques open to the 
pamphleteer. "The Author grounds all his Arguments on Facts, which have lately 
happen'd before our Eyes, " an admiring reader noted, 
and the Consequences he deduces are no way forc'd, or remote. I am 
therefore perswaded, that whosoever reads them with Attention, and 
/07 
without Prejudice, will be oblig'd to own they are just ... 
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This was not the only tribute to the "great Plausibility and force of 
Argument" with which Hare made out his case. 
1059 Swift, however, was 
more critical. He conceded the plausibility, but claimed that it was 
a cover for "much Artifice, and Abundance of Misrepresentation, as well 
as direct Falshoods in Point of Fact"; on further consideration, he 
could not deny Hare some measure of truth in his vindication of 
Marlborough's generalship, and his chief complaint was that this defence 
of what had always been "unquestionable" was laboured to the exclusion 
of such matters as the wrong Steps in the Treaty of Peace. " 
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Even a friendly reader was prepared to endorse this criticism 
to a certain extent; "if I may here presume in some sort to blame the 
Apologist of so good a Cause, it is needless to refute, to"argue, to 
prove, when the Actions themselves speak so loudly. "107 Marlborough 
himself had, of course, been'the first to make this claim; but Hare's 
preliminary survey of his opponents' arguments had demonstrated how 
unrealistic it had become, and how disingenuous was Swift's assertion 
that the Duke's professional ability had never been seriously called 
in question. In the circumstances, therefore, these criticisms were 
the highest tributes Hare could have received. He had constructed the 
necessary vindication with such constant reference to the facts of 
Marlborough's past conduct, that once the case was set out logically, it 
had the air of self-evidence of which the Duke himself had been confident, 
and the task itself seemed almost superfluous. 
But the charges of artifice and misrepresentation in Hare's account 
109 
of the peace negotiations had, as has already been suggested, a greater 
foundation; and in this case, his apparent reliance on fact assisted in 
the process of concealment, for he kept up a smoke-screen of superficial 
detail in such matters as the dates, times, and subject-matter-of the 
various conferences, in which there was an ostentatious display of 
accuracy. Since few would have been sufficiently well-informed to 
question even these statements, much less pinpoint a more significant 
error, the account could pass as impressively, even oppressively, weighted 
with fact. Hare's most dogged critic admitted defeat when faced with 
the task of examining it in detail, dismissing it as'a "Narrative, either 
of True, or Suppositious Facts, which I cannot pretend to, ýbe so intelligent 
in those Affairs as to disprove. '1108 
Yet there Iwas always the danger that this procedure would give 
the pamphlets a length and complexity which the average reader would 
not tolerate. Hare was certainly conscious of running this risk 
(his 
text is punctuated with apologies for undue prolixity and preoccupation 
with detail), but he remained doggedly resolved not to 
let it deter him 
from dealing with each pointas thoroughly as possible. That'the 
pamphlets even so make easy reading is attributable largely to the 
manner in which the arguments are presented. 
The device of casting a pamphlet in the form of an open letter 
to a friend was, of course, a very common one, indicative of a "willingness 
to 'get together' with the reader, and a corresponding unwillingness to 
write impersonally, or make ex 
cathedra statements, " which had become 
characteristic of the prose writers of the period. 
109 In Hare's case, 
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it. enabled the refutation of Tory criticisms to be conducted without 
undue formality and dogmatism; and the fact that the "correspondent" 
with whom he was on such familiar and cordial terms was himself "a 
Tory-Member" made the important point that Marlborough's vindication 
would be acceptable to intelligent and honest readers of either party. 
The form must, in any case, have seemed a natural one to a 
pamphleteer who in private life was such a prolific writer of informal 
news letters. In fact, it was the unlaboured style of these letters that 
he transferred almost unaltered into print. The forms of familiar speech, 
"'tis, " "can't, " you'll, " etc., are used throughout, and the phrasing is 
often colloquial to the point of raciness; "nothing but Experience could 
have convinc'd People, that Spain might not have been had for going for, " 
Hare remarked at one point, when explaining the decision to carry the war 
into the Peninsula (p. 17). The resulting informality, fluency, and 
liveliness of the prose make it an ideal vehicle for its weight of factual 
evidence and exposition, and they also communicate the confidence and 
enthusiasm of a writer completely at home with his subject. ' As a 
contemporary reader put it, Hare handles the vindication "with such 
Sprightliness, and such Energy of Stile, as expresses a mighty Zeal. 1"110 
Although Hare began with a conventional apology for "the many 
Marks of Haste and Negligence" in his pamphlets (p. 1), the informality 
of presentation was almost certainly calculated. He had had little taste 
for formal eulogy at any time; "I hope our Poets will try in their way 
to do justice to such a Theme, " he had written after the battle of Ramillies, 
"but if their verses prove no better than the prose congratulations I have 
i/o 
seen, one might be content to be without them"; of some compositions 
of his own on the same subject, he remarked, "they had that advantage by 
being writ in haste, that they were ye more natural; wch is all so great 
a subject wants. "111 
It was, in'any case, becoming undesirable for Marlborough's 
supporters to "do justice" to his military achievements by means of 
conventional panegyric, since all such material was seized on by hostile 
pamphleteers as evidence of a deliberate Whig attempt to eclipse the 
Queents prestige and authority. 
112 In November 1710, a eulogistic 
reference to the Duke's victories in a Latin sermon preached before 
Convocation by the Dean of Peterborough was sufficient to attract the 
unfavourable attention of the most widely read of the Tory news-writers, 
and when Kennett protested at a Tory "translation" of the Sermon which 
dubbed Marlborough a second Protector, it was retorted that the "Encomium" 
bestowed on the general had been greater than the tribute paid to the 
Queen herself, "a Practice that is grown into Request with the Party 
ever since the Dissolution of the Last Parliament. 1+113 Even Hare's 
studied moderation in this respect could not protect him from the charge 
of encouraging Marlborough's overweening ambition with his praise. 
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A'positive advantage of Hare's careful avoidance of literary 
affectation in the presentation of his case was that it enabled him 
to discredit his opponents' more elaborate techniques of "Romance" and 
"Declamation" by comparison, by associating them with the need for 
misrepresentation; "for plain Truths need no Disguise, " he commented 
in his opening paragraph, "Fiction and Ornament are of no Advantage, but 
111 
when they serve a Cause, that can't bear to be seen in its true Light" (p. 1). 
By this reckoning, Hare's soberer methods of procedure amounted to a pledge 
of good faith to his readers. 
Hare's greatest shortcoming as a pamphleteer was his apparent 
inability to transmute his indignation at Marlborough's treatment'into 
anything more-subtle than undistinguished invective, the least effective 
of satiric techniques. 
115 He himself was aware that his congenital hot 
temper in argument might prove a disadvantage;, "if resentment can give life 
to a discourse you wont think this wants any, " he wrote to Francis 
Godolphin, of an unpublished reply to an earlier pamphlet critical of 
Marlborough, "all the danger is, Im afraid you'll think there is too much. " 
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But these misgivings did not prevent: him from giving considerable rein to 
a similar "resentment" in The Management of the War. 'The following passage 
is fairly representative:, " 
I shall shew you the vile Ingratitude and Impudence of these Men, 
in such a Manner, as will, I hope, abundantly convince you, the 
most implacable Malice. could have invented nothing more stupidly 
ridiculous, than to accuse him of prolonging the War, who, has more 
Reason than any Body to wish a good End to it ... 
(p. 30) 
Terms such as "unjust and villanous, " "black Villany and Malice, " 
"senseless'and ridiculous, "", "the Folly and Malice of this most profligate 
Libeller, " were applied to the Tory pamphleteers and their productions 
with such wearisome regularity, that even Hare's greatest admirer felt 
the need to beg indulgence for "what may be found something Hot in his 
Answers and Recriminations. 11117 Meanwhile, his opponents, unable to 
fault him in more serious matters, had seized gladly on this weakness. 
From Swift came a reprimand for "foul" and ungentlemanly language, 
//z 
unbecoming their common profession, and another critic, snatching the 
opportunity for ridicule, recommended that the pamphlets be inscribed "In 
Usum Bellingsgate, for the Information of Porters, Carmen, Watermen, Oyster- 
Women, Orange-Women, &c. 118 
But there was perhaps one aspect of this "Bellingsgate" for which 
Hare was not entirely responsible. Many years afterwards, Oldmixon stated 
that Maynwaring's revision of Hare's pamphlets had been so thorough "that 
they might, indeed, have well past for his own, "119 The evidence of close 
collaboration between Marlborough's supporters is interesting, but in this 
instance it cannot be accepted without some reservation. Throughout the 
period of the composition and publication of The Management of the War 
Maynwaring hadýin fact been very ill, so ill that he was not even equal 
to his share of labour on the Medley; 
120 it is unlikely, therefore, that 
he would have undertaken a revision of Hare's lengthy and closely argued 
tract, as systematic as that described by Oldmixon. In any case, a 
comparison of The Management of the War with Hare's private letters in 
style and in the similarities of content already noted can leave little 
doubt that it was predominantly and characteristically his own work. 
There are, however, certain isolated passages in which Maynwaring's 
influence may be discerned. "Jacobite seems to be no juster a character 
of a Tory, as to the body of them, than Republican is of a Whig, " Hare 
had written to Sarah in 1710, "'tis the dirt each side throw at one 
another, and that in such plenty as some will stick. "121 It was Maynwaring, 
a more zealous Whig than Hare, who revelled in such mud-slinging, and in the 
past had been involved in the writing of pamphlets to raise "a cry upon the 
113 
Jacobites, " and "to prove that Tories are Frenchmen, and must never rise 
again. t1122 Such allusions occurred with sufficient frequency in The 
Management of the War to attract the attention of a Tory critic, 
123 
and 
in view of Hare's professed distaste for this name-calling, it is reasonable 
to conjecture that Maynwaring had been largely responsible for them. 
A few days before the publication of Hare's fourth letter "to a Tory- 
Member, " Defoe, who at this period attacked or defended Marlborough with 
equal facility, issued his Short Narrative of the Life and Actions of His 
Grace John, D. of Marlborough. 
124 It had been written, Defoe claimed, for 
tithe common People only; to vindicate the Innocent, and to undeceive a 
good part of the Nation, who have not had an Opportunity to be better 
Informed" (pp. 9-10); although without the political influence of Hare's 
"Tory-Member, " this section of the population had some power to determine 
Marlborough's fate, for "cunning Envy is often very strong, and when once 
its Devices are effectually spread in the Mouths of the Multitude, will 
produce a Blast able to blow down the most lofty Cedar" (p. 21). 
The pamphlet, in the course of its biographical narrative, dealt 
with a number of major topics of detraction, but-perhaps most interesting 
were Defoe's comments on the charge that Marlborough had prolonged the war. 
Lacking the authority which Hare's connection with the>Duke had given him, 
Defoe made up the deficiency by adopting the persona of "an Old Officer in 
the Army. " A vindication of Marlborough's generalship came very aptly 
frön a professional soldier, supposedly irritated by Tory 
11ý 
coffee-house practitioners of "the Art Military" (p. 26), for, as Swift 
remarked, "I know not any Sort of Men so apt as Soldiers are, to 
reprimand those who presume to interfere in what relates to their 
Trade. 11125 To have entered upon detailed accounts of strategic 
priorities and international diplomacy would have left Defoe's chosen 
readers little the wiser, but "an Old Officer" could be expected to have 
plentiful experience of campaigning conditions, and this was all that 
was necessary for Defoe's purposes. For the rest, he employed the 
kind of simple logic, combined with emotional appeal, which would impress 
the most uninformed. If the common people had had experience of life in 
the army, Defoe argued, 
they would be perswaded, that a State of War, to those who 
are engag'd in it, must needs be a state of Labour and Misery; 
and that a great General, I mean such a one as the Duke of 
Marlborough, weak in his Constitution, and well stricken in 
Years, would not undergo those eating Cares, which must be 
continually at his Heart; the Toils and Hardships which he must 
endure, and the often Sorrows which must Prick his Heart for 
ugly Accidents, if he has the least Spark of humane Commiseration, 
I say, he would not engage himself 'in such a Life, if not for 
the sake of his Queen and Country, and his Honour. (pp. 41-42) 
This was a very different picture of Marlborough from that 
usually presented in the press, a more appealing and human figure than 
the victorious demigod of past panegyric, or the master strategist of 
Hare's vindication; and the passage is particularly interesting because 
of its similarity in substance to the Duke's private letters of 
the previous two years, in which he had referred repeatedly to his 
advancing age and wish for retirement, and lamented the heavy mortality 
at Malplaquet and the havoc wrought in camp and countryside by famine 
and epidemics of sickness, 
126 
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It is perhaps surprising that Hare, who was in a better position 
than Defoe to be acquainted with Marlborough's feelings in this respect, 
did not include such arguments in his own vindication. Yet Hare, a 
civilian, whose interest in military and diplomatic affairs was primarily 
intellectual, does not seem fully to have shared the fellow-feeling which 
the Duke, as a professional soldier, had for his men. 
127 He would, in any 
case, probably have considered it beneath his dignity to adapt his 
complex arguments to the capacities of Defoe's chosen readership; "the 
multitude don't use to think, " was a characteristic complaint of his. 
128 
Defoe, however, possessed pre-eminently "the popular writer's gift for 
simplification,. for bringing an abstract issue down to concrete terms 
that appeal to the ordinary reader, " 
129 
and his view of Marlborough's 
situation, both perceptive and plausible, added a new dimension to the 
defences published by the Duke's supporters at this period. 
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Chapter III 
THE QUESTION OF THE COMMAND 
On the one hand, the accession of Marlborough's enemies to 
power, and his involvement in the campaign of denigration which had 
preceded and justified the dismissal of his colleagues, suggested the 
possibility of his own dismissal or resignation. On the other, his 
unquestionable ability to command success in the field made it advisable 
for the new ministers to retain his services, if they wished also to 
retain the confidence of the nation and the Allies in the future conduct 
of the war; yet it was evident that he could not be continued in office 
on the same footing as before. The problem of Marlborough's continued. 
command of the army received much attention from the party pamphleteers 
from mid-1710 until early the following year, and/some points the 
pressures they brought to bear were a determining factor in the solution 
that was eventually reached. 
For the new administration to have dispensed with Marlborough's 
services while the campaign was still in progress would have been a 
disastrous step, and after the defeats in Spain at the end of the year, 
which destroyed initial hopes of a speedy peace, Marlborough! s Flanders 
theatre was recognized as the only place in which the war could now be 
won. 
1 Since the Allies, particularly the Dutch, also interceded 
powerfully on Marlborough's behalf, both Harley and St John preferred 
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to represent the decision not to part with him as a gesture of 
indulgence to them. 
2 Yet the unpalatable fact was that even without 
these pressures, he could not have been disposed of simply as another 
political opponent. The barrage of plausible criticism of his conduct 
at home and abroad was slow to destroy the prestige of years of success, 
and in September Peter Wentworth learnt that 
the Duke of M-- will be continued until he lays down 
himself, for the merit of his service is more Glaring to 
the eyes of the World, then the private piques that he 
may justly have geven accation to be taken at him. 3 
Harley accordingly made overtures of accommodation before the campaign was 
over, and the Queen herself repeatedly declared that "there was no thought 
of putting him out. 114 
Nevertheless, rumours that "a Commission has been drawing for a 
New General" had been circulating since the previous April, and by mid-year 
it was the contention of the most influential Whig propaganda that Marlborough 
would be dismissed and the country fall "an immediate Sacrifice of France. "5 
These rumours that the new ministry intended to pay off old scores at the 
expense of the national interest were to some extent a Whig device for 
shaking national confidence in their opponents from the outset; the subject 
was such an effective one for this purpose that a Tory journalist condemned 
discussion of it as "tending to create Jealousies and Divisions amongst 
Her Majesties Subjects, and to excite them to Sedition and Rebellion. "6 
However, it was Tory, rather than Whig propaganda which gave 
these reports their credibility and absolved Marlborough's supporters from 
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the charge of sheer mischief-making; for only one ministerial pamphlet, 
and that intended in part for distribution abroad, explicitly referred 
to the Queen's promise to the Allies not to remove Marlborough from his 
command, and even this need not have been considered binding beyond the 
end of the campaign then in progress.? Otherwise there was a real 
discrepancy between the official attitude and the greater part of printed 
discussion of the subject. Sarah was puzzled. "Some times I think by 
the discourse of him, that they think it-of too much consiquence & danger 
to put him out after such success's; " she wrote to Hare, "but they print 
millions of lyes in case it happens to quiet those that would not like 
it. "$ It was not simply that Marlborough had not been spared by 
propagandists justifying the ministerial changes; many of them appeared 
to regard his dismissal as a serious possibility, some indirectly prepared 
for it, and one or two openly argued in favour of it. 
A Tory answer to a Whig ballad which foretold Marlborough's 
dismissal pointed out that he was as subject as any servant of the Crown 
to removal at the Queen's pleasure, whatever his success or popularity, 
and an "Honest Torie, " replying to another such prediction, made the more 
venomous retort that, ' 
if his ß [rac]e will not longer s nerv] e but upon his own 
Co [n] d [itio] ns, it may be near time for the Q [uee] n to 
use her P [rero] g[ati] ve; for I hope she can change h [i] m 
at her pleasure, as well as any other of her Servants ... 9 
The issue was further complicated by the rumour that when the envoy of 
the new ministry, Earl Rivers, departed for Hanover to ensure the Protestant 
3. 
heir of the good intentions of his colleagues, he had instructions to 
offer the command of the army to the Elector. There were, in fact, 
three variations of this news item: one stated outright that Marlborough 
was to be removed and the Elector put in his place; the second, that the 
offer was a safeguard against Marlborough's voluntary resignation; and 
the third, that the Elector was simply being invited to assume the nominal 
command of Generalissimo, which would not affect Marlborough's control of 
the army in the field. The last proposal could be approved of even by 
the Whig Observator. 
10 
However, the conflicting reports so increased the uncertainty 
about Marlborough's tenure of office that the Tory Post was soon 
maintaining that they were "altogether groundless. "11 Marlborough himself 
had already seen them for what they principally were, contributions to 
Barley's Election propaganda, to be seized on by his pamphleteers as 
indisputable proof of his good intentions towards the Protestant succession, 
upon which the Whigs delighted in casting doubts. 
12 Even so, Marlborough's 
secretary warned Whig journalists to be wary of scotching the rumours too 
hastily, "for I am persuaded the Party would be glad to send him [Rivers] 
those Instructions still if they could prevail. "13 
One Tory pamphleteer did press all the charges brought against 
Marlborough to their logical conclusion, arguing that the mere suspicion 
of treasonable designs made him unfit to retain his command. With considerable, 
though somewhat misapplied ingenuity he then used the strongest arguments 
in favour of keeping the general in office to bolster the case for his 
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removal, by pointing out that continued success under a single commander, 
and the popular acclaim it brought him, might swell him "into such an 
Imposthume of Greatness" as would make him a danger to the Crown. Even 
more ineptly, he cited with approval the French policy of making frequent 
changes in the supreme command, ignoring the obvious fact that it had 
resulted in nothing more desirable than nine years' consistent defeat for 
the French troops. More to the point, however, was the reminder that, 
while Marlborough had strong motives for continuing the war, the Elector 
of Hanover had a vested interest in procuring a speedy and secure peace, 
as the means by which his succession was to be guaranteed by other members 
of the Alliance. 
14 
But the more realistic of the pamphleteers who seemed to favour 
Marlborough's dismissal concentrated on undermining the belief that his 
presence at the head of the army was a prerequisite of success, realizing 
that for most people the prestige of consistent victory would be an argument 
against his removal, not in favour of it. Defoe wanted to know whether 
the Duke had "any hereditary Title to the Command of the Army of 
r 
. 
Britain, " and whether "God's Blessing upon her Majesty's Arms, to which all 
our Successes are owing, is a Peculiar to the Queen, to the Protestant 
Interest of Eu=e, or to the Person of the General? " The "Honest Torie" 
was "sure that we have the best Officers and Army in the World, who by 
God's Blessing cannot fail of continued good success, tho' the G [enera] 1 
should be Ch [an] g te] d" and suggested one of Marlborough's Tory rivals, 
General Webb, or the Elector of Hanover, as possible successors. 
15 
. wý.. 
It was Mrs. Manley who embarked most enthusiastically on the 
task of demonstrating to "those who esteem Stauracius so necessary; " 
that he could claim no personal credit for the Allied victories; for she 
argued that he owed them to sheer good luck, to the fact that Fate had 
made him the instrument of Louis XIV's downfall, and above all to the 
training which his veteran troops had received under the late King's command. 
Finally, realizing that the personal element could not be eliminated 
altogether, she described how, before a battle, the general had resort to 
''soperiferous Drugs, Fumigations, and certain Necromantick Rites, "I by 
which he "gains a foresight of the Event, and is instructed in the manner 
of overcoming-" 
16 This last point, in so far as it was intended to be taken 
seriously, is chiefly valuable as an illustration of the difficulty of 
discounting Marlborough's innate ability completely, without recourse to 
the wildest fiction. Nor was it hard for his supporters to dispose of 
the contention that good fortune alone was responsible for his consistent 
success* 
17 But the reminder that his victories were in a great measure 
attributable to the bravery and skill of his officers and troops had, of 
course, a real validity. Marlborough himself had repeatedly acknowledged 
this, and Bolingbroke years afterwards recalled having heard him say, 
before his first battle had been won, that he could predict the ultimate 
success of the Allied cause from the quality of the veteran troops whose 
command he had inherited from William 111.18 
Yet there was a limit to the appeal of such logic at a time of 
widespread uneasiness about the future of 
the war. Whatever part 
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Marlborough's personal ability might have played in past successes, 
the plain fact was that success had become identified with his command, 
and in practice Mrs. Manley's arguments did not convince even those who 
would most have liked to believe them. Swift was a better judge of 
the consideration which should be given to the almost superstitious 
national confidence in the Captain-General, because he was to some extent 
under its spell himself. Although he made a passing reference in the 
Examin to the credit that was due to the whole army for the victories, 
he privately acknowledged the fallacy of arguing from this that Marlborough's 
services were dispensable; for he realized that the invincibility of the 
soldiers, in which Mrs. Manley and others had expressed such confidence, was 
itself a product of collective faith in their commander, and as such, 
another argument against his dismissal, rather than in favour of it. 
19 
Meanwhile, of course, these onslaughts on the notion of Marlborough's 
personal indispensability had not gone unchallenged by his supporters. 
One of them pointed out that after all the Duke's success, "he must be a 
bold Man indeed, *that will pretend to succeed him, with Expectation ev'n 
of bare Approbation. "20 It added weight to this argument, that, of all 
the pretenders to the command, there was not one whose military record bore 
comparison with Marlborough's, and who did not have additional temperamental 
shortcomings disqualifying him from the post. Only the dangers of 
indulging in overt criticism of the new ministry and its adherents prevented 
the exploitation of these points, and this problem was ingeniously solved 
1-1 
in a pamphlet entitled The New Scheme. 
It consisted simply of a series of tributes to members of the 
Whig ministry, followed in each case by the name of a possible or 
actual successor who was notorious for possessing the contrary abilities 
or temperament; the reader was then ironically invited to make a choice 
in favour of the Tory candidate. This was a particularly effective 
means of ridiculing the pretensions of Marlborough's would-be successors. 
The Duke, for example, was noted for his unfailing'affability and patience; 
the reader was accordingly invited to compare these qualities with the 
corresponding character traits of the Duke of Argyll. The latter was 
an able and ambitious general and one of Marlborough's most hostile 
rivals, but his arrogance and ungovernable temper were a source of 
discomfort even to his admirers. When tribute was paid to Marlborough's 
modesty about his great achievements, General Webb's name was appended. 
Webb had won a brilliant minor victory during the campaign of 1708, for 
which at the time Marlborough had inadvertently failed to give him due 
credit, but he was said to have tired even his Tory sympathizers by his 
boasting of this single exploit. 
21 
The virtue of this technique was, that since not one word of actual 
criticism was involved, opponents could not complain without admitting 
in effect that the implied unfavourable comparisons were valid. The 
irritable confusion which this aroused can be judged from references to 
the pamphlet in the Tory press. Sir Thomas Double was made to refer 
to it complacently as "One of the most Impudent of all my Performances" 
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and to boast that "it has cost me above a Hundred Pound to disperse 
it about the Town, and round the Country, " Boyer was outraged at 
the "Scandalous Paper" and "the Malicious Aspersions" it cast on the 
new ministers, while another pamphleteer sought to neutralize the 
irony with the lame assertion that "it is a very Honest Paper simply 
as it is wrote; ' though applied to the passages relating to Marlborough, 
this would only have added to the laughter. 
22 
Maynwaring was personally convinced at this time that Harley was 
in favour of Marlborough's dismissal, and he was evidently determined 
that if this opinion prevailed, the minister would be accountable to 
public opinion for the consequences. In the Medlleyy, through the medium 
of a speech of Cicero against Caesar, he urged the Tories to put aside 
personal vendettas against the general at least until the war was over, 
since nothing but an irresponsible vindictiveness could justify his 
premature recall. 
23 
Ominous hints from the Tory press of financial enquiries and 
impeachments which might lie in store for Marlborough met the same 
response. When the French foreign minister argued that Marlborough 
could not be dismissed, because he had not been charged with any "capital 
fault, " he was reckoning without the press, and when Swift imprudently 
ventured to make the same point in order to refute the claim that 
Marlborough was being ungratefully treated, the Observator was very 
quick to take him up on it. 
24 For not only Swift, but several of his 
journalistic colleagues, had hinted at corruption in Marlborough's 
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handling of the public money, and recommended that he be called to 
account officially. He had also been accused of treasonable designs, 
and it was Swift who recommended publicly that his request for the 
Captain-Generalcy for life should be entered on record as "highly 
Criminal. "25 However, the Whig response to these threats was simply 
a reminder of the overriding need to retain Marlborough's services. 
The Observator, for example, pointed out that the Romans had deferred 
Scipio's impeachment until "after he had gloriously finish'd the War 
they had employ'd him in', ' and the benefits of Marlborough's victories 
were set against his alleged crimes, with the implication that his 
enemies could never justify taking official action against him. 
26 
The Queen and her ministers were of course aware of the strength 
of the Whig case. Marlborough did have irreconcilable enemies among 
the Tories who would have gladly seen him disgraced and impeached, 
whatever the consequences, and some of the pamphlets which recommend 
this course of action may be attributable to them. But how is one to 
account for the similar contributions from ministerial pamphleteers, 
such as Swift, Mrs. Manley, and Defoe, who elsewhere admitted the 
desirability of keeping Marlborough in office? 
one possible explanation is that, however undesirable Marlboroughts 
dismissal might be in principle, there were certain circumstances in 
which it would have been unavoidable. To Dutch pleas for an assurance 
that the general would be allowed to retain his command for one more 
campaign, a ministerial spokesman would say no more than that ''it might 
139 
depend pretty much on his Grace's own behaviour to the Queen and her 
ministrT. t'27 If Marlborough had returned to join with his Whig 
colleagues in an attempted overthrow of the new administration, his 
dismissal would have been as necessary as it actually became in similar 
circumstances twelve months later. Both Harley and St John regarded 
this, or pretended to regard it, as an increasingly serious possibility, 
despite information from a go-between that the general was "terribly 
mortified, and ... will submitt to your termes if you will make them 
supportable. " Indeed they may have felt that this last stipulation 
argued too great a readiness on Marlborough's part to make his own 
conditions for the partnership. They certainly succeeded in communicating 
their worst fears to the Queen, who at one point was prepared to contemplate 
his removal, should he refuse to "go into her Measures. " 
28 
Consequently it fell to the ministerial pamphleteers to prepare 
for this eventuality, and, as Sarah noted, "quiet those that would not 
like it-. t! Hence the hint of the "Honest Torie" that Marlborough's 
dismissal might become necessary if he would agree to serve only on his 
own conditions; hence the fact that Clement's promises to the Duke on 
Harley's behalf of "a large measure of Respect and Good-will" were 
conditioned by the hope that he would be 
"reform'd by some seasonable 
reproof, and be presern'd from falling into any such extream as might 
cancel the merit of his past Services"; 
29 hence the efforts to scotch 
the notion of Marlborough's absolute indispensability as general, and the 
hints in preparation for the parliamentary enquiries which would have 
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been necessary to justify the event if it had proved unavoidable. 
The very existence of this propaganda was actually a safeguard 
against the crisis which the ministers seemed to fear, for once it 
had been advertised that they intended to deal summarily with any 
opposition from Marlborough, those who were most in favour of his 
continuance considered that he should take care not to "give his Ehemies, 
a handle or pretence to lay him aside, which many suppose they woud. be 
glad to do. "30 
More than one Whig journalist, however, concluded that the real 
purpose of these preparations for Marlborough's return was to raise a 
hostile mob against him. A sufficiently violent reaction might convince 
the. Queen and the ministry that it was possible, and even necessary, to 
dispense with his services, whether his future conduct seemed to warrant 
it or not. A vague accusation of this kind, coming from the opposition, 
must be viewed with suspicion. The instances in which it is particularized 
are not impressive. A Whig commentator on Swift's famous contrasting 
bills of Roman gratitude and British ingratitude in the Examiner 
melodramatically claimed that, 
the Design of that Paper, at this Juncture, and in this 
Scarcity of Money, could be no other, than to direct the 
Mob to fire his Houses, and to plunder his Family; as if 
his over-proportion'd Rewards had burden'd the Subject, 
brought the Nation into so great a Debt, and occasion'd 
the present Calamity. 31 
The mob was an alarming and unpredictable force in politics, but the 
Finar was not primarily designed for such an audience; and since 
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lists of Marlborough's incomes had been circulated repeatedly in the 
past without precipitating arson and riot, Swift may fairly be absolved 
from seditious intent on this occasion. 
32 
Nevertheless, while no one item of propaganda can be said to 
have been written in order to arouse active popular hostility against 
the general, the press campaign as a whole might well have had this effect. 
A single ballad concerning his avarice had driven the audience of The 
Recruiting Officer to a frenzy of resentment earlier in the year, and 
the hostile pamphleteers were scarcely taking pains to avoid a repetition 
of this incident on a larger scale. Boyer implied that it was just, 
and even laudable, for the people to "Hate, and Exclaim against" the 
corrupt favourites to whom Marlborough and his family had been likened;,. 
Swift also mentioned the "universal Hatred" due to any general or 
minister who did not show "the most entire Submission and Respect" to 
the Queen, and remarked that, 
if Paulus Aemelius, or Scipio himself, had presumed to 
move the Senate to continue their Commissions for Life, 
they certainly would have fallen a Sacrifice to the 
Jealousy of the People. 33 
When, therefore, Swift claimed that Marlborough could not be said to 
have been ungratefully treated, because he had never been subjected to 
popular hostility, there was some justice in the Obst is retort 
that "it will not be owing to the Examiner if he be not hooted at and 
insulted in the Streets by the ungrateful Mob whenever he comes home. " 
In the event, Marlborough's reception was so favourable, that his 
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only problem was how to prevent his enemies using it to substantiate 
their claims that his prestige was a danger to the Crown; for his 
progress from the coast and entry into London were marked by 
demonstrations of popular acclaim. Sarah, as an eyewitness, recalled 
that, 
there was at most of the doors in the street very Substantial 
well lookt people, that shew'd great affection to the duke of 
Marl:... which shew'd that notwithstanding all the lyes the 
new ministry had spread by printing, & all manner of waist it 
had not had so thorow an effect to hurt the duke of Marl: as 
they wicht. 35 
This was a reasonable conclusion. Though the incident may not have 
been proof that Marlborough was permanently invulnerable to such 
propaganda, it seems that for many people, it was one thing to ridicule 
a great man's foibles, and another to be reconciled to losing his 
services at a critical period. For once the Observator had the last 
word: 
SM the Examiner may perceive, to the great Mortification 
of himself and his Faction, that the Scale of General Favour, 
and the Dispositions of the Kingdom, are not at their 
Disposal; and that they have spit their Venom against his 
Grace to no purpose. 36 
Although Marlborough had gained an unexpected advantage, the 
question' of his continuing command of the army was by no means settled. 
With dismissal now out of the question, his resignation remained the 
foremost factor in an unpredictable situation. Ever since the dismissal 
of Sunderland in June, rumours had been fostered in the Whig press and. by 
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word of mouth, that the general would feel bound to resign in sympathy 
with his colleagues, despite assurances which Marlborough himself gave 
to the contrary. 
37 These reports were disruptive of Harley's plans, 
especially while the campaign was in progress. It was less than three 
years since the episode narrated in The Secret History of Arlus and 
Odolphus, when Marlborough's threat of resignation had wrecked his 
schemes for a reconstructed ministry. Some means had to be found of 
combating the Whig propaganda; of reassuring those who were genuinely 
alarmed at the possibility of Marlborough's resignation, of discouraging 
such threats for the future, and finally of-ensuring that if the Duke 
should ever put them into practice, he, and not the instigators of the 
ministerial changes, would be held responsible for the consequences. 
The form of propaganda adopted for this purpose was so effective, that 
it eventually transformed Marlborough's indispensability into a means 
of ensuring his complete submission to the new administration. 
The principle was simple. - Marlborough's initial declaration 
that he would not bring chaos on Allied affairs by resigning was said 
to have been received with relief even by the Tories, "who never desired 
he should lay down. " Maynwaring also found "most People" of the opinion 
that the Duke "shoud serve, & do it as chearfully as is possible under 
his circumstances. "3$ But-if this realization of the need for Marlborough's 
services meant that his dismissal` would be regarded as an irresponsible' act, 
what would be the public reaction if he should voluntarily abandon his 
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post or even threaten to do so, on party or personal grounds? 
Discussions of the subject in the ministerial press therefore 
took their cue from a letter written by the Queen to Godolphin, when 
Sunderland's dismissal had been represented as sufficient to justify 
Marlborough's resignation: 
If he and you should do so wrong a thing, at any time, 
especially at this critical juncture, as to desert my 
service, what confusion would happen would be at your 
doors, and you alone would be answerable and nobody else. 
39 
The first two numbers of the Examiner hinted at this theme-in the mildest 
terms. The editor expressed his disbelief in the rumours of resignation 
and his confidence that Marlborough was "guided by a nobler Principle 
than tiot the little Interests of any Party. $% His main attack was on 
the Whig journalists who were calling the Duke's sense of duty in question 
for their own factious purposes. 
40 
Yet even these flattering and 
reassuring comments made it clear what weapon was being held in reserve 
if Marlborough's actions should ever confirm the truth of these reports. 
A much clearer indication of the underlying purpose of this propaganda 
came with the publication of a pamphlet entitled, Reasons Why the Duke 
of Marlborough Cannot Lay down His Commands, Deduced from the Principles 
of Loyalty, Gratitude, Honour, miInterest, &c. 
41 
These reminders of 
the obligations Marlborough was under not to desert the service of the 
Queen and countrymen who had so bountifully rewarded him, would have been 
reassuring to those who believed his resignation or disgrace imminent. 
At the same time, they indicated the standards he would be accused of 
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violating if he should resign, and at times the threat explicit in the 
Queen's letter was very close to the surface. It was pointed out, for 
example, that such a resignation would tend 
to the Encouragement of those Powers his Sovereign is 
engag'd in War with, which merits a more Odious Name than 
I can think of, while I have the Image of his Grace's 
Heroick Actions in my Mind. (p. 2) 
The finishing touch was a direct quotation from a formal reply which the 
Duke had made the year 'before on receiving parliamentary thanks for his 
services, to the effect that he would think no pains too great on his 
part to secure a safe and honourable peace. The pamphleteer called this 
a Testimony that will rise in Witness against Him, shall 
He at any Time act Counter to His Promises, by the Resignation 
you are talking of, before He has brought about those desirable 
Ends which He has so long contended for ... it would be Criminal in the Greatest Man breathing to degenerate into such 
an Inglorious State of Life, as a Retreat from his Country's 
Service, when the last finishing Stroke was only wanting to 
be put to all His Labours ... 
(pp. 5-6) 
There could scarcely have been a clearer indication of the recrimination 
which Marlborough might expect if he resigned. Yet there was no reply 
to these arguments, since they ostensibly appealed to his virtue and 
honour, and were in essence those which his own supporters had used to 
prevent his dismissal. Such propaganda placed Marlborough in a position 
which exactly suited the ministry's purpose. If he should now resign, 
they had prepared the public to condemn him; if, realizing this, he 
accepted the logic of his position, he would be disarmed of the one 
effective method of resisting whatever curtailments of his power they 
would devise. 
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Even so, the Whigs continued to spread the rumour of Marlboroughts 
resignation before the beginning of the next campaigns 
42 
either out of a 
genuine belief that he could never establish a satisfactory relationship 
with his political enemies, or because such reports continued to be an 
embarrassment to Harley and his colleagues. But such considerations 
did not influence Marlborough himself. The threat of being taxed with 
disobedience and ingratitude to the Queen, and made the scapegoat for 
every future misfortune impressed him deeply. Sarah testifies that 
"avoiding this snare" was one of the principal reasons for his reluctance 
to surrender his commands whatever the provocation given him. 
43 
Her 
further comments on this subject reveal how conscious Marlborough and 
his circle had become by this time of the pressures brought to bear by 
the party journalists. If he were to resign, Sarah was convinced that 
he would be proclaimed a public enemy by the ministers, and that their 
pamphleteers would then distribute propaganda "all over the countrys" 
claiming that he had "quitted his Queen's and his country's service, 
merely because he could not govern in the Cabinet as well as in the field. 1"4 
In fact, the treatment which Marlborough now received led her to 
conclude that, having prepared such a reception for his resignation, the 
ministers intended to force him to it as a substitute for his dismissal. 
She was not alone in reaching this conclusions 
45 
but before it can be 
endorsed, the ministry's point of view must also be considered. Faced 
with a majority wish that Marlborough remain at the head of the army, 
they knew that he was nevertheless a formidable political opponent, whom 
N 
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they could not safely continue in office without substantial reductions 
of his power in both civil and military spheres. Since measures for 
this purpose were necessarily undertaken at the same time as the official 
accommodation was being negotiated, they would naturally appear to 
Marlborough and his sympathizers as deliberate hindrances to it. The 
dividing line between policy and provocation was, and remains, very 
indistinct. The pamphleteers were employed at each stage to justify 
the ministry's measures and to forestall Marlborough's right to object 
to them; yet to him this was simply adding insult to injury. A study 
of the publications involved does tip the scale in favour of this 
interpretation. The pamphleteers had a case for some of the ministry's 
methods of dealing with Marlborough, but the manner in which they presented 
it seldom suggests a genuine desire to make the terms of his continuing 
service "supportable. " 
This unconciliatory tone was set by Swift in the famous Examiner 
of 23 November 1710. ' As the time of the hoped-for adjustment of 
Marlborough's relations with his new colleagues drew near, Whig journalists 
began, not unnaturally, to complain of the past and present hostility 
of the ministerial press towards him. Parallels were drawn with generals 
of classical history who had been plagued by ungrateful scribblers; and 
on the insulting assumption that considerations of common decency and, 
gratitude would not influence the ministers in their treatment of 
Marlborough, Maynwaring argued that they should at least take care not 
to precipitate his resignation by insults and in. usage while it was still 
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in their own interests to retain his services. 
These complaints attracted the attention of the chief 
ministerial spokesman, but instead of palliating the offence, he set 
out to make it worse. Dienissing the principal grievance with the 
breath-taking assertion that "in the highest Ferment of Things, we 
heard few or no Reflections upon this great Commander, " he altered 
the Whig protests in paraphrase, so that they appeared, not as legitimate 
complaints about a handful of pamphleteers and their patrons, but as an 
arrogant and indiscriminate clamour against the "Ingratitude of the 
whole Kingdom to the Duke of Marlborough', 11 for which there was no 
discernible cause but the dismissal of two of his relations from the 
Cabinet. By this device Swift evidently hoped to deprive Marlborough 
of the sympathy of those who had previously been most ready to, condemn 
his graceless treatment, since they would be most conscious of the 
injustice of this general accusation of ingratitude. Moreover, nothing 
destroys a genuine impulse of gratitude more rapidly and completely than 
constant reminders of the obligation and unfounded reproaches of failing 
to acknowledge it; and it was child's play for Swift to add to this 
sense of injury and alienation by demonstrating, with his lists of 
rewards bestowed, that the nation as a whole had been very far from 
ungrateful to the general. In fact, the classical parallel suggested 
that he had been considerably over rewarded. For good measure Swift 
then included insinuations of war-profiteering and cheating against both 
17 the Duke and Duchess. 
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It was easy to enjoy the ingenuity and wit of this piece, 
which the delighted printer dubbed "the Laurel Crown" (the twopenny item 
in the bill of Roman gratitude), 
48 
and forget its significance for the 
victim at the moment it was published. At a time when most people hoped 
that Marlborough and the new ministers would make a responsible attempt 
to put aside their differences in the national interest, Swift's response 
to Whig complaints in effect advertised that his patrons, for their part, 
were prepared to make no concessions to Marlborough's feelings. Yet if 
Marlborough had felt driven to resign, Swift's initial argument that 
the general had no right to object to his civilian colleagues' dismissal, 
could readily have been transformed into the cry that he had quitted 
only "because he could not govern in the Cabinet as well as in the field. " 
Sarah, who considered the officially inspired press campaign against 
Marlborough to be in itself sufficient provocation for his resignation, 
was understandably outraged at the inconsistency of this latest contribution 
with the majority desire for his continuance in office. 
49 
Among the more concrete issues which might radically influence 
Marlborough's decision to stay or go was the dismissal of Sarah herself. 
The Queen was determined that it should not be deferred beyond the end of 
the campaign, and it was probably only for fear of precipitating the Duke's 
resignation that it had been delayed so long. Apart from the personal 
feelings which might lead him to this step, there were the international 
repercussions of his wife's dismissal to be considered; 'his concern 
was least ye noise of it abroad shoud lessen him, as if he was not so 
Asa 
much in ye Q [ueen'] s favour. " 
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The press had an obvious part to play in solving the problem 
created by the Queen's obstinacy on the one hand, and Marlborough's 
sensitivity on the other. The campaign against the Duchess, a study in 
itself, was far less restrained than that against her husband, and since 
the imprudent behaviour which had destroyed 'her friendship with the 
Queen was common knowledge, there was no lack of material. As justification 
of her dismissal in itself these productions were quite superfluous. 
Even Whigs who admired Marlborough acknowledged that his wife had lost the 
Queen's favour deservedly. 51 The aim was rather to disarm the Duke's 
objections to the event, and prevent him from using it as a legitimate 
pretext for his own resignation. St John had ended his abusive attack 
on the Duchess with the assurance that "the Royal Hand is already reach'd 
out to Chain up the Plague" and Boyer forestalled Marlborough's right to 
claim this as a grievance, by arguing that 
no Military Services, or other Merits, can give a Man a just 
Title to Screen a.,.,, n9 no not his nearest Relations, who forget 
themselves so far as to Insult their Royal His tress, and 
Bountiful Benefactress. 52 
From the ministry's point of view, these tactics were an 
unqualified success. "They soon indeed found their account very much 
among the people (wch was the point they had to gain) in this way of 
proceeding, "! Sarah admitted, "and therefore they took all occasions of 
printing all the rude and scandalous things that were possible against 
me. ""53 The result was that when Marlborough found the Queen immovably 
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resolved on her dismissal, many felt it would be wrong for him to 
resign on this account. As Sarah herself realized, it would have 
given the Tory pamphleteers the excuse to claim that he had sacrificed 
his country's interest simply because his wife could not "be permitted 
to use the Queen disrespectfully. 104 
Yet this method of forcing Marlborough's acquiescence in his 
wife's disgrace only intensified the greatest personal ordeal he faced 
on his return. For him there could be no distinction between a libellous 
attack on her and one on himself: "When with Reproaches they the Wife 
defame, /'Tis at the Husband's honour that they aim, " a verse dialogue, 
supposedly between the Duke and Duchess, argued. Another ballad vainly 
urged some mitigation of Sarah's treatment, out of consideration for the 
Duke. 55 It is not surprising, therefore, to find Sarah claiming that 
the ministerial pamphleteers published "lyes" about her, "knowing that 
will add to the uneasiness which they give the duke of Marlborough in all 
other things, their main poynt being to remove him fron the Queen, & not 
to let him serve any more. "56 
With Marlborough's home-coming imminent, another matter which 
called for similar treatment in the press was the cashiering of three of 
his best officers, for drinking toasts to the "confusion" and "damnation" 
of the new administration and pledging themselves to "stand by" their 
general. The ministry was concerned in its own interests to reduce 
Marlborough's absolute influence in military affairs, 
57 
and the behaviour 
of the three officers afforded reasonable excuse to begin the process. 
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Yet it was necessary to tread warily, since Marlborough might consider 
that his inability to protect his most zealous supporters would so weaken 
his effective authority in the army, as to leave him with no alternative 
but resignation. Anticipating his objections, the Queen explained that 
the cashiering of the three "was not done with ye least disrespect to ye 
Duke; but because they had made it their Business to reflect upon her, 
& her administration" and should therefore be made an example to others. 
58 
The subject was then handed over to Swift for discussion in the Examiner. 
This publicity was in itself bound to increase Marlborough's 
resentment at the blow to his authority; but Swift used the whole incident, 
in the first place to demonstrate that the ministers' determination to keep 
"the Military Power ri. e. Marlborough] in absolute Subjection to the Civil 
[i. e. themselves], " was legitimate and even essential policy, and in the 
second, to make sure that the Duke could not resign without appearing to 
condone the worst implications of his officers' unwary remarks. For while 
Swift was careful to keep to the letter --, though scarcely the spirit 
of the Queen's declaration that no reflection on Marlborough had been 
intended, he also had her authority for claiming that the officers' 
offence was a personal insult to herself, as well as to her administration: 
I have heard it mentioned as a common Practice last Autumn, 
somewhere or other, to drink Damnation and Confusion (and this 
with Circumstances very aggravating and horrid) to the New 
Ministry, and to those who had any Hand in turning out the Old; 
that is to say, to those Persons whom her Majesty has thought 
fit to employ in her greatest Affairs; with something more than 
a Glance against the Queen herself. And if it be true, that these 0 es were attended with certain doubtful Words, of 
st_ by their General, who without question abhorred them: 
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Let any man consider the Consequence of such Dispositions, 
if they should happen to spread ... If Men of such Principles 
were able to propagate them in a Crap, and were sure of a 
General for Life, who had any Tincture of Ambition, we might 
soon bid farewel to Ministries and Parliaments, whether 
new or old. 59 
Since the earlier part of this same issue had been occupied 
with a discussion of the dangerous implications of Marlborough's request 
for his Captain-Generalcy for life, this concluding thrust was obviously 
intended to heighten suspicion and alarm against him. Yet by paying 
lip service to the view that Marlborough "without Question abhorred" 
the treasonable activities of his supporters, Swift had made sure, even 
while maintaining his own admirably impartial stance, that the Duke could 
not now resign, protest, or make any public gesture suggesting sympathy 
with his officers' predicament, without convicting himself by his own 
actions of disrespect to the Queen and sinister designs against the 
established constitution. Again there were the conflicting pressures, 
tempting him to resign and yet making it impossible for him to do so with 
honour, which so complicated Marlborough's position during this winter. 
Yet had matters rested there, it would have been difficult for 
Marlboörough to claim deliberate and outright provocation; his own 
supporters had after all committed the original offence. But when the 
episode became involved with yet another humiliating expedient for reducing 
his power and prestige, it could reasonably be said that the bounds of 
policy had been passed. 
The question of whether Marlborough should as usual receive the 
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formal thanks of one or other of the Houses for Parliament for the 
achievements of the campaign was in the hands of his political 
opponents. There was a hostile Tory majority in the Commons, and 
although the Whigs had more strength in the Fords, an unsuccessful 
attempt to move the vote there had already convinced them that they 
were not strong enough to force the issue without risking a humiliating 
defeat. Finally, when Marlborough returned, the Queen herself informed 
him "that no motion should be n, 4t in the hous- of lords as usual to 
thank him for hieß services because her ministers would oppose that. tt60 
The omission appeared significant to those who looked for some 
sign that the new ministers really intended to establish a cordial 
working relationship with the general for the coming campaign, and there 
were complaints from a Whig pamphleteer. 
61 
Yet the decision, though a 
deliberately humiliating one, had been justified in the course of the 
Lords' debate on the grounds that the unspectacular siege warfare of the 
previous campaign had brought peace no nearer. 
62 
The ceremony had been 
omitted in the past for similar reasons, 
63 
so that, had the matter rested 
there, it could not have been called a studied insult. It was the immediate 
publication of a pamphlet entitled, Reasons Wya Certain Great Ram-r-au 
Has Not Yet Receiv'd the Thanks of Either of the Two Houses of Prnrliame] nt, 
which cast doubt on the real motives for the action. 
64 
Ostensibly a vindication of the official decision, it dealt only 
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perfunctorily with(least exceptional reason for it ..... the lack of progress 
during the campaign (pp. 5-6). Instead, drawing on recent Tory propaganda, 
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it suggested that Marlborough was being refused the usual tribute in 
recognition of the measures he was alleged to have taken to prolong 
the war and obstruct the peace for his own enrichment. Parallels from 
classical history were used as the thinnest of evasions of direct 
accusation; so thin, that the device was rather a mockery of the victim 
than a serious attempt to provide protection for the pamphleteer and true 
historical precedent for Marlborough's treatment: 
The Records of past times among ... the Romans, tell us of 
Generals that for the sake of supporting their own Honour in 
one Part of the World, are said to have been the Cause of 
losing that of their Country in all others; Of Consuls, that 
out of a Regard to themselves and the Perquisites of War, were 
accus'd of having rejected the Conditions of Peace, thol never 
so Advantagious to those they fought for; and prefer'd the 
loss of Legions before Towns, to the Acquisition of Victories 
in open Fields; of Embassadors, that have postpon'd a certain 
Benefit to an uncertain Expectation; and tho' it cannot be 
said any one of the foregoing stations have been made use of by 
any British Subject to any one of the forgoing purposes, I 
presume it may without Offence be affixu'd, That the Persons 
so Offending, had no Decrees in their Favour from the Roman 
Senate. (pp. 14-15) 
Another reason for the omission of the usual ceremony, it was 
suggested, was the suspicion under which the conduct of the three cashiered 
officers had placed Marlborough. To the objection that a general could 
not justly be blamed for the indiscretions of his subordinates, it was 
retorted that Marlborough could not complain of ungrateful treatment, 
because he had not officially been held responsible for the incident and 
had been amply rewarded by Parliament in the past (p. 10-11). Even while 
screening himself behind the Queen's declaration that she had intended 
no reflection on Marlborough in disgracing his three supporters, the 
-IJ'6 
anonymous pamphleteer had contrived to flout it more blatantly than 
Swift; and the unashamed suggestion that the refusal of the address of 
thanks was actually a form of punishment for suspected offences for 
which there was no higher authority than hostile propaganda, gave the 
whole affair the aspect of deliberate provocation and party malice. 
It is understandable that the official decision, together with the 
publication of this "invidious and scurrilous" pamphlet, ""encreas'd the 
Apprehension of many, that his Grace would gratify his private Disgust, 
and lay down his Commission. *65 
There are indications, in fact, that in their readiness to impose 
humiliating conditions on Marlborough's tenure of office, in the confidence 
that he could not resign without drawing the condemnation of his countrymen 
down on his own head, the ministry and its supporters had somewhat 
overraached- themselves. During the winter, Marlborough ignored press 
attacks altogether and confined his remonstrances on other matters to 
his private conclaves with the ministers. Whig versifiers drew attention 
to his studied indifference to party libels, as an attitude for more 
dignified and becoming than his wife's combativeness, 
66 
and on this 
occasion it did him good service. Whether his motive was a genuine 
sense of duty, or simply a sense of self-preservation, the outward 
patience and submissiveness he consistently displayed made the ministryis 
treatment of him seem more and more like deliberate persecution. 
IS7 
Defoe was later to pay tribute to Harley for having 
shew'd the Hero, who we thought would have quitted the 
Service in Disgust, that his own Interest, his Countries 
Advantage & his Mistresses Glory, might still be in his 
Power, if he knew how to Practise what his Duty to them 
all Call'd for, (viz. ) to Submit to the Reason and the 
Commands of his Soveraign. 67 
In the sense that Marlborough had continued at his post, partly at least, 
out of fear of being condemned by the ministerial pamphleteers for 
disobedience to the Queen and neglect of his country's interests if he 
did not, 'Defoe'was probably quite rightýin giving some credit to Harley's 
ingenuity for the decision. But the contrary pressures which had been 
exerted did not escape notice. Not even Swift was privately convinced that 
the credit for Marlborough's remaining in office really lay with Harley 
and his colleagues. In fact, he became increasingly apprehensive that if 
the general did resign, not only would they lose his necessary services, 
but the ministry, and not Marlborough, would be held responsible for the 
consequences. As'soon as the Duke had'declared his readiness to work with 
his new colleagues if at all possible, Swift remarked, "I really think 
they will not do well in too much mortifying that man, although indeed 
it is his own fault"; and a few days later, hearing Whig rumours that 
Marlborough would resign, he was prepared to criticize the ministers for 
pressing the Duke too hard, and letting "personal quarrels mingle too 
much with their proceedings. " 
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Marlborough himself was aware that his hold on public sympathy 
was one of his few remaining assets, and when, on the eve of his departure 
for the Continent, he asked Sir David Hamilton what people were saying of 
/sg 
his conduct to the Queen and nation since his return, he must have 
been gratified to learn that "some gave him as Great or greater 
Character, for yt, Victory over himself under Provocations, yn for all 
his other Victories. 1169 
Yet the ministers were well aware that, for all Marlborough's 
outward submissiveness, he was still their enemy, and not the less so for 
the treatment to which they had subjected him; "the exterior is a little 
mended", St John wrote, "but at heart, the same sentiments remain, and 
these heightened and inflamed by what he calls provocations. "0 It must 
have strengthened these misgivings that his continued command of the a=y, 
even though necessary for the ministry's stability, was also the most 
effective method for Marlbbrough himself "to maintain his Credit Abroad, 
and to retrieve his Interest at iiome. "? 
l The hopes of the Whig 
opposition were pinned on this process. In a verse dialogue in which 
Sarah figures, lmienting the ill-. fortune that has fallen on her family, 
Court acquaintance reminds her, 
Your noble LCor]d his old Com[man]d still bears, 
And who can tell if Fortune but declares, 
What one Lucky Blow may give to your Affairs. 
Sarah admits, "That Thought indeed does keep my Hopes alive", but fears 
that the Duke's enemies, who have already tried in vain to destroy his 
reputation by means of the press, will attempt to prevent any future 
addition to his prestige by the sane means. 
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This is exactly what they were planning to do. Swift's famous 
__1 
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letter to "Cras=s, " published less than three weeks after the first 
official announcement that Marlborough was to retain his command for 
the following campaign, was to Steele a plain declaration that the Duke 
was still regarded as an adversary, and a "very formidable" one. 
73 
It was because the contents of the Exiner could so readily 
be taken as an index of the ministryts sentiments, and by association, 
even those of the Queen herself, that it was such an effective medium 
for guarding against any revival of Marlborough's prestige. For as long 
as the ministerial journal still continued its hostility to him, no one 
could suppose, whatever the outward appearances, that Marlborough was 
really trusted by his new colleagues or in full favour with the Queen. 
When considering how to deal with Marlborough should circumstances forbid 
his immediate dianissal, Harley had suggested that, "[if] the Prince 
could not presently withdraw the Effects of his favor, yet he could 
Easily divert it" by "Publicly & avowedly" bestowing it on another. 
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Clearly Harley had himself in mind, and the policy had been translated 
into practice by the ministerial revolution and the accompanying 
propaganda which had contrasted his own rise to royal favour with 
Marlborough's deserved loss of it. 
Mrs. Manley had already hinted that an official decision to 
retain Marlborough in command of the army would not mean that he was 
fully restored to royal favour. Past offences had been such as could 
be neither forgotten nor forgiven: "Stauracius, 'tis true, is. yet at 
/60 
at the Head of the Thracian Legions, but with that Esteem which his 
Contempt of Caesar has justly drawn upon hi©. "75 Once Marlborough's 
re-employment had been officially settled, Swift's renewed assault in 
the Finer was confirmation of this point. The advantage of these 
tactics for the ministry was considerable. Marlborough personally 
attached a great deal of importance to the public knowledge that he was 
high in the Queen's favour and in the confidence of his own government, 
maintaining that it was this, and not his official status, which gave 
him his influence abroad and at the head of the army. Stripped of these 
assets, he felt demoralized and vulnerable, less able to do justice to his 
responsibilities, and less ready to make enemies of the ministers by open 
opposition. 
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A more straightforward effect of this press attack was the 
damage it could do to his remaining popularity at home, which the coning 
campaign might otherwise consolidate. The letter to Crasais, rivalling 
"the Laurel Crown" as the most widely read of the _, was singled 
out by a relatively impartial critic as Swift's "Master-piece. 1177 Even 
as an isolated piece of propaganda, it could be expected not only to whet 
the hostility of Marlborough's Tory enemies, but to deprive him of code 
of the public Mmpathy he had gained during the winter. 
Swift's problem was how to achieve these objectives while under 
the-temporary restraints which now lay on all the Duke's detractors; for 
the official acknowledgement that his services were indispensable to the 
new ministry, and the fact that he had been sent to command again 
_ :ý 
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in Flanders in spite of earlier Tory objections to this strategy, 
meant that direct belittlement of his professional ability, especially 
from a ministerial spokesman, would be neither prudent nor convincing. 
On this issue, in fact, Swift had already created difficulties for himself. 
Several weeks before, in recognition of the influence of The Management of 
the war, he had committed himself publicly to answering the first two 
parts in detail. A third section had now appeared, and still Swift did not 
redeem his promise. Indeed, it had become obvious that he could not do so. 
Even if he had felt confident of his ability to rout a well-informed 
adversary on his chosen ground, this could not have been done without the 
radical critician of Marlborough's professional conduct which present 
circumstances forbad. Swift therefore seized upon the abusive postscript 
to Hare's third letter as an excuse for paying no further attention to the 
whole 
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Hare's complaint was that Marlborough had been referred to in 
the fourth issue of the Examiinner (for which Swift was not responsible), 
as "an ambitious Cam at the Head of a Mercenary Army. " He was not 
the only reader to accept this interpretation of the phrase, and it was 
probably correct. Nevertheless, the insult had been so obliquely framed 
that it could easily be disclaimed and Whig journalists who quoted it out 
of context were certainly more concerned with berating the Examine: than 
with vindicating Marlborough. In fact, there was probably some justice 
in a Tory pamphleteer's remark that, but for this publicity, most readers 
X62 
would have passed the jibe over unnoticed. 
79 On the other hand, 
Swift's outrage at Hare's "gross perverting of an innocent Expression" 
was also in excess of its object, and seems to have been largely simulated 
to free himself from the promise which it was no longer convenient to keep. 
One modern editor, however, has suggested attributing the two 
anonymous Exminations of The Management of the War to Swift, on the basis 
of his retracted promise to answer Hare's pamphlet "in a discourse by it 
self. "ý The titles do indicate that the anonymous author wished the 
connection to be made; given the Examiner's reputation, this would have 
been an obvious means of promoting sales. It is just possible, though 
in view of the low quality of the two pamphlets, unlikely, that he was 
undertaking the task with Swift's sanction. But contemporaries were 
never deceived into supposing Swift the author in his own right. One of 
them did at first connect the Examination of the Mangeent of the War with 
Swift's promise of a separate answer to Hare, but concluded almost at 
once, 
Itis such a mean, low Performance, that after reading it twice 
over, which I believe is more than any body else will do, I 
can't discern in it the least shadow of an Argument: and I 
must do my Friend the Examiner the Justice to clear him from 
having any hand in it. 31 
Meanwhile, the Whig journalists were not prepared to let 
Swift's omission pass unchallenged. To both the Observator and the Medley 
it was a demonstration that the Examiner had met his match in Hare, and 
it was conjectured that Swift's patrons must have instructed him not to 
undertake the task he had promised, for fear he should "expose himself, 
/G3 
as they knew he would do, if he ventur'd upon it. ' 
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Some reply from S*dit was clearly necessary, both to save face 
and to undo some of the effect of Hare's influential pamphlets by more 
devious means. Since Marlborough's military achievements were temporarily 
sacred, his prevailing temperamental weakness made an excellent substitute; 
"excessive Avarice in a General, is, I think, the greatest Defect he can 
be liable to, next to those of Courage and Conduct, " Swift argued when 
challenged, "and may be attended with the most ruinous Consequences., 
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The subject was also an ideal one for the sheer destruction of popular 
prestige. Defoe had already remarked that avarice in a statesman was 
bound to arouse the 'Wortali Aversion" of the populace, and Swift bad 
also singled out this quality in Marlborough as one which would "extremely 
damp the Peoples Favour, as well as the love of the Soldiers. "84 
But Swift had still to tread warily if he was to avoid the 
obstacles that hedged about any press attack on the general, and he first 
took care to disarm critics with an apparently magnanimous tribute to 
Marlborough's virtues and achievements, including his courage and success 
in the field. His next step was an anecdote purporting to illustrate 
the ridiculous and undignified personal frugalities which Marlborough 
practised in the midst of his wealth and grandeur. This was certainly 
no reflection on his professional ability, but it was precisely the kind 
of ridicule which had driven the audience of The Recruiting Officer to a 
frenzy of jeers and catcalls, in spite of a consciousness of Marlborough's 
military merit. It also presented a facet of the general's character 
16y. 
which was ludicrously difficult to reconcile with that of the national 
hero whom some of Swift's readers may have hailed in the streets a few 
weeks before. 
The transition to more serious matters was made with studied 
indirection: 
When your Adversaries reflect how far you are gone in this Vice, 
they are tempted to talk as if we owed our Successes, not to 
your Courage or Conduct, but to those Veteran Troops you command; 
who are able to conquer under any General with so many brave and 
experienced Officers to lead them. 
Here Swift almost certainly had in mind the passages fron Mrs. Hanley's 
Memoirs of Flu, in which she had compared Marlborough, in his excessive 
avarice, to Crassus, and argued that his victories were largely owing to 
the bravery and ddIl of his officers and troops. 
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But even while giving 
her theories the maximum of publicity, Swift was careful to maintain his 
own impartial stance by reporting them as hearsay; though his failure to 
disagree with than, even from this detached standpoint, implied that the 
criticise was valid, or at least that Marlborough had only himself to 
blame if his adversaries could thus cast plausible doubts on his ability. 
By this means, Swift bad contrived to belittle Marlborough's courage and 
military talents in spite of his initial tribute to them. 
The device of hearsay was unobtrusively abandoned as Swift 
went on to retail accusations that Marlborough had starved his soldiers 
rather than forfeit profits from safeguards and contributions in occupied 
territory, that he had confined his conquests to Flanders where the gains 
were greatest, rather than press forward with an invasion of France, and 
that he had broken off the treaty of peace rather than end these 
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opportunities for enriching himself. In renewing this last accusation, 
Swift had simply ignored Hare's carefully argued rebuttals ("your 
Friends offer nothing material in your Defence"), and returned to the 
well-worn, but effective device of aphoristic comment on the evils of 
avarice in public life ("all agree, there is nothing so pernicious, 
which the Eztreans of Avarice may not be able to inspire"). 
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Unable to destroy the total impact of Swift's attack, the 
Whig pamphleteers used Marlborough's newly confirmed status to make 
some telling criticisms of the author. Defoe dwelt upon the folly and 
danger of destroying the army's confidence in its general while the war was 
still: In progress; Maynwaring, so moved by this fresh outrage from the 
Examiner that he rose from a sick-bed to compose a reply, taunted Swift 
with stupidity in failing to realize that the Queen's renewed declaration 
of confidence in Marlborough had superseded earlier instructions to 
denigrate him at all costs; and the Observator argued with some point 
that Swift's insinuations amounted to a reflection on the Queen and 
ministry, since, by his account, they had re-employed as Captain-General 
a man whose moral shortcomings made him "unworthy the Command of a 
single Company. '"87 
The most decisive complaint, however, came from Marlborough 
himself. Earlier in the year, the Observator had remarked, "'tis well 
for the meiner, that he seems to be below the Duke's Resentment, "88 
but this apparent indifference was simply a part of Marlborough's prudent 
policy of ignoring all provocations until he was more certain of his 
166 
ground. He may have expected that once he was reinstated in his 
command, this goading would cease. When it did not, he appealed to 
St John to redress the grievance. The Secretary of State's patronage 
of the journal was too well-known for him to risk a rupture of his 
official relations with the Duke by ignoring the complaint. In fact 
he had good reason for confirming Marlborough's suspicions that he could 
restrain the meiner at will, since this implied that he could also 
revoke his instructions should there be occasion for it. 
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This hint 
was not lost on Marlborough, and it was not the last time this bargaining- 
counter was to be used between them. 
Ministerial propagandists who accepted the need for Marlborough 
to retain his command also aimed to guard against the possibility that his 
continuing foothold in power would eventually become the means of restoring 
a Whig ministry. The ministerial changes, which had severed the official 
connection between Marlborough and his former colleagues, had been the 
first step in curtailing his power, and the pamphleteers had taken care 
to emphasize this in order to justify retaining the services of a man who 
had repeatedly been accused of treasonable designs. Writing of the 
"exorbitant Power" of Marlborough and Godolphin, Boyer had explained 
that the design was "to remove the one, and by that means restrain the 
Authority of the other:: Marlborough would thus, in Swift's patronizing 
phrase, be "taken out of ill Hands, and put into better, " and it would be 
quite safe to continue him in office. 
90 It is interesting to note also 
that most of the references to his attempt to secure the Captain-Generalcy 
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for life, attribute the original design quite erroneously, but quite 
deliberately, to the Junto, with the implication that in this instance 
Marlborough had allowed himself to be manipulated, possibly against his 
better judgment, by his "Republican" colleagues. 
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There still remained the fear that the fragile bond between 
Marlborough and Godolphin and their Whig associates would be cemented by 
their common adversity, and by the knowledge of the Whigs that the Duke 
was their last link with ministerial power. The pamphleteers accordingly 
continued their efforts to foster distrust between them and so prevent 
them from joining forces in the future to oppose the ministry. Two 
publications taunted them with having "privately offersd to sell one 
another" in the course of the ministerial changes, 
92 
and the fact that 
Marlborough had continued at his post after his colleagues had been 
dismissed, provided an excellent opportunity for combining assurances 
about the restraints imposed on his overweening ambition, with insinuations 
that he had deserted the Whig cause. One of the meaner refinements of 
this propaganda was that, if the Duke has resigned in sympathy with his 
colleagues, he would have been taxed with putting party loyalties before 
the good of his country; whereas, having taken the contrary decision, 
he was now as readily condemned for sacrificing former attaclmients in 
the interests of self-preservation. 
It took Mrs. Manley's ingenuity and the resources of secret 
history to present this conflicting case to" best advantage. 
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She first represented "Hezminius" (Harley) reassuring the Emperor 
that Stauracius would not be 
any longer formidable, when once Aemilius [Godolphin] was 
displac'd ... The lawless Power of the Conspirators once 
reduc'd, it was not to be doubted but he would content 
himself with being the second Person of the nnpire, without 
any longer aiming to become the first ... 
With the facility of secret history, she then provided an insight into 
Aemilius' own reflections on the same subject, and so was able, without 
inconsistency, to launch into the bitterest denunciation of the general 
for his apparent switch of loyalties: 
On Lord Stauracius, always Faithless and Ingrateful! there 
was no dependence to be had; so well he knew the Native 
Falsity in him, that to secure himself, that General would 
not hesitate at bdraying what was dearest to him! ... nor 
should he be in the least surpriz'd to find Stauracius making 
early Offers of Peace and Service to Lucifer himself, were 
he once in Power! in publick disavowing and condemning 
those very Actions, which he had in private not only approved, 
but advanced! there was nothing but such a defection 
remaining to make the Father of the moire more contemptible 
than he was, or to the last degree despised ... 93 
This interpretation of Marlborough's decision was not only very much in 
keeping with Mrs. Manley's past readings of his character, but also had 
a particular relevance to his present situation. Although his determination 
not to resign was approved of "by those Whigs thats his real friends, " 
Sarah warned him that some would be suspicious of his readiness to act in 
concert with Harley. 
94- In fact, Marlborough was of necessity playing 
something of a double game; in Tory circles, much as Mrs. Manley had 
represented, "lamenting his former wrong steps in joining with the Whigs, " 
when only a few weeks before he had assured them of his unshakable 
loyalty. 95 There was always the danger that, with the encouragement of 
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such propaganda as Mrs. Manley's, both sides would come to regard him 
as a timeserver, a type traditionally as much despised by those who 
temporarily accept his allegiance, as by those whom he has betrayed. 
The most provocative summing up of Marlborough's situation 
during this winter, from the ministerial standpoint, came from the author 
of The Secret History of Arlus and Odolphus. Having claimed the nation's 
confidence in an administration which had secured Marlborough's incomparable 
fighting abilities, he made it clear that the general's days of meddling 
in civil affairs and obstructing the diplomacy of Europe for his own ends 
were over; and there was also the hint, for the benefit of the displaced 
Whigs, that in acquiescing in this settlement, Marlborough had cut his 
losses and deserted them: 
we have not yet heard that Fortunatus himself has thought them 
so absolutely Necessary to his Support, as to be frighted 
out of his Post by their Removal; so far from it, that he 
acquiesces in the Will and Pleasure of his Sovereign, and is 
contented by. being a little eas'd in Disposing our Affairs at 
Home, to use his greater Leisure in minding his sufficient 
Business Abroad, and I don't question from his past Successes, 
that he will yet frighten our Enemies into an Honourable 
Peace, if during the next Treaty, he keeps at the Head of his 
Hundred Thousand Plenipotentiaries. 96 
It was these lines which stung Francis Hare into publishing 
his own classic analysis of Marlborough's relations with the Tory ministry. 
The long passage which forms the conclusion of his fourth letter "to a 
Tory-Member" was fairly characterized by a contemporary as "an exceeding 
Remarkable bold and no less Prophetick Expostulation and Reflexion, " 
and has been several times reprinted, though usually without acknowledgement 
of its source. 
97 
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Few of the tactics used by the ministers and their pamphleteers 
to ensure Marlborough's submission to them, had escaped Hare's notice. 
On the question of the general's resignation, he commented, 
they know not how to let him leave his Command, or continue 
in it: If he had left it, then with loud Mouths they would 
have thrown the Odium upon him, which they dare not take upon 
themselves, and all the Effects of their own ill Management 
would have been laid upon him, as if his quitting had been the 
sole Cause of them: and we should have heard nothing but 
Invective and Complaint of his Ingratitude to his Queen and 
Country, after such ample Acknowled®ments as they have made of 
his Services. (p. 98) 
Hare was also minutely acquainted with the simultaneous pressures on 
Marlborough to resign, in the shape of the measures taken to reduce his 
power and prestige at home and abroad: 
Things are not the same, any more than the Usage he meets 
with: When he is uneasy in his Thoughts, undermin'd in the 
Favour of his Sovereign, and vilely misrepresented to the 
People; when his want of Interest at Home makes it impossible 
for the Allies to depend on the Hopes he gives them; when he 
is without Authority in the Army, where 'tis made criminal 
to espouse his Interest, and to fly in his Face is the surest 
Means to Advancement ... (p. 96) 
To those who are unaware of the private feelings concealed by 
the facade of the working relationship just established between Marlborough 
and the ministry, this outpouring of the Duke's grievances would have been 
a revelation; 
98 
and the wisdom of publishing it was so questionable, that 
Hare must have had strong motives ford andoning his habitual discretion. 
The first was clearly sheer indignation at Marlborough's treatment, with a 
corresponding determination to prevent the ministers from claiming any 
credit for his decision to remain in office. But Hare was also aware of 
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the effect which a consciousness of lack of support at home could have 
on Marlborough's freedom of action in the field. In fact he was 
convinced that, having compelled Marlborough to remain at his post even 
while depriving him of the necessary authority to act decisively, the 
ministers and their propagandists would then hold him responsible for 
any lick of success. Having predicted that Marlborough would achieve 
little in the coming campaign, Hare therefore attempted to forestall 
this criticise with a reminder of the disadvantages under which the 
general's "profess'd Enemies" in the ministry had placed him: 
For with what comfort can he continue in a Command under a 
Notion of doing his Country Service, when all possibility of 
serving well is taken from him? When nothing is left him 
that can make a General be obey'd or lov'd? What Encouragement 
can he have to venture upon any great Enterprize, when he is 
sure ill Success will be made a Crime, and good Success from 
him they bad rather be without? (pp. 97 and 98) 
Finally, Hare was also very much concerned at attempts to 
encourage the Whigs to resent Marlborough's continuance in office as 
a betrayal of their interests. The revelation that the Duke still 
regarded the ministers as his "profess'd Enemies" was obviously intended 
to scotch this view, as was the important concluding assurance that he 
would never join with his new colleagues to promote a peace which fell 
short of the Whig ideal: 
He has gain'd too much Honour by the War, and espous'd too 
far the true Interest of his Country, to promote an ill Peace, 
or make way for it by an ill War; and if nothing else can 
please these Gentlemen, he will never purchase their Favour, 
and Applause, at the Expence of his own Glory and the Nation's 
Safety; to say nothing of the common Cause, which nothing 
will prevail with him to betray. (p. 99) 
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It is not surprising that these passages should have 
attracted interest. Hare's indignation, for once not allowed to 
dissipate itself in unedifying abuse of his opponents, carried 
conviction. As usual, he was assumed to be writing from first-hand 
knowledge, and for the first time he actively encouraged this assumption 
with his casual insights into Marlborough's state of mind ("he is uneasy 
in his Thoughts ... 't), and his confident statements of his patron's 
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political allegiances. In fact, there was a strong implication at 
certain points that the manifesto of grievances had actually been written 
to Marlborough's dictation, and this, in contrast to Hare's impersonal 
"journal" of the Gertruydenberg negotiations, was calculated to convey to 
the reader the compelling sense of intimacy with the motives of those 
in the highest government circles, which was the hallmark of genuine 
secret history. 
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It was certainly true that every sentiment which Hare attributed 
to Marlborough in these passages, fear of the condemnation which would have 
followed his resignation, concern at the press attacks and at the effects 
of his loss of the Queen's favour, and resentment at the attempts to 
undermine his authority in the army, can be paralleled in the Duke's 
private letters and conversation; and like Hare, he anticipated an 
unspectacular campaign and was sure that his enemies would blame him for 
it. 99 Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Hare was writing to 
his patron's instructions on these matters. The genesis of this 
173, 
conclusion to The Management of the War is to be found in a letter 
which Hare wrote to the Duchess of Marlborough in October 1710; 
100 
clearly it represents his own thoughts and observations. In any case, 
however accurate a picture these passages presented of Marlborough's 
private sentiments, it is unlikely that he would have approved of their 
publication in what was virtually a declaration of war against the 
ministers on his behalf. At the time, he was doing his utmost to convince 
St John that his devotion to Tory interests was genuine, 
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and he would 
scarcely have considered it in his own interests to advertise to the 
world at large at the beginning of the campaign, that his relationship 
with his new colleagues was one of mutual hostility. 
If Hare had had any encouragement to publish these passages, 
it is more likely to have come from the Duchess of Marlborough, to whom 
he had first communicated his thoughts on this subject. She too was 
becoming increasingly concerned at the ministers' attempts to drive a 
wedge between her husband and the Whigs; "I believe what they wish 
most is that hee should act with them till hoe has lost every friend 
hee has, ''.. she had written to Rare. 
102 She would therefore have considered 
a blunt and public declaration of Marlborough's real feelings towards them 
to be in his best interests. Hare must have known this and was probably 
encouraged by it. This conflict of opinion between Marlborough, his 
wife, and his most zealous apologists was to recur several times, with 
important consequences, in the course of the coming campaign. 
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Chapter IV 
"THINGS AIRE NOT THE SAME': THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1711 
In order to demonstrate that Swift was not the reckless and 
indiscriminate libeller he is sometimes represented, his latest biographer 
has asserted that the attacks on Marlborough in the Examiner, while the 
journal was under Swift's editorship, were only three in number, the last 
being the letter to Crassus. Mr. Foot agrees that after this issue, 
"apart from an occasional stab at the Duchess, the paper bad refrained 
from any provocation directed clearly at the Duke. "1 It will be seen 
that Marlborough and his supporters disagreed with these conclusions, and 
not without cause. Certainly it is not true to say that the letter to 
Crassus was the last manifestation of Swift's hostility to the Duke in 
the Examiner. The issue of 22 February, for example, bad contained 
the condemnation of Marlborough and his family as corrupt royal favourites 
which has already been noticed. 
2 A few days after this, however, St John 
received the Duke's ccmplaint of the earlier number and passed "the proper 
hint" on to Swift. For several weeks it had the desired effect. He was 
in any case amply supplied with subjects of more immediate interest, among 
them the assassination attempt against Harley, and William Benson's 
influential letter to Sir J('acobl Branks7, which seems to have marked 
a revival of interest in Whig propaganda. 
3 For some time after his 
departure for The Hague at the end of February, Marlborough was out of 
the public eye. The question of most immediate importance, his continued 
command of the army, had been settled; the campaign did not promise to be 
a spectacular one, and his premature desertion of the London political 
arena was taken as a gesture of conciliation, amounting to weakness, by 
both friends and enemies. 
k 
When Marlborough's name did begin to reappear in the party 
press, it was not always in a context to which he himself could have taken 
exception. Despite Tory enthusiasm for carrying on the war in Spain at 
the expense of that in Flanders, the ministry was careful not to neglect 
Marlborough's theatre of operations. He was given adequate financial 
backing, which he in turn gratefully acknowledged. All Hare's complaints 
of lack of moral support could not therefore prevent the Harleyite 
pamphleteers from making a merit of this preferential treatment, and 
offering it as proof that the ministry had made no irresponsible surrender 
to Tory prejudice, nor allowed the war effort to suffer for the sake of 
victimizing Marlborough. 5 
It was not long, however, before the Examiner 
'began 
to renew 
hostilities. As pamphlets of the previous year had demonstrated, the 
absence of any direct allusion to Marlborough by name was no proof of a 
genuine desire to spare his reputation. Reference to policies and events 
in which he had been involved, or to qualities which had repeatedly been 
the subject of more outspoken satire, were by this time more than sufficient 
guides to the identity of the victim. Swift himself admitted that 
"Reflections upon any particular Person" were seldom necessary: 
If I display the Effects of Avarice and Ambition, of Bribery and 
Corruption, of gross ? morality and Irreligion; those who are 
the least conversant in Things, will easily know where to apply 
them. 6 
This device of indirect reference now became a favourite method of 
stabbing at Marlborough. 
At the end of March, Swift made the passing remark that the 
verbal tribute paid to Harley by the Queen and Parliament after the 
attempt on his life was 
more acceptable to a Person of Mr. Ha_ ftUs generous Nature, than 
the most bountiful Grant that was ever yet made to a Subject ... 
although neither Avarice nor Ambition would be able to comprehend 
its Worth. 7 
The stressed phrases made the jibe at Marlborough's more substantial rewards 
almost audible. Three weeks later, Swift returned to the subject of the 
ministerial revolution, to display once more the necessity of the Queen's 
ridding herself of her arrogant favourites, or "'Ephori 11 the latter one of 
Harley's favourite terms for the ministry of Marlborough and Godolphin; 
8 
it is worth remembering that all Swift's criticisms of the previous "corrupt 
Administration" were reflections on Marlborough, since he and Godolphin 
had been the Queen's political managers for eight years past. The same 
issue contained an insulting reference to the Duchess of Marlborough, and 
this was closely followed by a discourse on that 'most useful Science" of 
"defrauding the Publick, " in which both the Duke and Duchess were included 
by indirect allusion. 
9 -A little later came a pointed reference to 
"insatiable Avarice" as one of the characteristic "sordid Vices" of those, 
'who by the Appearance of Merit, or Favour of Fortune, have risen to 
great Stations, fron an obscure Birth-. 1110 The mention of low birth, 
avarice, and the favour of fortune made the application to Marlborough 
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(Fortunatus) unmistakable. Mrs-Manley had described his rise to power 
in precisely these terms. 
Admittedly these were pinpricks compared with what was past and what 
was to come, but they were nevertheless a constant reminder of the latent 
antagonism between Marlborough and the Examiner's patrons, which at any 
time might flare up into something worse. In the last week in April 
and after, this is what happened. Swift's first step was to condemn the 
parliamentary authority which had been bestowed upon the principle of "no 
peace without Spain; ias a device to preserve the old ministry in power, 
and "to gratify the unmeasurable Appetities of a few Leers, Civil and 
Military, " by the indefinite prolongation of the war. Any reader would 
realize that Marlborough was included in this censure, and the whole 
argument was of far-reaching significance, as a contribution towards the 
wholesale condemnation of the war in The Conduct of the Allies. If it 
were accepted, Hare's defence of Marlborough's conduct as plenipotentiary, 
which had been grounded upon this parliamentary sanction, would have no 
validity. The Whigs, realizing the importance of this form of propaganda, 
were convinced that St Jobn was personally responsible for it. 
11 
Towards the end of May came the most direct attack on Marlborough 
since the letter to Crassus, a discussion of the exorbitant and unjustifiable 
expense of Blenheim -- "a Subject's Palace 11 as Swift meaningfully described 
it - worked with purposeful ingenuity 
into an apparently harmless account 
of the ministry's plans for building new churches. 
12 Even more ominous, 
as a further precursor of The Conduct of the Allies, was a comment in the 
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next issue on the alliance which Marlborough and Godolphin ("certain 
`reat 
Persons, who had been all their Lives in the Altitude of Tor - 
Profession") were compelled to make with the Whigs, because the Tories 
began to be resty, and would not allow Monopolies of Power 
and Favour; nor consent to carry on the War intirely at 
the Expence of this Nation, that they might have Pensions 
from Abroad ... ý., 13 
If the Examiner, was assured of a wide circulation, its connection 
with the ministry meant that its editors had always to observe some 
forbearance towards Marlborough. An anonymous pamphleteer, however, did 
not lie under such restraints, and a popular tract, entitled Oliver's, 
PoockketLLooking-Glass, so libellous that it had to be sold 'tsous le manteau, " 
took full advantage of this fact. The publicity it received in the 
advertising columns of the Examiner and the Post-. Bo not only confirmed 
that these ministerial organs were basically hostile to Marlborough, but 
worked so much in its favour that a fortnight after the first announcement, 
another edition was advertised, "many Thousands of the former Editions 
having been sold in a little time. "14 
This popularity was an ominous indication of the public appetite for 
such material, and may have resulted in part from the author's heavy debt 
to the New Atalantis. Like Mrs. Manley, he dwelt upon Marlborough's rise 
to power from humble origins, the part which his sister, as the Duke of 
York's mistress, had played in his advancement, his affair with the Duchess 
of Cleveland and subsequent ingratitude to her, and his desertion of 
James II at the Revolution. The narrative was undistinguished, largely 
4 
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a vehicle for the wearisomely vituperative commentary on Marlborough's 
"unparalelltd Crimes. " Its most interesting and topical feature was an 
appeal in the last pages to a particular section of the Duke's enemies, his 
professional rivals and malcontent subordinates. 
The pamphleteer had certainly been well primed with the most promising 
topics for this purpose. Marlborough's promotion to high rank of his 
"Irish favourites, t" Cadogan, Meredith, and Maccartney, had been much 
resented by their Tory rivals, one of whom, General Webb, had raised the 
subject in Parliament earlier in the year. 
15 These "Sclavonian" supporters 
of the Duke were accordingly singled out for attack in this pamphlet, on 
the assumption that Marlborough was using them to build up a faction in 
the army, "that the Interest of his Party might not want the Support of a 
Military Assistance upon Occasion" (p. 70). One of his professional critics 
had made this same accusation in a private letter to Barley the year before. 
16 
It may not be coincidence that General Webb's personal grievance against 
Marlborough, dating from the battle of Wynendael in 1708, was also aired 
at some length by this pamphleteer, together with detailed criticise, on 
tactical grounds, of other controversial actions during the campaigns of 
1705 and 1709. On these occasions, it was argued, Marlborough had shown 
himself incompetent in generalship, insufficiently concerned for the lives 
of his men, and unjust to subordinates, in denying them their rightful 
share of credit for victory, (pp, 51-61). Such propaganda was certainly 
indicative of the Tory disposition to foster faction and indiscipline in 
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the army, of which Marlborough and his supporters had complained, and it 
may be that the pamphlet was intended, among other things, for circulation 
within the army itself, to undermine confidence in the Duke's leadership. 
As soon as its popularity became apparent, the inevitable "answer" 
was published. Its paragraph-by-paragraph dissection of the Tory 
pamphleteer's errors and prejudices was intelligent and conscientious, far 
more so. ýin fact, than his "incoherent Rhapsody of Scandal and Detraction" 
deserved.? Yet one is struck by the futility of the task. An answer 
depending so closely upon an opponent's text could only have been meaningful 
to those who had been sufficiently attracted by the original to read it 
with attention, and they would have been the least likely to trouble them- 
selves with criticisms which destroyed the basis of their enjoyment. In 
this respect, the two tracts were a classic illustration of Hare's maxim 
that "answers to Libells are seldom libells enough themselves, to give the 
readers much pleasure"; and while the journals of the following year 
contained advertisements for yet further editions of the first pamphlet, 
nothing more was heard of the answer. 
18 
In the second week of June, Swift surrendered the Examiner to 
Mrs. Manley, a change which did not in itself bode well for Marlborough. 
Under her editorship, the columns of the journal were liberally sprinkled 
with references to the "lawless Junto" and their "Arbitrary Cap[taijn Genj'erah'; 
to "insignificant Pages ... hoisted above the Knowledge of themselves, " who 
embezzled the public money and presumed "to give Laws even to their 
Sovereign"; and to "the Commanding ashy and Cof feree" whose overbearing. 
Igo 
behaviour had once deprived the Queen of her most faithful servant. 
19 
It is not surprising, therefore, that by mid-year Marlborough's supporters 
were anxiously watching for some sign of the early demise of the journal, 
writing to inform him that envy was "putting all her engines in motion" 
against him once more, and complaining to the ministers on his behalf of 
"the'Examiner's' severity on the Duke. " 
20 
The ministers, however, bad reasons enough for not having consistently 
enforced the policy of forbearance which had followed Marlborough's initial 
complaint. St John's suspicions about the sincerity . of 
his professions of 
goodwill to the ministry may well have been confirmed by the closing passages 
of ageme_tof the War, and there were also disquieting reports that 
Marlborough was reconsolidating his power abroad. 
21 But the most immediate 
and obvious excuse for the persistent hostility of the Examiner was the 
equally persistent provocation from the Whig press; and on this issue 
centred the differences of opinion between Marlborough and his wife which 
were to be a determining factor in his relations with the ministry for the 
rest of the campaign. 
Left to himself, and in spite of the private resentments so 
graphically described by Hare, Marlborough would have maintained outwardly 
cordial and conciliatory relations with the ministers, at least for the 
duration of the campaign. A major practical reason for this was the 
obvious fact that he could not hope to do justice to the responsibilities 
of his command without an adequate working relationship with his colleagues; 
(9171 
and on the success of the campaign depended not only his reputation, 
but his ability to contribute to a good peace or to oppose a bad one. 
An even more powerful motive was fear of the weapons they could 
use against him if he should show any signs of open opposition. The 
most immediately threatening of these was the press; "whilst I am in ,, 
the service I am in their power, especially by the vil]. anous way of 
printing, which stabs me to the heart, "' he wrote to Sarah, and therefore, 
"whilst I serve I must endeavour not to displease. "22 Marlborough's 
sensitivity to press attack, more acute during this last year of his 
command than ever before, has generally been condemned by historians. 
At best, it is represented as a regrettable infirmity of mind; at worst, 
as an arrogant incapacity to brook a word of criticism; and at all times 
, as a major handicap in the political 
battles in which he was involved. 
His attitude is sometimes unfavourably compared with that of Harley, who 
read libels against himself "by way of Amusement with a most unaffected 
Indifference. " 23 
If, as the Exminer once remarked, the ability to remain calm and 
unintimidated under a sustained and undeserved campaign of detraction 
from the prass was "the Perfection of Heroick Vertue" in a state®an, 
24 
Marlborough must be acknowledged to have fallen far short of this ideal. 
He himself envied Godolphin's "good temper and Judiment" in despising 
the attacks of the ministerial' propagandists; yet, as Haynwaring 
pointed out, Godolphin lived to regret this attitude, 
25 
and Marlborough's 
contrary reaction was not an unrealistic response to the situation in 
192. 
which he found himself in 1711. 
In the first place, one must remember the pressures to which he 
had been systematically subjected by means of printed propaganda during 
the previous winter, in particular, the attempts to discredit him 
whether he decided to resign or to remain in office, and the curtailments 
of his power and prestige to which he had been obliged to submit as a 
result. By these means, far in excess of the kind of incidental detraction 
which any public figure might expect, he had been made to feel something 
of the power of the press as a weapon skilfully wielded by political 
opponents, and it is mall wonder that he had come to fear and detest it 
as never before; and for the future he might well be concerned at the 
influence which a journalist of Swift's calibre could exercise over public 
opinion in general, and over the Tory majority in the Commons in particular. 
it should also be acknowledged that the ostentatious indifference to 
printed criticism for which Harley has been admired was more appropriate to 
his circumstances than to Marlborough's ., - In 1711, the former was in 
full power and royal favour, with all the means of controlling the output 
of the party presses which this position gave him at his command. 
Marlborough's situation was correspondingly vulnerable. His prestige had 
already suffered from his loss of the Queen's favour and from the propaganda 
accompanying the ministerial changes, and any future opposition would make 
him liable to further press attack at the instigation of his own Cabinet 
colleagues, against whom few of the usual means of protection and 
retaliation could be used with safety or effect. Moreover, Harley was 
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not called upon to command an army, while a ministerial journal 
advertised to friends and enemies, and to his own subordinates, that he 
did not have the confidence of his emm government. As Swift's attacks 
multiplied, the Observator commented on the damage they could do to 
Marlborough's authority in the army and the corresponding boost this would 
give to French morale; for "they can't take it for an Argument that 
those People wish our General to be duly supported or successful abroad, 
when they. libel him so boldly at home. "26 
Finally, it may be noted that Marlborough's sensitivity to officially 
inspired detraction was not a purely personal matter. He had always 
believed that his own standing and reputation could not be damaged without 
hazarding the success of the European cause which he led, and he was now 
more than ever conscious that, in undermining his position by means of the 
press, the ministers would not simply be carrying on a personal vendetta, 
but laying the way open for an insecure peace. "'Tin not therefore the 
Person of the Duke of I am concern'd for, " Hare had written on 
this subject, 
but for the Connexion which the Fate for this poor Nation, of 
our Allies, of all Europe 
so 
has with his. 'Tie the Prospect of 
an ill Peace after glorious and successful a War, and the 
diema]. Train of Consequences which such a Peace will bring with 
it: 'tie this disturbs me; and Otis indeed this, and only 
this, disturbs him ... 27 
With such issues at stake, Marlborough had been anxious that his 
wife should not jeopardize his relations with the ministers, or provoke the 
Examiner out of the silence which had followed his first complaint to 
St John, even by hostile references to them in private letters which were 
i 
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subject to their inspection. 28 It soon became clear that this 
prohibition was even more applicable to the public hostility of the 
Whig press. As Hare had already pointed out, when Sarah complained of 
Swift's attacks on the Duke during the winter, "they, who suffer the 
Medley, may well enough pretend, they cant hinder the Examiner. 1129 He 
was no doubt referring to the fact that the Whig journal bad been started 
under her auspices, with her chief political confidant as one of its 
editors. Although its avowed purpose was to combat the r, it 
was far from being a consistently defensive publication. Maynwaring's 
ridicule and criticism of Harley in particular, enraged Swift as much 
as it delighted Sarah, and the minister himself was said to have been 
sufficiently aroused from his habitual indifference to such matters to 
contemplate taking official action against the journal. Mrs. Manley also 
claimed that "the Heads of the late Faction, " two of whom were related 
to Marlborough by marriage, circulated large numbers of the Medley and 
the Observator free, "to corrupt the Hinds of weak People , who are at 
distance from the Metropolis. "30 
Therefore, when Craggs protested early in July of "the libels 
that came out, " Harley could quite reasonably reply that Marlborough 
"must not mind them, that he himself was called rogue every day in print, 
and knew the man that did it [a reference t6 Maynwaring] ... yet he should 
live fairly with him. " Watkins, making the same complaint, was more 
bluntly reminded that "the 'Medley' and 'Observator' were patronized and 
promoted by the Duke's nearest relations, " with the implication that 
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Marlborough could expect no better treatment from the miner while 
this state of affairs continued. 
31 It is possible that Hareýas well 
as Maynwaring, was suspected to contributing to the Medl y. Although 
the suspicion was unfounded (Hare is not mentioned in Oldmixon's detailed 
account of the journal's composition), 
32 it, was not an unnatural deduction 
from the approving references each made publicly to the work of the other; 
and since Hare's connection with Marlborough was even closer than 
Maynwaring's, this would have hardened the ministers' hearts even more 
against the Duke. 
It is clear that Marlborough disapproved of the anti-ministerial 
activities of the Medley as much as he disapproved of the invective in 
his wife's letters, and for the same reasons. When he was told of the 
unsympathetic response to his complaints of the ministerial press, Watkins 
reported, 
he utterly denies his giving any manner of encouragement to 
the "Medley, " and when I spoke last to him on that subject I 
almost put him into a passion, and he concluded my argument with 
V saying: "I wish the devil had the 'Medley' and the 'Examiner' 
together. " 33 
Sarah's attitude, however, was diametrically opposed to her 
husband's on all these points. . lware that his commitment to Whiggism 
had never been strong, and yet that his support would be necessary for 
the success of any Whig scheme to topple the new administration, and 
suspecting at the same time that Harley hoped to persuade Marlborough 
WAY 
not to "Joyn against him in any difficultys that(happyly arise in the 
winter, " she took the most suspicious view of the Duke's readiness to 
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conciliate the ministers: 
I hope in god my lord Marlborough will leave a better charecter 
then to help support such villians for a little mony which hee 
does not want, & which would stain all the glory hee has seemd 
to bee very fond of ... 
Her prayer was that he would not "bee used by them, but Waite for the 
first opertunity to joyn with those that will bring these wreatchs to 
Justice. " Nor did she consider the threat of the ministerial press 
reason enough to truckle to its patrons. Two years later, when the 
Examiner had done its worst, her defiance was still unquenchable: 
I had rather they should write so as long as the world endures, 
then only to say that common thing my self that I am an humble 
servant to any of these ministers who deserve to bee hang'd ... 34 
It was characteristic that her only response to Marlborough's plea to 
moderate the tone of her letters should have been to redouble her abuse 
of Harley, in the hope that the correspondence would be brought to his- 
attention. 
35 Still less would she have been prepared to curb Maynwaring's 
activities, and the Medley's editors, whose task was to keep up Whig 
morale, had already made it clear that the Examiner and his patrons could 
expect no deference from them while the Tory journal continued. 
36 
Nor was the Medley the only publication of these months to 
exacerbate Marlborough's relations with-the ministers, -and'reflect Sarah's 
hope that he would join in Whig schemes, to bring them "to Justice. " 
When the preamble to the patent for Harley's Earldom of Oxford and Mortimer 
was published at the end of May, it was found to give as one reason 
for, the promotion,. his efforts to prevent "the further Plundering the 
Nation, " a clear reference to the alleged peculations of the old 
ministers. 37 Yet the zeal of the Tory Commons to bring them 
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to justice for this "Plundering" had proceeded no further than the 
passing of votes and the publication of a Representation, claiming, amongst 
other things, that delays in passing accounts for thirty-five millions of 
the public money had been a device for concealing the massive embezzlements 
of the Godolphin administration. The Whig pamphleteers therefore used 
these documents to discredit both Harley and his Tory backbenchers, and to 
set them at loggerheads with each other; for the latter, banded together 
as the October Club, were already resentful of the ministers' failure to 
impeach their predecessors for the corruptions of which Tory Election 
propaganda had held them guilty. 
38 
A small pamphlet, entitled A Roman Story, 
39 
recalled the fate 
of "Manlius" (Oxford), who had brought about a ministerial revolution by 
accusing the previous office-holders of corruption, and had then alienated 
his own supporters by his inability to substantiate the accusations. 
Meanwhile, 
the Senators, who were thus innocently slander'd, took the 
Matter very heinously, and met frequently together, to think 
of Methods to chastise the Author of these Slanders, and to 
clear up their Innocence to the People. Howbeit, they thought 
it not pro er to stir in the Matter till the return of the 
Dictator 
rMarlborough] 
from the War ... 
They therefore instructed their "Officers" (the party pamphleteers) to 
make continual demands for official proof of their crimes, in order to 
convince the people of their own innocence and of the injustice of their 
accusers (p. 9). Finally, the Dictator, having returned from his campaign, 
brought Manlius to trial and eventually to execution, for falsely accusing 
his opponents of "plundering" their country. 
ý9ý 
Maynwaring was very much in favour of this form of propaganda. 
The new ministers, he wrote to Sarah, 
did not want to be put in mind to punish the late ministers if 
they coud: But since there is nothing against them & it is 
impossible to punish them, as it certainly is, I think it very 
right that the Publick should know all this, & how shamefully 
they have been abus'd: And this must certainly hurt the new Ministers as well as do the old ones Justice. 40 
It is possible that he was the author of the Roman Storv. In reply to a 
friend's enquiries about his journalistic "performances, " Maynwaring 
admitted, "Something of that Kind there has been often, & in several Shapes, " 
implying that his activities were not confined solely to the Medle-v; and 
he added, with a glance at the patronage suspected by the ministers, ººI 
think A11 Men shoud do what they can; & those that are'oblig'd, return it 
in such manner as they are capable. º''1 Certainly Sarah was not the only 
member of Marlborough's family to appreciate and encourage Maynwaring's 
efforts to defend the old ministers and discredit the new. In a letter 
written while both were Sarah's guests at St. Albans., Godolphin referred 
approvingly to "some collections" Maynwaring had prepared for the press 
"in order to sett the late representation of the H: of C: in a truer light, " 
and undertook to supply him with the necessary documents to continue the 
work. 
42 The "collections" involving detailed statistical evidence can now 
be assigned to Maynwaring with certainty, 
43 
and he may well have added the 
historical allegory to his other publications in this cause. 
A little later, there appeared a classic example of the "Officers", 
propaganda referred to in this pamphlet, a 
longer tract mockingly entitled 
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The Re-representation or a Modest Search after the Great Plunderers of 
the Nation. 
44 
It criticized both the patent and the Representation at 
length, and claimed that those who published such accusations when they 
were unable to prove them officially deserved severe punishment themselves. 
It drew attention to similar threats and allegations of the previous year 
against Marlborough and Godolphin, suggesting that their escape where 
there had been so much will to punish was proof of their innocence (pp. 67- 
70). The promise of impeachment, it argued, had been a ministerial device 
to hoodwink the Tories, and it was finally predicted that these false 
accusations would prove the means of restoring the old ministry to the 
Queen's favour (pp. 86-88). 
The authorities could not overlook such blatant criticisms of 
parliamentary proceedings, presented without even the nominal protection 
of historical allegory; and since the most provocative passages of the 
pamphlet had been reprinted in the forty-first Medley, the Whig journal 
was also involved in the censure. 
45 
This in itself would have given the 
ministers sufficient cause to suspect that such propaganda was being 
produced at the instigation, or at least with the full approval, of 
Marlborough's family. 
That they did so, and believed Sarah in particular to be the 
directress of all propagandist schemes for bringing down the ministry, is 
strongly suggested by Mrs. Manley'a allegory in the fifty-first Examiner. 
It described the visit of "Fulvia'" to "the House of Pride" (Blenheim), 
where the goddess instructs her and her associates in the best means to 
-- --_ __- 
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turned against him (as pamphlets such as the Re-representation aimed to do), 
and all his policies for the public good misrepresented to the people: 
Neither new Seas explor'd, nor Countries discovered and subdued; 
the heavy Debts of the Empire discharged, Credit restored, Peace 
brought home to their Dwelling, Trade secure and flourishing, 
shall overcome those Suspicions and bad Impressions we will make 
upon the People. 46 
14rs. Manley evidently had reliable resources of information about the 
activities of the Duchess's circle. Within a few weeks, Maynwaring was to 
publish his popular balla. a,. An Excellent New Song, Called Credit Restored, 
satirizing Oxford's South Sea scheme and other efforts to bolster the public 
credit. This, Sarah recalled, had been a great favourite with the Whig 
conclaves at St. Albans,. where it must have been composed, and it was later 
to be suppressed officially. 
k7 
Maynwaring was also soon to be deeply 
involved in the production of propaganda to discredit the ministry's peace 
policies. 
Since Oxford was among the many who credited the popular myth 
the that Sarah could "turne and govern her Husband as she pleased, " 
48 
knowledge that she was bent upon ousting the new ministers, together with 
the hint that Marlborough was expected to join with the Whigs on his return 
for the same purpose, provided reason enough to treat him as a political 
enemy, despite his earlier professions of co-operation. In fact, given 
Sarah's very decided views on this subject, it is possible that such a 
rupture of the Duke's apparently cordial relations with his new colleagues 
was one of the aims of this Whig propaganda. The suspicion and antagonism 
it fostered were calculated to destroy any confidence there might be between 
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them and so leave Marlborough no alternative but to join with the Whigs. 
Watkins, who believed that the Duke's salvation lay in resisting such 
pressures, commented, 
as for "Medleys, Observators, " etc., what corner soever they 
come from, 'tis certain my Lord Duke has some near relations 
who are far from being his friends, and ... they have their 
ends if they can keep him from joining heartily with the present 
Ministry ..., 19 
Yet this procedure had its dangers. One result was the revival 
of a form of pressure from the ministry which Marlborough particularly 
dreaded. It has already been noticed that both he and Hare feared attempts 
to blame him for an inactive campaign, and in April St John had answered 
Marlborough's initial professions of goodwill with the assurance that he 
would not be held responsible for any lack of success; 
50 but the Duke's 
worst fears were realized after a meeting between Craggs and Oxford early 
in July. The Treasurer, though professing his readiness to co-operate 
with Marlborough, had refused to curb the hostility of the ministerial 
press while the provocations of the Whig journalists continued, and 
despite Craggs' reminders of the general's want of credit with the 
army and other disadvantages, he also made it clear that some action 
was expected in the field; "there must be either Success or Blame, " 
Maynwaring now realized. 
51 
The point was then made publicly in Mrs. Manley's allegorical 
attack on the Duchess of Marlborough in the Examiner; for at the 
House of Pride, Fulvia is advised that for the success of her intrigues 
against Agrippa, "Antony's Zeal must languish, " so that want of the 
usual success in the field will add to the embarrassments of the new 
Zog. 
administration. It was a renewed warning that the ministers' indulgence 
to Marlborough was conditional on his good behaviour, and that if he 
should join in Whig schemes of opposition, their propagandists could 
take advantage of the apparently insuperable difficulties in the field 
, 
to spread the notion that he had deliberately put the interests of his 
wife's faction before his country's good. 
There was one other weapon in the ministry's hands, more 
dangerous than any form of printed propaganda. Sarah shared the view 
of Maynwaring and other Whig journalists, that Marlborough and his former 
Whig colleagues could never be convicted officially of the financial 
malpractice they had been charged with in the press; she would therefore 
see no danger in mocking this propaganda and proclaiming her husband's 
future opposition to the ministers publicly. "As to what you have hinted 
some times of Ld. Marl: 8 being in their power, " she wrote to Craggs, 
I hope there is no ground for that apprehention, first because I 
think hee talkd as if hee had beenvery carefull to manage the 
Publick mony, & cautious not to sign any thing that might hurt him 
self, & next because I think if these wicked infamous sett of men 
could have ruind my lord Marlborough they would have don it long 
agoe, not only to have Justifyd them selves to the, world, but to 
put it out of his power for ever to revenge the wounds they have 
given him, which I hope hee will never forget ... 52 
But this was a serious error of over-confidence. The failure to 
call Marlborough to account officially after the accusations of the 
previous year was not, as Sarah and her circle assumed, evidence that the 
new ministers realized the emptiness of their threats, but simply that 
such action had been deferred, should it prove necessary at all, until 
his military services were no longer indispensible. In January, St John 
had threatened enquiries into financial irregularities if at any time 
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he should refuse to co-operate with them, and Defoe's mocking comment 
that the October Club's clamours for the impeachment of Marlborough and 
Godolphin had been "put off with a Commission to State and Take the 
Publick Accounts" was particularly premature; 
53 it was this body which 
came forward a few months later with the evidence that provided the 
immediate excuse for Marlborough's dismissal. 
Since 1708, at least, Harley had had in mind a deduction from 
the pay of the foreign troops hired by England, as an issue on which 
Marlborough might be called to account by Parliament, 
54 
and this was to 
be one of the principal items of the Commissioners' indictment. 
Marlborough himself had been informed in May that they had begun to 
investigate this matter, and whatever he told Sarah of his caution in 
handling the public money, this-must have contributed to his unwillingness 
to give offence to the ministers. 
55 A Harleyite pamphlet of the previous 
winter, which had glanced at the Duke's alleged appropriation of "the 
sweet Article of Secret Services" provided another ominous clue to 
their intentions; 56 this matter was also to be taken up by the 
Commissioners. The threat of Marlborough's future opposition provided 
good reason to hasten and encourage these proceedings. 
Meanwhile, Whig attempts to discredit them served as a further 
excuse to keep up the Examiner's hostility. Swift soothed the goaded 
and frustrated Tory backbenchers with the reminder that satire had 
traditionally been a means of punishing those whom the law could not 
touch 57 Defoe, however, stripped this pose of some of its dignity 
20ý 
by describing a meeting of. the October Club, at which "a wiser Member .. 0 
than the rest, " accepting the need to defer the impeachments of Marlborough 
and Godolphin, proposed that the Exams miner and his colleagues "should be 
employ'd to open upon them, and to rail and throw Dirt at them, that the 
hatred of the People. might not cool and abate. " 
58 
The Examiner was finally suspended on 26 July, and because of 
the frequent complaints'about it on Marlborough's behalf, it has been 
assumed that the action was taken in recognition of his sensitivity to its 
criticism. 
59 
It is virtually certain, however, that even without these 
pressures, the journal would have ceased production at about this time. 
In fact, Mrs. Manley proclaimed publicly that she had intended to take her 
farewell a little earlier, but had delayed in order to include the 
allegorical attack on the Duke and Duchess in the penultimate issue. This 
was scarcely indicative of an overriding deference to Marlborough. She 
also made it clear that the suspension was only temporary, "till the Meeting 
of the Parliament. 1160 Evidently one motive was the close of the current 
session. 
Another may well have been a decline in the journal's sales 
and reputation. Swift later revealed that he had hoped to put the ma%'j 
enemies it had. 3ade him off the scent by the change of editorship, 
61 
and 
it is at this point, perhaps, that the influence of Marlborough's 
disapproval may be discerned; for the Examiner's _'s attacks on him had 
205' 
drawn threats of legal action from the Observator, which was believed 
to be sponsored by the general's family and might be supposed to reflect 
his intentions. 
62 
The change of style was as obvious to the journal's 
readers as Swift had intended it should be, and though Mrs. Manley's 
contributions were not as utterly contemptible as they have been 
represented, 
63 
they certainly suffered by comparison with Swift's. The 
Medle taunted its rival with diminishing prestige, and one of Maynwaring's 
acquaintances told him, 
he had seen Dr Atterbury lately, who own'd that the Advertisement 
in the Medley about the Act of Indemnity, had quite sunk the 
Examiner, & that he never could recover it. 
Atterbury was of course not the editor, as Maynwaring seems to have 
assumed, but he had probably retained an interest in the fortunes of the 
journal to which he had once contributed, 
64 
and the comment may well 
represent the truth. 
But though there were reasons enough, apart from Marlborough's 
complaints, for the suspension of the Examiner, it had become convenient, ............ 
and even necessary, for Oxford and St John to persuade him privately that 
the action had been taken at his instigation. Their attempts to keep a 
check on his authority and prestige and to intimidate him into submission 
by means of the press, appeared, if anything, to have been rather too 
successful. Towards the end of May, Lord Raby was prevailed upon by 
the Allied leaders to plead that "it would not be amiss whilst he was 
at the head of the Army he should be a little incourag'd, for his dejection 
was such, it had an effect on the whole army"; and Raby added his own 
-ýý 
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recommendation that the general should not be "too much mortify'd., 
65 
In June, Marlborough began to ado his own weight to Raby's appeal. 
To a colleague who had access to the Queen, he wrote, 
I do meet with so many mortefications, that if my own honour, 
or the Queens Service could permit of it, I would not serve 
any longer ... for if I consider'd only my self, the best thing I could do, should be to retier and be quiet, for I am sensible 
that the dayly Vexations I meet with, dose not only break my 
sperit, but also my Constitution. 66 
By July he was talking more seriously of resignation unless some mitigation 
of these ('Vexations" and some signs of renewed confidence and support were 
forthcoming from the Queen and her ministers. If he were given 
satisfaction on these points, he promised "to live with Lord Oxford, as he 
had done with Lord Godolphin"; if not, he feared the worst consequences 
for the Allied cause under his leadership. 
67 
To add to these considerations 
came a renewed plea from Watkins for the suspension of the Examiner, which 
had now become the Duke's "greatest grievance. " Of the charge of 
encouraging the Whig journalists' hostility to the ministry, Watkins 
reported, "I do very stedfastly believe he himself is innocent, " and 
"'tis not just he should suffer for their faults. 1168 Another supporter 
argued that "he is above being governed by the little piques [which] may 
be in his family, in things which so highly concern the Queen's service 
and the welfare of his country. tt69 
The ministers therefore had much to gain by representing the final 
demise of the already moribund Examiner as an act of compliance to 
Marlborough. While their secret peace negotiations matured, they could 
: LO7 
not afford to make his continued command of the army as impracticable 
as he claimed it had become, and since the hostility of the journal had 
advertised the lack of governmental support of which he complained, its 
suspension could be regarded as visible evidence of their improved 
relations. The fact that he had been taught its measure as a means of 
dealing with any future opposition from him or his supporters meant that 
its silence would also be understood as a guarantee of his , rood 
behaviour. 
In fact, now that Marlborough himself seemed ready to disclaim sympathy 
with Whig schemes of revenge, the ministers might well feel it imprudent 
to drive him unnecessarily into opposition by keeping; up a source of 
dissension which the Whigs themselves were anxious to foster. 
Brigadier Richard Sutton, like Watkins, genuinely, believed that a 
truce between the Medley and the Examiner would free both sides from 
the mischief-making of their propagandists and allow them the chance of 
a mutually profitable working relationship. The ministers certainly 
encouraged this opinion. Having been sent to London with news of the 
first success of the campaign, Sutton wrote back to Marlborough's head- 
quarters, after a brief interview with St John, "I think I may assure 
you of hearing of no more Examiners, by which I hope the Medley will cease, 
and I pray (as well as I can) [that may heals all differences. " A few 
weeks later, Oxford repeated to Craggs, who duly informed Marlborough, 
"that 55 [St John? ] had made the examiner quit his Scribling because 
he understood it was disagreeable to 78 [Marlborough] . "? 
) 
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The first successful operation of the campaign, the passing of the 
supposedly impassable French lines, was apparently one with which the most 
hostile critic could find no fault. It was brilliantly executed, 
bloodless, the result of much careful planning on Marlborough's part, in 
which few others could claim any share, and it opened the way for decisive 
action which had before seemed impossible. It also appeared to dispose 
once and for all of Mrs. Manley's recent insinuations, proving "very 
seasonable to raise the spirits of those, who his Graces Enimys had 
raised great aprehensions in, of seeing nothing done this year. "71 Yet 
within a few days it had become one of the most controversial actions 
of his career. 
In the first place, the initial London rumours of action in Flanders 
reported, not the bloodless crossing of the lines, but a complete victory 
on the scale of Blenheim, with the capture of innumerable trophies and 
prisoners, among the latter the French general, Villars, himself. These 
reports had such currency and occasioned such rejoicing that when the 
first accurate account of the affair was circulated in a soberly worded 
broadside published "by Authority, " it was received with a sense of 
anticlimax and disappointment. 
72 
Wildly inaccurate reporting of military operations was no novelty 
at this period, 
73 but at a time when Marlborough's political opponents 
might be supposed to fear a sudden revival of his prestige, this instance 
appeared suspiciously convenient. The most elaborate version of the 
ao9 
rumour in the London newspapers was that of the British Mercury. In 
the issue of-Z7-30 July, it was reported that Marlborough had sent over 
an account of the victory by Major General Evans, 
who arriv'd here Yesterday with a Letter to the Queen's Majesty, 
in which, as we are very credibly inform'd, his Grace had only 
Time to say, That her a est 's Arnr hadMin'd a complete Victory; 
and that Marshal Villars was THEN WITH HIS GRACE; referring for 
the Particulars to the Major General aforesaid: Which Particulars 
(according to our best Information) are, That besides Marshal Villars, 
his Grace has taken 16000 Prisoners, and aaongst them 22 Battalions 
entire: That the Enemy's Left Wing, and all their Horse, are 
entirely ruin'd, 160 Cannon, 120 Colours, 58 Standards, and all their 
Baggage taken, and the Army in Pursuit of the rest. 7I4 
This bears all the signs of a malicious invention, designed to spread the 
temporary notion that a second Blenheim had been won. The plethora of 
exact detail, and in particular, the similarity of the paraphrased dispatch 
to the famous pencilled note which had brought the first news of the earlier 
victory, are highly suspicious. 
75 It is unlikely, however, that the 
editor of the British Mercury, at this time a Huguenot journalist named 
Alexander Justice, would have been knowingly a party to a hoax of this 
kind. The paper was intended only for private circulation, and the 
proprietors forbad successive editors to engage in any political controversy, 
on pain of instant dismissal.? 
6 
Moreover, the next issue contained what appears to be a genuinely 
discomfited apology for the blunder, giving the wide currency of the 
rumours as an excuse. Though a perfectly innocent, but rather unconvincing 
explanation was offered for their existence, there was a passing reference 
to the theory that they had been spread by "some Persons in View of a 
particular Interest. " Boyer was more specific in his accusations. He. 
aio 
claimed that the Tory propagandists, having been disappointed in their 
insinuations that the whole campaign would be spent in inaction, had 
devised the "Strategen" of the phantom battle "to pall the Publick Joy, 
and depress his Grace's spreading Reputation. "77 This does seem to be 
the most likely explanation of the phenomenon. 
What made this "Stratagem'' particularly damaging to Marlborough was 
the fact that he had actually passed up an opportunity for battle after 
passing the lines, which even the proverbially cautious Dutch Deputies 
had considered favourable. Though he offered sound strategic reasons 
for his decision, it is now generally agreed that he was also influenced 
by fear of the capital which his political enemies would make of a defeat, 
or even of an indecisive victory. 
78 Craggs' hint to Oxford a few weeks 
before, that Marlborough was reluctant to undertake any risky operation 
because of the fault that had been found with the battle of Malplaquet, 
suggests that this may well have been the case. 
79 The general's position 
was singularly difficult. It had been made clear that he could expect 
to be blamed if the army remained completely inactive; yet any action 
short of an almost bloodless victory would have made him liable to even 
more serious criticism; and having avoided the greater risk by deciding 
upon the siege of Bouchain, he now faced the charge of frittering away 
the campaign in indecisive action. The fact that his dispute with the 
Dutch Deputies had become public knowledge in every European capital 
increased this danger. Remonstrating privately with the Deputy Goslinga, 
who had been loudest in his criticism, Marlborough explained that, 
iii 
dans les conjonctures delicates, ou il se trouvoit par 
rapport au nouveau Ministere, qui ne cherchoit que les 
occasions pour le ruiner, ii etoit a craindre, que cette 
mesintelligence ne lui fit du tort ... 80 
The confidential remark throws a good deal of light on Marlborough's 
relations with the ministers at this time. For all their readiness 
io comply with his demands, and for all his own eagerness to "preserve 
and improve" their confidence, 
81 
he remained convinced that if they 
were given the slightest advantage over him, they would use it to destroy 
him. He advised another foreign colleague that since the ministers were 
in full power, it would be wise to maintain good relations with them, 
82 
and he evidently believed that this conciliatory attitude, which would 
give them no cause to fear his opposition and no excuse to employ their 
destructive tactics openly, remained the best means of safeguarding 
himself. 
Since Marlborough had so little confidence in the genuine goodwill 
of his colleagues, it must have been in a mood of challenge that he wrote 
to St John, requesting that a statement of his reasons for not giving 
battle after passing the lines be published in the London Gazette, so that 
criticism of the decision "might not make any false impression on 
people's minds. , 
83 
The Duke had always attached considerable importance 
to this form of publicity, and while still a member of the ministry, he 
was evidently not prepared to relinquish his right to it without a struggle. 
The maintenance of his reputation among his own countrymen was one of his 
few remaining protections against the hostility of political opponents. 
The ministers, however, maintained the pattern set by the suspension of 
aua 1 
the 
. 
Examiner. Although St John assured the Duke that "no impression 
was received here like what your Grace seems to apprehend, " the vindication 
was at once inserted almost word for word in the Gazette', in an anonymous 
paragraph under the Brussels heading. 
8h 
In the final issue of the Medle , however, written while Maynwaring 
was a guest at St. Albans, the first success of the campaign was used to 
revive the Whig war-cry of "no peace without Spain, 1185 and it may have 
been this which prompted a'paragraph in the Post-Boy, ostensibly from The 
Hague and taking notice of the fact that Marlborough had been forced to 
justify his conduct after the passing of the lines, 
because the Publick, who sometimes pretend to judge of Things 
they do not understand, call'd the Passing of the Scheld before 
Bouchain was invested, a manifest Blunder. 86 
In spite of the carefully oblique framing of this criticism, the Obserrator 
was at once up in arms, proclaiming almost triumphantly that the Post Boy 
"$7 had "taken up the Examiner's Province ... to revile the Duke of Mar___ýlborýow. 
Maynwaring was no doubt expressing the feelings of the general's family 
circle when he called the passage "such a Reflection upon his Conduct, as 
I think the rogue that writes it shoud be hang'd for. "ý Yet the ministers 
were prepared to palliate this offence also. When Craggs complained to 
Oxford in person of the "Impudent paragraph, " the Treasurer professed 
that "he had not so much as heard of [it], but would enquire into it. 1189 
Meanwhile, Marlborough was doing what he could to keep his own 
supporters from breaking this uneasy truce. In one of the Spe,, ct.,, ator's rare 
incursions on to controversial ground, Steele had made the passing of 
___. __ýý____ -- aý 3. 
the lines the occasion for a graceful, but rather cryptic tribute to 
Marlborough, which included the comment that his riches and power had 
no value for him "but as accompanied with the Affection-of his Prince, " 
and that such a man would be "Glorious without Possibility of receiving 
Disgrace. " It was at this time also that Craggs applied to Sarah 
on Steele's behalf for the post of Marlborough's salaried apologist. 
The Spectator's eulogy was perhaps an earnest of future services. 
Marlborough's enthusiasm for the offer was qualified. "I find, " 
Sarah told Craggs, 
bee is willing to give him any thing that I shall desire when 
bee comes over, but bee says bee would not doe it now, nor bee 
named, & if I ghesse right at his meaning I-believe it is better 
bee should not, because what ever Mr Stele writes in. doing him 
Justice it will not have so good an air if tis thought that bee 
is paid for it ... 91 
Marlborough's distaste for mercenary apologetics was probably real enough, 
but it is likely that his stipulation was chiefly designed to prevent 
further provocation being given the ministers in print on his behalf, at 
least while the campaign was in progress. 
Craggs had apparently understood his meaning. Much was made 
in the Whig press of the malicious glee with which some Tories received 
pessimistic or critical reports of the siege of Bouchain. Indeed, it 
was said that Marlborough's military advisors had tried to dissuade him 
from an operation which presented so many difficulties, on the grounds 
that failure would give his enemies the chance to destroy his reputation, 
or to revive Mrs, Manley's insinuation that he was determined to create 
problems for the ministry by acting with less than his usual zeal. 
92 
auI1. 
When all obstacles had been overcome, therefore, Craggs received a 
letter from Cadogan, demonstrating that the capture of the town had 
been "attended by all the Circumstances my Lord Dukes Friends could 
wish for his Glory and Reputation. " This was relatively harmless, 
but the letter continued, 
I am sure you are not unacquainted with the difficultys most 
People foresaw in this Eiterprise, and I believe it was 
sufficiently made known in England; by some who intended my 
Lord Duke no service, tho as things have turned their 
representations must add a Lustre to the undertaking ... 93 
The impersonal, tone of the letter suggests that it was written with a 
view to publication, and in that case the underlined passage could have 
been taken as a taunt at the misguided ill will of the ministry and its 
propagandists. It is interesting to note that when Craggs had 
the document printed anonymously in the Daily Courant this allusion 
was omitted. 
94 He must have been aware that Marlborough had no wish 
to be defended in the press in any way that would revive these old 
antagonisms. 
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